Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/3095¾

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation⁵²

December 8, 1931, noon

Secretary: Hello, is that you General. You asked me to call you. I have your cable⁵³ and I have sent a telegram to Tokyo⁵⁴ similar to the one which was suggested by Briand but, in addition to that, yesterday afternoon the Japanese Ambassador came to see me here and in the talk he indicated that the Japanese were likely to make another move on Chinchow and I made very strong representations to him; then as to what would be the effect of such a movement on American public opinion. I am sending you a copy of my aide-mémoire of that interview. I talked a great deal more strongly to him than Briand’s proposed telegram. I concur in the inference as to what the Japanese will probably do next. It looks very serious. It looks as though they had made up their mind to drive out the Chinese forces and that will make a very difficult situation. Frankly, it is hard for me to see how the Council can with any dignity go on with their procedure if they do that.

Dawes: What is in our mind to do is this; that we feel just as you do about the intent of Japan and Sze has a new resolution over there which they are going to agree to in the meeting which they are holding now. It is just exactly what I wired to you on December 1,⁵⁵ except the last sentence of paragraph five is transferred to the declaration. They will put something about it in the resolution. I have it here and can read it to you.

Secretary: I doubt if that is necessary. What I want to know is what the resolution is. I understand——

Dawes: The last sentence of paragraph five goes into the declaration. Sze thinks they are going to have a meeting tomorrow afternoon and at that time they will present this resolution and at that time the Japanese may or may not agree and China may or may not, but China will probably agree. Matsudaira will probably agree to the resolution and the declaration.

Secretary: Do you think China will?

Dawes: That is the present program. I am going to see Briand at 6:45 tonight and will know exactly what they are going to do then. But about this Chinchow business, so far as the League is concerned they are satisfied to do as you have done and have each Government do so individually through its representatives with Japan, but they want to get this resolution out and probably it will be presented tomorrow even if Japan does not agree but Japan will probably agree. I saw Matsudaira just a short time ago and in fact it was only twenty minutes before you telephoned me so I told him that I would see him at a quarter of six, but I had time to ask him whether or not they were going to agree to that resolution that will be presented tomorrow afternoon and he said we are going to agree to it with reservations. I suppose that is with some unilateral reservation. I didn’t have time to get back to the telephone before your call but I am going to see him an hour before I see Briand and I will give you that as soon as I talk with Matsudaira.

Secretary: Do you think that the Chinese will agree to it?

Dawes: I think the Chinese will agree to it from what Sze says.

Secretary: Do you think the resolution is likely to pass?

Dawes: I am inclined to think from what Matsudaira says that they will agree to the resolution with some reservations. Then the resolution will go forward as the attitude of the League with the exception of Japan. Then they will go away.

Secretary: That is good so far as it goes. Now I think when you see Matsudaira you ought to speak very seriously to him about the effect this will have on American opinion. When you see Matsudaira you ought to speak very seriously as to the effect which a move on Chinchow will have upon American opinion.

Dawes: I will do so.

Secretary: It will crystallize American opinion into the belief that the whole effort of Japan from the beginning has been to drive the Chinese out of Manchuria and the effect will be extremely serious. You will see from the telegram which I have sent to you about my talk with the Ambassador yesterday how we feel about it here and that is the serious part of the whole thing. The press has been holding back but has been getting ready to explode just as soon as the Japanese make that move and I can not hold them any more and we shall very soon make our statement—as soon as the resolution is passed. You need not tell him that. But very soon we shall have to come out with a statement of the entire negotiations from our standpoint which will not make any favorable impression toward Japan.

Dawes: Sweetser’s report I think is very good. I sent you a telegram⁵⁶ about the discussions of the Council this afternoon about their position. You ought to get it before night. It is merely what I have said except that it is a little more informative as to how their minds are running. It is the intent of Japan to move forward but the League will get out its position as a sort of basis for the rallying of the moral strength of the work [world?].

Secretary: I think it is very important, if possible, to get that resolution passed with Japan’s consent because I think Japan is trying to get out of that resolution so far as the neutral commission is concerned and if they give her any chance by delay, she will get out of the whole thing.

