862.20/930: Telegram (part air)
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 20—8:50 a.m.]
151. Consulate’s 142, April 16, midnight.5a The atmosphere during the Council period in respect of the issues bringing to the surface expressions of opinion on the part of responsible national officials was comparable to that described in the Consulate’s despatch No. [Page 255] 1135 (political) of December 26, 1934.6 Such expressions aside from what actually transpired in the Council sessions afford something of a view of the general European situation; more particularly however they revealed the preoccupations which among others in the minds of the delegates governed their recent action and are still undoubtedly factors in future developments.
(1) Stripped of its details many of which remain confidential and can be judged only by inference the Stresa Conference is regarded as having achieved one main point in the establishment of a relative solidarity between Great Britain, France and Italy. This translated into military terms and so understood by the delegates of the three powers is that while Germany admittedly now or in the immediate future could defeat any one power she presumably could not defeat a combination of the three powers who are in accord at least respecting the reality and the common danger of the German menace.
(2) The Council session reaffirmed the prospect of common action by the three powers in the face of the situation described. This is of course aside from private understandings which may have been reached during the Conference. Incidentally difficulties were apparent to the achievement in a body like the Council operating under a definite mandate and partially fortuitous in its composition of concrete and unanimous action on question of such a character and significance.
(3) Despite statements emanating from Berlin before the Council meeting which were credited with being impelled by the situation described under (1) above, there was at the opening of the Council a general unanimity of opinion although expressed in widely differing terms that Germany’s basic policy embraces definite objectives in territorial expansion primarily Memel and, deflected to the south by her Polish arrangements, Austria and secondarily the Teutonic portions of Czechoslovakia and the ultimate freeing of the Rhine zone from the militarization provisions.
There is also general agreement that a continuance of German rearmament at the present rate means a Germany prepared for warlike eventualities in approximately 1 year.
(4) Under the present set of circumstances it is not seen that Germany can expand on the continent by peaceful means. The alternative unless German policy be checked or altered is thus at least a local war and presumably a general war.
Great Britain, France and Italy have a common interest in checking or in some manner effecting a change in German policy. Russia and the Little Entente most particularly Czechoslovakia have a like [Page 256] vital interest. This interest is in a greater or lesser degree also common to all Europe in view of the probably widespread involvements of any war. Possible checks to Germany are seen in (a) the general threat implied in (1) above; (b) a “preventative” war; (c) the application of sanctions; (d) the acceptance by Germany of an international arrangement.
(a) While the moral effects of Stresa were regarded as impelling German pacific statements particularly of her willingness to enter into a nonaggression pact, their efforts were frankly viewed at the opening of the Council session as maneuvers on the part of Berlin rather than as indications of a change in policy. It was felt that Stresa’s threat to Germany must be implemented to be effective.
(b) While a preventive war has at no time been viewed as a probability there have undoubtedly been preoccupations concerning it. Aside from a desire to avoid any war it presents, however, important practical obstacles. It is believed that the only states which under the existing conditions could carry their peoples into such a war are Italy and Russia. Internal conditions would make such action difficult if not impossible for France and for all of the states of the Little Entente. In Great Britain there is an unwillingness both of the Government and of the people.
Thus the anomalous situation is produced that a checking of Germany by a war could presumably only be brought about by prior German action which in turn rests on Germany’s military readiness which is rapidly approaching completion.
From a technical point of view also a war presents difficulties for the powers opposing Germany. This arises in definite measure from the position of Poland should she side with Germany or take a neutral position. In a war unless Poland took an active part against Germany she would constitute a definite threat to the Russian and Czechoslovak flank. Moreover, while responsible officials of the League disarmament section admit their belief that the figures which Russia has filed are below her real strength it is estimated that Russia’s transport facilities are extremely inadequate.
(c) There is apparent a very evident unwillingness to impose sanctions at the present juncture. Sanctions to be effective would require united action and to advance the question and not to achieve unanimity would obviously produce a fatal breach in the common effort of the powers. The tendency during the Council [meeting?] was thus to turn for the immediate present to some other arrangements.
(d) Great Britain was the advocate of coming to the multilateral agreement with Germany. German pronouncements indicated, however, an unwillingness to go to the length of a mutual assistance pact which the French, Italians and Russians asserted to be the minimum basis on which they would accept a compromise with Berlin. Intimations from Germany of a probable unwillingness to include certain states in any multilateral arrangements seemed not only to render an agreement with her almost impossible but were also vividly indicative of the directions of her policy of aggression.
