793.94/3036: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
841. From Ambassador Dawes. Following is report from Sweetser:
“The Chinese and Japanese replies to the draft Council resolution were received here today. Sze informed Drummond that China would accept the resolution as it stood without amendment provided of course Japan did the same. The Japanese delegation asked that Ito might appear before the Drafting Committee tomorrow morning to discuss the Japanese reply rather than that the Council follow the procedure originally arranged of having Yoshizawa meet with the Twelve at noon.
The twelve members of the Council held their first meeting in the last 2 hours from 6 o’clock to 8 discussing exclusively the Chinchow situation. Briand reported that certain soundings with the Chinese as to the Japanese memorandum on that subject showed the greatest misgivings. There had been strong opposition in China to its terms [Page 618] including street manifestations. The Chinese had now presented a counter aide-mémoire giving the text of Koo’s proposals to the three powers, stating that one Government had replied unfavorably and the other two not at all and that therefore no definite proposal had been made, as the three Ministers in question understood. Koo was stated to have informed the Japanese Minister at Nanking yesterday, in reply to his request that Chinese troops be withdrawn to Shanhaikwan in view of the withdrawal of Japanese troops, that China had already accepted the Council’s plan of having neutral observers serve as liaison between the Chinese and Japanese forces and that the matter was now in the hands of those observers. Koo was said to have added that if Japan were really apprehensive of the intentions of the Chinese troops China would give assurance to the Council that her troops at Chinchow would not move forward towards the Japanese and would accept the recommendations of the neutral observers to make this assurance effective. In these circumstances, he had observed, if the Japanese troops do not leave the railway zone again there can be no possibility of a clash.
Briand added that the Chinese seemed to think the situation at Chinchow is now regulated and the proposed action of the Council met. He himself felt that through the presence of the observers a considerable neutral territory had been disengaged where peace and order prevail. The observers he said are active and effective; his last telegram today showed the existence of a real neutral zone. He felt there was no danger at the moment of a grave conflict.
He also reported a conversation this afternoon with Yoshizawa who begged the Council to intervene to urge China to accept direct negotiations and to withdraw to the Great Wall. He replied that it would be a delicate matter for the Council to press the Chinese to evacuate their own territory and pointed out that the danger of a clash no longer existed. He would urge the two parties to let the situation at Chinchow rest and get ahead with the resolution. Yoshizawa however replied that he had no instructions in this connection.
Briand then asked his colleagues which course they wished to follow, to consider Chinchow as settled by the observers and thus get on with the resolution, or to continue with the purpose of further clarifying the Chinchow situation. In other words, should the Council take the position that the neutral zone was satisfactorily settled and that there was no danger of conflict or should it attempt to bring pressure on the Chinese to evacuate entirely? He seemed to incline to the former.
Cecil approached the problem somewhat differently. He had told Matsudaira that there seemed to him two aspects of the question: first, the neutral zone itself, the details of which could be arranged in direct negotiations with the Chinese; and second, the guarantee that Japan would give to the Council as to penetrating that zone. The first point that must be cleared up he thought was the actual demarcation of that zone; the Chinese side was to be the Great Wall but what would the Japanese side be? Obviously to be a real zone there must be a limit somewhere, whether the Liao River or otherwise, beyond which the Japanese would not go. The creation of such a zone would be of the greatest value both to the Chinese and the Council. Without it China would be at the mercy of the Japanese as she had only 17,000 combatant troops around Chinchow who would be quite unable to withstand the [Page 619] Japanese. Any understanding therefore would be to her advantage. The predominating consideration which the Council must have in mind was that the Japanese military were still pressing to march to Chinchow and were being restricted only by the greatest effort. If the Council could get a real guarantee that the Japanese would undertake no further invasion of Chinese territory it would be a real accomplishment. On the other hand, if the Council did not secure this guarantee but passed a general resolution and the Japanese moved forward a few days afterwards the situation would be disastrous.
Fotitch favored considering the neutral zone as in fact established. He thought that if the Council asked new guarantees it would meet the same old difficulties. Also he doubted if the Council should take on itself the delicate task of asking China to evacuate its own territory.
Drummond pointed out that the Japanese aide-mémoire had offered the definite condition that Japan[’s] troops would not go into the neutral zone to do police work but only in case her subjects or troops in North China were endangered. Briand had previously remarked that this condition had greatly disturbed the Chinese; they could not understand what seemed to them a wholly new policy of Japan’s going to the protection of her nationals by a long overland route rather than by the usual way by sea. Drummond also stressed that if the Council did not find a solution for the Chinchow matter the Japanese would certainly march in.
Briand continued to express disquietude regarding the lack of clarity as to Japan’s intention. He had kept trying he said to get some kind of definition from Yoshizawa as to the limits of the zone but had not been able to get any satisfaction. Also he was not quite certain how real a zone the Japanese had in mind to create, for, though they spoke of not entering it except to go to the aid of their nationals in North China, they seemed to have certain reserves. Finally he was disturbed at their reluctance to keep the Council informed in case they should enter into direct negotiations. He thought the Council could not afford to have any possibility of misunderstanding.
Madariaga had Been greatly impressed by Cecil’s argument that a clash now might negative 3 whole weeks of effort. In view of the Japanese memorandum, he thought the Council could recommend direct negotiations to the Chinese provided the essential points were cleared up. He thereupon presented a definite proposal to this effect, which Cecil thought the Japanese might be willing to accept provided it involved a direct agreement with the League and not an agreement with the Chinese under the League, which seemed to be very distasteful to the Japanese.
A discussion then followed on procedure. Cecil urged that the Council must get on with its work, that its members had now been here 3 weeks, and that the time had come to hasten matters somewhat without this endless reference to Tokyo and Nanking. He urged a public meeting very shortly, saying the League had always succeeded where it had used publicity and often failed where it had not. After Briand had pointed out that it would be most unfortunate if, after all this time the Council held a public meeting only to hasten matters, the parties say they had no instructions, the Twelve decided that the best course would be to send an immediate letter to Yoshizawa tonight saying that they would be prepared to comply with the Japanese [Page 620] request that they urge direct negotiations upon China provided they had certain clarifications as to the scope of the negotiations intended.
A communication was accordingly drafted and despatched immediately afterwards. After stating the Council’s willingness to take this action and its understanding that nothing in these negotiations would affect the engagements undertaken in the September 30th resolution, the communication welcomed the proposal in paragraph 6 of the Japanese memorandum that Japan was willing to make a declaration before the Council that in future troops would not enter the neutral zone and requested a more exact definition of the limits of that zone. The Council understood from the memorandum that during these negotiations Japanese troops would not enter the zone except for temporary emergency.”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw
- Telegram in six sections.↩