Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, The American Republics, Volume IV

724.34119/312: Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, December 16, 1935—2 a.m.
[Received 3:38 a.m.]

297. From Braden. Department’s 177, December 14, 4 p.m.

1. The entire situation in regard to the proposed settlement of the prisoners and security problems changed completely with Ayala’s reply of December 5 (paragraph No. 3 of my 294, December 6, 8 p.m.). Previously financial terms were only important point of divergence as Bolivian and Paraguayan delegations had agreed on all other points. Paraguayan reversal of position makes present situation as follows:

2. Financial settlement. From conversations with the Bolivian and Paraguayan delegates we are now confident that if agreement were reached on other points this would present no serious difficulty. Failing direct agreement on sum to be paid we believe that both parties could be induced to leave it to the Conference to fix the sum within the limits of the maximum which Bolivia has so far agreed to pay and the maximum which Paraguay is prepared to claim.

3. Congressional ratification. The Paraguayan Government is now adamant in insisting upon this point. Elío expressed willingness to accept if necessary but such procedure would entail difficulties and delay: (a) It is doubtful whether a quorum of the Bolivian Congress could be gotten together and if so whether ratification could be secured (see despatch No. 457 of October 16, from La Paz¹⁹); (b) the return of the prisoners would be delayed until after ratification instead of beginning within 30 days of signature of agreement as contemplated in Conference proposals. The question of ratification had been discussed in detail in earlier negotiations and every one including the Paraguayan delegates agreed it should be avoided. The change in the Paraguayan attitude was ordered by Ayala and did not come until 10 days ago. If what Paraguay desired were really security against possible Bolivian aggression an interpretation of the June 12th Protocol by the Conference as a whole in the sense that the security measures therein to remain in effect would be more valuable than a bilateral agreement with Bolivia even if ratified.

4. Wording of security clause. The Paraguayan insistence on the language they suggest makes it obvious, however, that they seek not ordinary security but a guarantee of the present lines of separation until it might meet their pleasure to conclude a definite treaty of peace. If their desiderata in the present negotiations were accepted they would have achieved practically their maximum territorial claims and have a protocol ratified by the Bolivian Congress which would enable them to retain all of the territory by the expedient of sitting tight and failing to enter into a direct agreement or an arbitral compromise. They would thus have no incentive to negotiate a treaty of peace on any terms other than ratifying the present occupation. It is, therefore, accurate to describe the Paraguayan strategy as attempting to trade the prisoners for the entire Chaco. There is not the faintest hope that Bolivia could accept this and the Conference would be discredited were it to lend any assistance to the Paraguayans in their apparent purpose in view of the provisions and intent of the June 12th Protocol and of the term of its October 15th proposal for a territorial settlement dividing the Chaco.

5. Saavedra Lamas, Rodrigues Alves and I have spent days attempting to break down the stand of the Paraguayan delegates but they insist that they have categorical instructions from Ayala and cannot cede. It is futile to discuss the matter further with them as Ayala has disavowed their acceptance of the December 3rd formula and deprived them of any power to negotiate. It is evident therefore that Ayala is the only person with whom we can deal with any hope of success.

6. Saavedra Lamas on December 13th urged one of the Paraguayan delegates to fly to Asunción in order to give Ayala a full picture of the situation here. The Paraguayans countered by suggesting that I fly to Asunción with Rivarola; they asserted that in my capacity as chairman of the Prisoners Committee I could explain the situation to Ayala frankly and forcefully, whereas none of them as Paraguayan delegates could do so and that they were certain that in a straightforward talk of a few hours Ayala and I would be able to reach a satisfactory settlement. They consulted Ayala by telephone and he replied that it would be extremely important for me to come expressing himself in such terms as to be tantamount to an invitation. Saavedra immediately fell in with the suggestion and has since repeatedly and strongly urged that I go to Asunción offering us transportation in Argentine army planes.

7. When the suggestion was first made I unreservedly opposed it. On continued insistence by Saavedra Lamas and the Paraguayan Government I have finally agreed to submit the proposal for your consideration subject to the following conditions which have been accepted:

(a) That I be accompanied by Podestá Costa (he carried on the February 1935 negotiations in Asunción, he would be especially useful in drafting and his addition would divide the responsibility with the Argentines, test Saavedra’s sincerity and guard against the latter’s jealousy);

(b) That no publicity whatever be given to the trip and,

(c) That the trip should have the approval of the other delegations (the Bolivians, Brazilians and Peruvian[s] have expressed themselves strongly in favor of it; the Chilean and Uruguayan chief delegates not yet consulted as they are away over the week end).

8. I realize the possible difficulties and dangers in the course suggested but we are in a desperate situation which must be met by unusual means. We agree completely with you that adjournment of the Conference without a satisfactory solution of the prisoners and securities questions would be highly regrettable, particularly as under the resulting uncertain conditions the two nations might conceivably drift into a renewal of hostilities. It seems impossible for such a solution to be reached unless some drastic step is taken to emerge from the impasse. It will be impossible to postpone the recess for more than a few weeks as the chiefs of the Bolivian and Paraguayan delegations have made it clear that they must return to their countries and the majority of the neutral delegates are anxious to suspend activities.

9. I am now disposed to think I should go and request your authorization. If I decide upon trip we will probably leave December 18 and return December 20.

10. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro. [Braden.]

Weddell

19. Not printed.