793.94/3051: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
847. From Ambassador Dawes. Following is report from Sweetser:
“Cecil reported to the Twelve this afternoon regarding this morning’s meeting of the Drafting Committee with Ito. He said he thought the Committee had been completely unsuccessful in meeting the Japanese view and had indeed been handicapped by the fact that Ito seemed to agree throughout with the Committee rather than with his Government. There still remained two questions, first as to police action, which he hoped might be omitted entirely from either resolution or declaration and left to a unilateral declaration by the Japanese, and second, what he called the pitiful remnants of the attempt to fix a time limit for evacuation, which again he thought might better be put [Page 626] in the form of a strong statement in the declaration rather than in an anomalistic phrase accepted by the Japanese for the resolution.
A general discussion then followed. Cecil said he thought the Council ought to face the fact that it had secured very little result under the mediatory provisions which are alone possible under article 11 which requires unanimity, as the parties seemed willing to do everything except agree on the same thing. The Council had however secured the commission which was of very substantial value. He himself was very discouraged by the Chinese attitude on Chinchow and was afraid China was sealing her own doom. She would either go to pieces or fall victim to the Japanese or Chinese [sic].
Colban was not so pessimistic. This affair was not only a startling crisis in itself but also one of the most difficult fundamental problems in the world. The Council had already prevented conflict, maintained contact and offered a way out. Briand took much the same view. Article 11 permitted only modest results at best; it could not lead to a great transformation. The Council was in the presence of two countries very firmly standing their ground; one had decided upon stern action to discipline the other. He confessed to great disquietude when the observers had been sent; now at last after much difficulty the Council had arrived at a general resolution. Acts of war had not become war; the commission would provide real information; the two peoples would accustom themselves to fraternal conciliation. He thought the time had come to complete the resolution.
The Twelve accordingly agreed to rush the resolution to completion while the situation still permitted. Accordingly it decided not to take the Chinese memorandum on Chinchow as applying to the present situation but as having been directed to the original proposals which were now out of date to enhance hope of a better arrangement for the neutral zone. It was agreed that there would be private negotiations tomorrow on the resolution with both parties; that the Drafting Committee would meet separately with first the Chinese and then the Japanese tomorrow afternoon; and that an effort would be made to bring an agreed resolution before a final public meeting Monday afternoon or Tuesday. All this is of course conditional on no explosion occurring at Chinchow and is indeed being rushed in order to forestall such an explosion.
During the discussion Mutius, the German representative, asked what the situation was as to the cooperation of the United States. Briand replied in a single sentence that on several occasions that Government had intervened along the same lines as the Council.
Considerable press agitation centering on Sze’s alleged resignation which equally caused interest in official circles was dispelled by fuller information that Sze had in effect offered his resignation according to the conventional Chinese practice following a violent denunciation by Kuomintang headquarters in Europe but that his action was not expected to become effective.”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw
- Telegram in three sections.↩