Dawes: They are going to bring it to a head tomorrow afternoon. I had hoped that they would do it this afternoon but Sze objected to that because he said he wanted to hear something more from his government. I think he has enough discretion to really join in with the thing and the Japanese have committed themselves so far to it now that it would be hard for them to withdraw but anything could happen over night. The resolution will be presented tomorrow as the attitude of all the members with the exception of Japan and China and that would have some general effect. That other statement which they propose to put in by the twelve is a statement of their position with Briand’s statement and everything and China probably will acquiesce. That would leave Japan alone but it is a good thing to cause public opinion to focus on the situation. With the twelve, of course, it becomes the attitude of the League with the exception of Japan.

Secretary: If they fail to have a vote on it or fail to get a unanimous vote, I hope they will make clear that the original proposition for a neutral commission came from Japan.

Dawes: Yes, that is a good point.

Secretary: I would like that made very clear.

Dawes: I will speak to Briand about it.

Secretary: In case she finally goes back on it, that ought to be made clear.

Dawes: Exactly.

Secretary: The thing that you should make clear to Matsudaira is that this march on Chinchow will be regarded as crystallizing the whole issue against Japan. It will make clear the whole issue in a way it has not been made clear thus far.

Dawes: Another thing. Do you want me to speak to Briand tonight about that naval business? You sent me a short telegram saying that when I said goodbye to him to speak to him about the Italian naval matter. Shall I speak to him about that tonight?

Secretary: Won’t you see him again? I don’t want that. Frankly that is a matter that is not germane to this. I want you to use your own judgment about that.

Dawes: My judgment is not to do it. I talked with Massigli last night and asked him how he was getting along with the Italian matter and he was quite evasive about it. They will decide something within a week. I had a telegram from Margett[s], the observer at Chinchow, sending me information.⁵⁸ Following the ordinary custom of limiting what Margett[s] gave us of the objections of Japan, I gave it to the Council over there to go along with the reports of their observer with information which was on the status quo. He called me up and I told him that I could not make that public as coming from the United States and then Drummond wanted to know whether you could not give out that information in Washington, that is, the essence of the reports of your military observers, because he thinks that is something that will exert pressure both upon China and Japan to come into the resolution. He wants the reports of the observers around Chinchow without expressions of opinion as to what Japan intends to do.

Secretary: I will consider that and very possibly——

Dawes: I don’t want to print it here because of the reservations I made.

Secretary: The whole question is that I do not want to make any side issue with Japan until we get them right on the whole thing. I will do the best I can with that but I will reserve judgment on whether I will do it before the meeting of the Council. I do not want to break in on that.

Dawes: That is your telegram No. 632.⁵⁹ It has nothing to do with the Council here but just information as to what your military observer has said.

Secretary: Sooner or later I will make that public but I do not want to do it when it will make Japan angry enough not to vote for the resolution.

Dawes: I see, all right. I will keep you advised. You will find these telegrams that come to you today all informative. I suppose you keep up with them.

Secretary: I keep up with them personally. You will find the telegram about my talk with Debuchi yesterday also informative.⁶⁰

Dawes: What time will that arrive here?

Secretary: It has gone now. It went about half an hour ago. You will get it tonight.

Dawes: I can tell Briand the subject of it.

Secretary: The main thing is that I want you to get the substance of it to Matsudaira too.

Dawes: Yes, I will. I will do that.

Secretary: It is a very serious situation with public opinion. Public opinion is tending so strong against Japan that this will crystallize it.

Dawes: All right, Mr. Secretary, that is all.

Secretary: Yes, goodbye.

52. Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and General Dawes in Paris, December 8, 1931, 12 noon.
53. See telegram No. 854, December 7, 10 p.m., from the Chargé in France, p. 632.
54. See telegram No. 259, December 8, 11 a.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 54.
55. See telegram No. 827, December 1, 11 p.m., from the Chargé in France, p. 609.
56. See telegram No. 858, December 8, 4 p.m., from the Chargé in France, p. 645.
58. cf. telegram No. 1056, December 8, 2 p.m., from the Minister in China, p. 641.
59. Dated December 7, 6 p.m., not printed. It transmitted news from Mukden, etc. (793.94/3056).
60. Telegram No. 633, December 8, 2 p.m., to the Chargé in France; not printed. It quoted text of telegram No. 259, December 8, 11 a.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, omitting text of Briand’s communication to Shidehara, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 54.