740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/667
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 6.]
Sir: Nothwithstanding the fact that, as I have previously reported, this Government continues to manifest every external assurance of calmness with regard to international conditions in general and recent developments in Germany in particular, there is no doubt that its principal members are deeply concerned as regards possible repercussions upon this country. Expressions of private opinion in various strata of society vary according to the temperament, inclination and interest of the individual; while it has been interesting to observe that for some weeks the press has been controlled (either by reasons of individual policy or, much more likely, by intimations from on high) in any expressions of opinion—limiting itself to copious extracts from publications in other countries.
The two main factors of the present Government’s perturbation are: first, the conviction that if Germany decides to fortify the German portion of the Rhineland, France will be so geographically blocked and militarily engaged that her support of the States of the Little Entente in general, and especially of Czechoslovakia, will be reduced to a shadow of the promises of military protection in the assurance of which the Little Entente was conceived and born; and second, the intransigence of Hungary in her unwavering opposition to any politico-economic rapprochement between the States of the “Danubian Basin”—that hackneyed phrase which has been worn almost threadbare and does not correctly define the region which it is supposed to denote.
[Page 291]That is the present situation in a nut-shell and it seems hardly necessary to elaborate thereon—especially when the Department will recall that these two main factors in their varying phases have been discussed in previous despatches from this Legation almost to the point of repetition. Nevertheless the fact that these reasons for concern were yesterday frankly expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to an American newspaper correspondent and confirmed by the Minister to me in a private conversation on the same evening, throws the whole question into such relief as perhaps to justify reiterated exposition.
With regard to the first point, it will be recalled that President Beneš, when Minister for Foreign Affairs, repeatedly expressed to me his latent concern lest some such eventuality might arise which would exert a powerful influence upon Czechoslovakia’s policy and render necessary a very careful threading of her way. This attitude may be best summed up in the following phrase: while ever loyal to the principles of the League of Nations and to the fulfillment of all international obligations, and while largely dependent upon the support of France, such leadership will not always be so blindly followed as to produce, for example, a blanket endorsement of the Hoare-Laval Agreement regarding Abyssinia or continued support of a provocative policy on the part of France should such cause Czechoslovakia gratuitously to estrange her powerful German neighbor. Other Czechoslovak statesmen of lesser importance have said the same to me; military men have dismissed with a deprecating shrug of the shoulders any suggestion that this country could really take up arms against Germany; industrialists and agricultural operatives, while admitting the fear of invasion or control, have equally confessed their impotence to withstand it; and members of the Austrian nobility whose roots are planted centuries deep in the soil of Bohemia, are frankly fearful that their beloved land may some day fall within the frontiers of an implacable, disciplined and ambitious nation. Whether such annexation of the major portion of this country will take place and, if so, whether for political, economic or militarily strategic reasons, I have previously reported in some detail.
In his discussion of this phase of the matter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs after reiterating his concern as to the inevitable results upon this country of the bottling up of France, observed—rather wistfully—that he did not really think that Germany wanted to fight! I could not escape the impression that his wish was largely father to the thought and I am not aware that he expressed this belief in his conversation with the aforementioned American correspondent, but such a frank expression of his fears, and the reasons therefor, is an unusual procedure on the part of a Minister for Foreign Affairs—unless [Page 292] he desires that this opinion be made public, as it undoubtedly will, but thereby rendered available for German consumption.
With regard to the intransigence of Hungary, the reasons and opinions and illustrations supply the fabric for the same old weary story which has been reported upon over and over again ever since the establishment of the Succession States: Austria wishes to cooperate economically with Czechoslovakia and to join with her and the other States of this region in some effort to neutralize the aspirations of Germany, while Hungary, notwithstanding the many injustices from which she has suffered in the economically illogical demarcation of her frontiers, is only too willing to occupy any position—even that of semi-subordination to Germany—which will embarrass the nations which have been given large portions of her former territory and thus render as difficult as possible the position of Jugoslavia which she considers an absurd federation, that of Rumania which she loathes, and that of this country which she detests as a nation of deserters and servants. The Department may recall that in the years between 1927 and 1930 I have written much upon this subject from Budapest. Illustrations always strengthen—or at least enlighten—statements, and I could ask for no better illustration of the present mentality of certain countries involved than that afforded at a recent social gathering in Prague where, in the presence of representatives of France and the United States, the Chiefs of the Diplomatic Missions of Germany, Poland and Hungary rather ostentatiously withdrew to a smaller room and there discussed with every evidence of pleasure the situation which had arisen as a result of Germany’s latest acts.
Increasing evidences of progressive weakening of the Little Entente should not be lost sight of, and I have reason to believe that impressions of this nature will shortly find expression in certain American papers whose correspondents have been recently in Central Europe. Of course, the key-note for this opinion is set by the success of German economic and political propaganda in Jugoslavia, as well as by the disinclination of that country—regarding which I reported at that time—to concur in the opinion of the other two States of the Little Entente that Austria’s disavowal of any intention to permit the restoration of the Hapsburgs can be taken at face value. It seems unnecessary to discuss at this moment the position of Rumania or the value which she may lend in a military sense to Czechoslovakia, but the indisputable fact remains that Czechoslovakia, by far the strongest of the three, is gradually being forced into a more and more desperately isolated position.