Despite the difficulty inherent in this as no other alternative seemed open, there was a tendency to seek a solution through future negotiations [Page 257] with Germany particularly in the form of the conference on Austria which it was suggested should take place in Rome in the latter part of May.
(5) The British are finding it extremely difficult to reconcile themselves to their present role of occupying a partisan and thus a restricted position on the continent. Their aim is to bring Germany back into the concert of the powers and thus regain their liberty of action. Consequently London was the advocate of continued efforts to obtain Germany’s adhesion to multilateral engagements. To the extent to which this is believed to be possible and to the extent to which it is believed Germany would fulfill in such undertakings the British policy is seen as the advancement of peace. To the extent to which the contrary is believed British policy is viewed as merely dangerous temporizing which accords Germany opportunity fully to rearm and as having only the merit of avoiding more immediate hostilities in the hope that some unexpected developments may give the situation a more favorable turn.
There were echoes here of a resentment of the British tendency to maintain unilateral contact with Berlin, accusations even going to the extreme of expressions of belief that the British Ambassador in Berlin inspired the German statement respecting the nonaggression pact which the British presented at Stresa as a means of support for their own thesis.
(6) Aside from questions of her intentions and the sincerity of her pronouncements, delay is seen in almost any eventuality as militarily favorable to Germany. Berlin’s policy thus far has been seen as encouraging by such means as are at her disposal the continuation of the fluidity of all international discussions. The attitude of German “agents” here in expressing in receptive quarters a hopeful advocacy of a continuance of the Disarmament Conference is viewed as a case in point.
(7) French policy is obviously aimed at an encirclement of Germany and is viewed either as a necessity in the light of the character and intentions of Germany or as a necessity which France has created for herself by her continued unwillingness to come to terms with Berlin. In either case it is seen as a course tending toward eventual hostilities in some form.
(8) Russia and Czechoslovakia are most evidently animated by a genuine fear of Germany which has become the dominating factor in their policies.
(9) Italy has equaled if not exceeded the other great powers in pronouncements of her willingness to resort to extreme measures and has gone definitely further in material action including partial mobilization. There are rumors that in private conversations the members [Page 258] of the other two delegations complained of what they characterized as the “weakness” of Mussolini at Stresa which is defined as an uncertainty respecting the probability of his living up to his pronouncements. This rumor is, however, possibly merely an expression in imaginative terms of the traditional belief in Italy’s policy being at all times dictated by an absolute opportunism.
(10) Although outwardly exhibiting evidences of drawing closer to Germany Polish policy from the Geneva angle is still obscure. The paradox of her French alliance vis-à-vis her German arrangements was never more explicit. Her speech in the Council was credited as being designed for Berlin while her vote for the resolution was decisive for Paris. It is generally believed that Poland will continue if possible to follow a middle course while awaiting the outcome of developments.
(11) There is no question but that based on the situations described above the atmosphere of Geneva and of Europe, to the extent to which Geneva reflects it, is universally one of extreme pessimism. There is a disheartening lack of belief in the value of all pacts and incidental to this the feeling that the very multiplicity of arrangements operates to create involvements which are a danger in themselves. The only optimism shown is on the part of delegations which have succeeded in some element of immediate policy.
What Germany ultimately will do, aside from any pronouncements from Berlin and aside from any agreements by Berlin, is the point on which all speculation turns which is intensified by the belief that Germany will be prepared for material action in the relatively immediate future. The expectation of an armed conflict takes the form of a popular fatalistic belief in its inevitableness, a psychology more dangerous than jingoism as the latter usually is confined to a section of the population while the current feeling pervades all elements. As a pertinent example, the belief is widely held among the Swiss that when trouble next arises French and German military movements will involve the western cantons and that thus Switzerland will be drawn in. This attitude is reflected to a greater or less degree by all European governments by their military preparations.
(12) The solidarity of the three powers and Russia is obviously based almost solely on their immediate common cause vis-à-vis Germany. It is thus in that sense artificial with many delicate features. Any relaxation of the tension concerning Germany or perhaps even a reassertion of certain basic divergencies of interests between these powers are regarded as liable to induce at any time a break in their present common front.