862.20/979
The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 3.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 218, of April 18, 11 a.m.,8 and previous telegrams and despatches on the subject of the Stresa Conference and to attempt herein some comment upon the agreements arrived at there, the methods used for obtaining agreement, and the probable consequences thereof.
The immediate effect has been salutary. The atmosphere has been calmed, the nervous state of military expectancy has been dispelled, military operations have been prevented, at least for the time being, and an atmosphere of tranquillity has been produced.
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Examining each of these principal pacts briefly it is disclosed that the same principle is applied to each of them, i. e., an operation contemplated on the Locarno plan with the addition that the signatory Powers may make supporting bilateral treaties amongst themselves and that Powers not signatory may be brought in to the general operation of the pact by the expedient of bilateral treaties between them and signatories of the pact.
Eastern Security
As regards the Eastern Security Pact, the principle last enunciated is expected to be involved. France and Russia, so I have been informed by Mr. Suvich, were not in accord on the underlying principles of Eastern security. Russia wanted an automatic pact—one which would call for immediate assistance, military in character, in case there was aggression, and to come into operation ipso facto at the moment of an aggression. To this France objected, wishing instead to have an arrangement within the scope of the League of Nations, not automatic in character but which would call for a conference to determine upon the fact of aggression and out of which would come a [Page 261] decision for united action. To neither of these plans was Germany in agreement. That Government took the position that there should be no plan requiring the use of military force, though during the Conference she modified her position to the extent of saying that she would accept a pact such as she desired with the proviso that other signatories, in case they felt disposed, could make bilateral pacts of mutual assistance.
The matter was so complicated the conferees at Stresa were unable to agree upon an exact formula for execution so they postponed the question with the statement that they would continue negotiations with a view to developing the security of Eastern Europe.
Air Pact
The Air Pact, which was one of the elements of the conversations at London on February 3rd, was approached in the same manner. Italy had been opposed to the Air Pact on the Locarno principle because she would not be in a position to benefit by the help of England in case she were attacked directly or in case Austrian independence was threatened and she had to proceed against Germany without the assistance of France. So the same principle as proposed to be applied to the Eastern security arrangement was applied to the Air Pact, and it is to proceed upon the basis of Locarno leaving England and Italy as guarantors but not as guaranteed Powers with the proviso that these two Powers may proceed to make a bilateral arrangement between themselves supplemental to the air Locarno. This principle would be extended to include arrangements also between Russia and England, and Russia and Italy, and between France and Czechoslovakia, and Czechoslovakia and Russia. So that in this way they overcame the objections of Italy and were able to accommodate France in her desire to bring in Russia and Czechoslovakia with the supposed advantage to her side of having Czechoslovakia act as an air base for Russia. The German Ambassador in a recent conversation told me that Czechoslovakia had already arranged for air fields in far greater number than she could possibly use and Germany felt that these air fields were for the use of Russia as an ally of France and Czechoslovakia in the case of an operation against Germany.
Austrian Independence
As regards an arrangement to secure the independence of Austria, the same principle seems to have been applied. The position of Italy heretofore has been that France and England should agree to come to her assistance in case of an attack on Austria. This England has been loath to do. However, the proposal of Mussolini apparently adopted by the Conference is to merge the guarantee of Austria into a Danubian [Page 262] Pact of which he has long talked as a separate proposition and to have all the signatories of the Danubian Pact agree to support the independence of Austria on the general principle that the Governments of the countries contiguous to Austria will agree to oppose any movement against it and that the other countries such as Bulgaria, Rumania, France, England, and even Russia, be brought into the arrangement by the negotiation of bilateral treaties amongst themselves which would come into operation in support of the countries immediately surrounding Austria. This makes Austria the center of European security and involves practically every Government on the Continent, except Switzerland, to oppose German aggression in Austria. The position of Germany vis-à-vis this question is one of decided opposition. The German Ambassador called upon me on the morning of April 16th. Parenthetically I will insert here that he told me several days before that during Simon’s visit to Berlin, Simon had made the suggestion to Hitler that the German Government be represented at Stresa. However, the next day Simon had “diplomatically withdrawn the suggestion”. Herr von Hassell did not on that occasion allude to the suggestion that his Government be represented at Stresa except to comment that Germany did not particularly like to be the subject of conversation in a meeting of other Powers called to discuss the action of its own Government. Proceeding, however, to a discussion of the Austrian situation, he said he did not know that his Government would be represented at the Danubian Conference called in Rome. He felt sure, however, that the divergence of view of the participating Governments would be such as to render it practically impossible to arrive at anything but a very general and minimum understanding. He commented upon the difference of opinion between Yugoslavia and Italy and upon the difficulties between Hungary and the Little Entente, as indicating the difference of the points of view which would prevent a unanimity in important matters.