The attitude of the newly appointed German Minister at Prague48 is not without interest. A man of keen and alert intelligence and of [Page 293] implacable devotion to the policy of his country, although not necessarily an ardent Nazi in principle, he created upon arrival the impression that he would drive the members of his efficient staff at a high rate of speed and would pay attention to every detail of a busy office. Now that he has been here approximately two months, I find the contrary to be the case: he entrusts more and more detail to his subordinates, has already traveled to a considerable degree through the Northern and Western portions of Bohemia, and in answer to my passing question as to whether he found the duties of his mission arduous, replied, “I am principally busy in keeping in touch with ‘our people’”.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs in his conversation with me, also referred to the importance of immediate developments in the Ethiopian-Italian dispute, expressing himself as far from convinced that Italy’s alleged military triumphs as reported are as great or as lasting as the Italians might wish them to be; expressed thinly disguised dissatisfaction with sanctions which, although loyally supported by this country, are a constant source of annoyance and economic dislocation; and quite frankly referred to the inevitable weakening of Italy as a result of the Abyssinian campaign and her economic difficulties which would greatly lessen the potency of her resistance against Germany should Austria find it necessary to bespeak the support so often promised by Mussolini.
As I also reported at the time, Czechoslovakia joined in the protest against the decision of Austria to adopt conscription and this, of course, is of importance in the present situation, but I cannot escape the impression that although the protest was a pro forma one characterized by the almost impotent feeling expressed to me by Jan Masaryk as regards Germany: “Of course we don’t like it and we have to say so, but what can we really do about it?”, this Government faces the dilemma of welcoming any increase of armed resistance against Germany and of deploring any dislocation which arises from disregard of Treaties and which will impede economic rapprochement with Austria. In this connection, the Minister for Foreign Affairs observed to me that he hopes that “Austria may find it possible, before the meeting of the Little Entente Foreign Ministers early in May, to give us something so as to obviate the necessity of our laying the matter officially before the League of Nations”. He also said that he does not believe that Hungary will follow Austria’s suit in resorting to conscription, as she sees that her best interest consists in taking no such action at the present moment.
It would indeed be easy to relapse into either of two moods—one contrary to my customary manner of approach to such matters, and the second almost fatal to one who has long followed the profession [Page 294] of diplomacy: pessimism and prophecy. There is ample reason for the former, not only from the standpoint of whether or not this democratic state will be permitted to—or, indeed, can—live among these eddies of political aspirations and enmities of Central Europe which change almost daily and are so beclouded by regional pacts, treaties of mutual assistance, conventions for non-aggression, perambulations of visiting statesmen, et cetera, as now to have reached a point amply described in a recent article in one of Prague’s foremost newspapers as a “diplomatic labyrinth”. The critics (if not the enemies) of Beneš now assume the attitude of more or less malicious hope that he will find that the conduct of affairs of state from the Presidency in these pregnant moments is a very different affair from that of opportunist negotiation at Geneva; while his friends and supporters believe that if this experience has been of any value it is now to be put to the test and wish that his hands might be strengthened by greater willingness on the part of the electorate to deal in more elastic manner with the German elements of the population. The rigidity of the present ruling class in this regard seems, indeed, to be a mingling of a desire for reprisals and a specious superiority complex arising from a position of inferiority for generations: the inhabitants of the German regions of the country express undisguised exasperation at the efforts of this Government to introduce the Czech language in those districts; while the Czech elements in and about those regions assume the attitude of having been ground under foot and reduced to a subordinate situation by Teutonic influences (both German and Austrian) for several hundred years, they now mean to show who is the master. It does not require a very discerning mind to perceive that these sores into which salt is rubbed almost daily may very easily communicate their inflammation to other parts of the body politic.
Should I succumb to the second temptation—that of prophecy—I should be inclined to express the opinion that Germany will go right ahead in getting whatever she wishes, unless the economic situation within that State applies a brake which no other external or internal forces appear able to exert. She has won in the Saar, she has had a moral victory in Memel, she appears to have won in the Rhineland, and the gathering of certain nations at Geneva appears singularly futile in either devising means of control or in supplying the necessary amount of elasticity in the pending negotiations. Admittedly the Franco-German situation is a grave one, but I can only reiterate—even to the exclusion of what used to be known as the “Balkan tinder box”—that the problems of Central Europe and the alignment of the nations composing it are of equal importance. In reply to my inquiry as to what would occur as regards Poland [Page 295] when Germany reaches the point in her program of regaining territorial contiguity with East Prussia, I have been informed from many sources that the quid pro quo for the disappearance of the corridor will be the “granting” of Slovakia to Poland or at least the parcelling of this Province between Hungary and Poland—thus bringing Poland into territorial contiguity with Hungary, capitalizing a friendship which has been an historical fact for centuries, effecting the complete encirclement of the remaining portion of this country, splitting the Little Entente completely apart, and opening a wide front for the “Drang nach Osten” which is as important a factor in Germany’s present policy as it was in the days prior to 1914.
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Respectfully yours,
- Ernst Eisenlohr.↩