765.84/1814: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 14—4 p.m.]
497. Consulate’s 481, October 11, noon [midnight]; and No. 484, October 12, 2 p.m.89 I feel it to be desirable to present certain features of the situation here respecting the matter of the application of sanctions. I beg to recall that action taken in the Committee of Coordination and in the Committee of Eighteen is in a peculiar sense not action taken “by” these bodies. There is no voting in the usual sense of the term. Consent to a definitely formulated proposal is an independent action of each government concerned. The common bond in the procedures is that of separate and direct obligations under article 16 of the Covenant. The object of the procedures is entirely a practical one, the governments concerned voluntarily undertaking to coordinate their action. In theory one government alone could apply any of the sanctions enumerated in article 16. In practice however, as the studies of this article made in 1921 show, it has been felt that a failure to attempt to coordinate the fulfillment of obligations under article 16 would lead either to chaos or to no action whatsoever. Moreover consideration was also given to the circumstance that any action thus taken by an individual state would present the aspect of a hostile attitude toward the delinquent state rather than the execution of an obligation based on a common law. On the other hand, while united deliberations serve to promote common action in an orderly manner they at the same time provide an opportunity to any government acting with other governments to promote its own internal or external policies. The present serious differences which have arisen between the French and the British over the matter of “export” or “import” sanctions may be regarded as a case in point. There is thus a great deal of political activity in progress. Doubtless also direct diplomatic efforts are similarly in progress in many capitals.
A peculiar characteristic of positions taken here as I have had occasion to observe over a long period is that governments will very readily take positions in principle. This tendency is intensified in the present instance where the whole character and future of the League is regarded as definitely at stake. Thus running through the entire problem aside from the merits of the particular case and the desire to preserve the peace is also a desire to preserve the League or, as it has been frankly expressed to me by certain delegates, a desire to save its face.
[Page 674]There is no definite way of ascertaining to what extent governments will be able to carry out the undertakings given here due to constitutional difficulties and the necessity for preparatory legislation or whether in giving such undertakings they have the intention of even endeavoring to carry them out. I point out however, that the “proposals” thus far adopted by the governments constitute definite commitments stated in categorical terms.
In view of this situation while I transmit such information as I can obtain here which seems to me to be of importance respecting the pertinent policies of various states I should say that the best source at present for information regarding such policies is in the respective capitals.
With reference to the Department’s telegram 118, October 11 [12], 2 p.m.,90 concerning the position of Poland, I shall endeavor to obtain what I can but my present reply is that I have no sound information other than Poland’s apparent reluctance, which I have previously reported, to make commitments and the general enigmatic character of her attitude.
The present aspect is that of hastening the procedures. I have the impression that the objective is to obtain as many acceptances to as effective proposals as possible. I presume that shortly the responses of the governments giving the “measures” taken will begin to come in. I note that the procedure now adopted respecting this is that the Secretary General is formally transmitting the proposals to the League governments and that responses will be addressed to him for transmission to the Committee of Coordination. It seems to be felt here that a reason for the delay in these responses is the bargaining which is in progress between the powers. I feel moreover that these responses may be accompanied by reservations, a type of reservation being, as was the case in the affair of the Chaco, that action will be made conditional on that of other powers. Further complications in this matter are the questions raised by certain governments respecting “compensation”, a rather extended interpretation in respect of this having been placed on paragraph 3 of article 16.
I think it may be said in general that as the work progresses and as the sanctions proposed become more drastic in nature the difficulty of obtaining universal or substantial agreement will probably increase and that question may then arise as to how far the states who favor stronger sanctions will decide to apply them. The most important factor in this is still seen as to the degree of agreement which may be reached between Great Britain and France.
As to the concrete problem of the actual application of effective sanctions I find no expression of opinion here which seems to me to [Page 675] be based on sufficiently sound grounds to admit of even the remotest forecast. I also feel that the ultimate effects of the applications of sanctions on the course of international trade can only be a subject of pure speculation.