The German Ambassador mentioned Austria and said that his Government could not consent, and would not consent, to a definition of the word “interference” in Austria to be rendered solely by the Government of the interested country. He elaborated by saying that if there should be an uprising in Austria and an attempt to march on Vienna by Austrians and the Schuschnigg9 Government should call on Italy, the Schuschnigg Government might claim that it was being helped by Italy, but that Germany would consider it would be interference on the part of Italy. Contemporaneously, the Yugoslav Government would say that if Italy can send two divisions into Austria, Yugoslavia will send two divisions into Austria. At the same time his Government might take the same attitude. He said that his Government [Page 263] would not consent to an arrangement which would permit an interpretation of the word “interference” to be made only by the authorities in control of the Government concerned, so that they could proclaim that assistance from one side would be non-interference, while assistance from another side would constitute interference.
The general attitude of the German Government toward all of the arrangements made at Stresa can be fairly inferred from the conversation of the German Ambassador regarding the Austrian arrangement. In addition to that, and speaking of the Eastern Locarno, he said that his Government would not engage itself in any way to use military force in conjunction with other Governments because Germany felt that an engagement to use military force was wrong in principle and contemplated the eventual use of that force; that his Government was willing to proceed to negotiate non-aggression pacts with the proviso that the other Governments concerned could, over the objection of Germany but nevertheless could, make mutual assistance agreements amongst themselves. He said that his Government did not approve of it and did not like the idea of an obligation calling for mutual assistance or the use of military force but that they would consent reluctantly to the conclusion of such agreements amongst other signatory Powers but would not themselves engage to do likewise.
German policy of course would find greater security in an agreement which did not contemplate the use of military force against an aggressor or which would not combine all of the signatory Powers in military operations against Germany in case Germany should be an aggressor. The Government of the Reich would prefer a loose arrangement of non-aggression pacts, so that in case they should be judged the aggressor there would not be any obligation on the part of all the other Governments to join in military operations against Germany. Rather the German Government would leave to chance and to expediency the opportunity to divide the other Governments and have some of them refrain from the use of military force against her than have a binding obligation calling for the use of that force and from which it would be hard for any of the signatories to such an agreement to escape.
Germany is also putting forth legal obstacles to an Eastern Security Pact in the form of an objection to the use of the word “aggressor”. She wants an exact definition of that word and is not ready to agree to the Russian definition.
The truth is that Germany is not willing to accept any of these pacts and cannot do so and achieve her ambitions. If she accepted a mutual assistance pact and continued to pursue the course which she has followed for the last few years it is almost certain that she would some day be adjudged or be accused of being an aggressor and would call [Page 264] upon herself the combined force of the other signatories. The same philosophy follows the German desire to have “interference” in Austria defined. So that it is safe to assume that Germany, while she seems to be checkmated for the moment, has not decided to alter her general policy any more than she will discard her ambitions or change her national characteristics, though it is conceivable that a change of administration within Germany might modify her course.
Mr. Suvich is highly gratified with the results of Stresa and is optimistic. He is more definite in the expression of his reaction on this matter than in any matter I have ever talked to him about concerning Germany. As reported in my telegram No. 218 of April 18, 11 a.m., he said he was definitely of the opinion that Germany had been stopped and he thought that the situation which now confronted Germany was one which would have a continued and lasting effect. However, I am afraid he is too optimistic. I cannot conceive that the arrangement will continue forever or that the psychological situation which permitted it will continue undiminished in intensity. When there is a relaxation, Germany will find some way of proceeding, in Memel or in Austria, and may have the temerity to proceed along the demilitarized zone on the Rhine, though I discount that probability on the theory that Germany’s ambitions lie now to the east and south and that if she pursues a policy which does not unduly antagonize France along her boundaries, she will be less apt to draw France into any possible future disturbance. However, Mr. Suvich told me that Germany had commenced to violate the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the demilitarized zone and had already established fields for airplane use within that zone; had built houses which were susceptible of being used as storerooms for ammunition and bombs; had, as a matter of fact, sent into the demilitarized district members of the Reichswehr in plain clothes; and had an arrangement whereby the police of the demilitarized zone, though not nominally parts of the German army, were susceptible of being incorporated with it. Mr. Suvich is convinced that they will not proceed further in that zone and insofar as that is concerned, I am rather inclined to agree with him because it would be a gratuitous affront to France and cause an unnecessary exposure of Germany in some future military activity. However, I cannot be as optimistic as Mr. Suvich in reference to the Austrian and Eastern ambitions of Germany. Although I feel that, for the time being, the Stresa Conference has served to allay the fears of Europe that war is imminent. But I do not feel it has cured the troubles of Europe nor do I feel that they can be cured by military alliances or by enlarged armies, or by increased equipment. A result of the Stresa Conference is certain to be increased standing armies in Europe and more extensive [Page 265] preparation for the eventual. That will continue unless and until Germany can be brought to agree solemnly, in conference, to military limitation. As soon as Germany agrees to such limitation she will have discarded her territorial ambitions because she will be inferior in numbers and in strength to those who have fears about her aggrandizement. So that while the effect of the Stresa Conference is good and has pushed back the clouds of war, it has not cured a situation which finds its roots deeply imbedded in the soils of fear, prejudice and hatred, and stretch out under the subsoil of a Europe marred by geographical boundaries, trade barriers and national ambitions, and heterogeneously fomented by different languages, religions, philosophies and racial instincts—all age-old and ineradicable.11
Respectfully yours,