793.94/3119: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 8—8:34 p.m.]
860. From Ambassador Dawes: I have just had my interview with Briand. Drummond and Leger also were there. The program agreed upon for the public meeting tomorrow afternoon is that the resolution will be presented and voted upon unless either Japan or China at that time asks for a delay in the vote for another day, because the now expected messages from their Governments have not been received. Whether the voting takes place or not, at the open meeting of the Council tomorrow afternoon the resolution will be introduced and made public to the world, of course. Should either China or Japan request a delay in the vote because of the nonreceipt of an answer from the Government by the time of tomorrow afternoon’s meeting, the vote will be put off not longer than one day. However, both China and Japan are expected to receive their final instructions prior to this open meeting.
Following the vote the Council will be adjourned, subject to the call of its President.
To Briand I explained the steps you have taken along the line of his letter to Baron Shidehara and in your talk with Ambassador Debuchi, saying I expected an aide-mémoire of your interview. Briand expressed appreciation.
[Page 649]The expectation is that, whether or not a military explosion occurs in Manchuria between now and tomorrow afternoon, the above-mentioned meeting will be held and the foregoing program will be carried out. Answering my query as to whether there were any suggestions he had to make to me for transmittal to you as being possibly helpful in a common situation calling for statements from both the United States and the League of Nations, Briand said he would wait until the end of the discussion in the Council’s closed meeting tomorrow morning, for this would, to some extent, influence his own views. If any suggestions of the sort should occur to him after the morning meeting and before the public meeting at 5 p.m., he would inform me accordingly.
At 5:45 p.m., before my call on Briand, Matsudaira again came to see me. I made a strong statement with regard to your certainty that any advance of the Japanese upon Chinchow would have an extremely adverse effect for Japan upon American public sentiment. Matsudaira said he understood this and he was striving in every possible way to prevent an advance of this kind. He explained that Japanese public sentiment was running very high, because it is believed there that the Japanese military advance on Chinchow was halted by the agreement of Wellington Koo to withdraw Chinese troops south of the Great Wall. Matsudaira said he himself understood the facts concerning the alleged Koo offer, but they were not understood by the Japanese public which felt Japan had been tricked into withdrawing her troops. He explained also that his Government had informed him that, in making the neutral-zone offer, it was not the intention to advance Japanese troops beyond the railway zone if the Chinese moved within the Wall. However, this is water over the dam. From my talk with Matsudaira I have the impression that Japan will agree to the resolution. He told me that direct negotiations over the situation at Chinchow are now proceeding at Peiping between Japan and China. [Dawes.]