Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, General, Volume I

740.00/241½

The British Embassy to the Department of State²

November 29, 1937

Statement by Lord Halifax at the Meeting With the French Ministers in London on November 29th, 1937

Lord Halifax said that he would do his best to speak frankly and to discuss his visit in complete confidence.

He proposed first to treat the various topics that arose during his conversation, and then to add his own personal impressions.

The matters discussed fall naturally into three groups:—

(1) Central and Eastern Europe.

(2) German attitude to the League of Nations and Disarmament.

(3) The Colonial Question.

To some extent these questions were interconnected, but he would try to deal with them separately. He would begin with Central Europe.

central europe

As regards this, the line he took with Herr Hitler was to say that the attitude of His Majesty’s Government was not to stand rigidly in all circumstances on the status quo. No reasonable man could expect the world to remain for ever in the same condition. But His Majesty’s Government and other Governments were concerned to see that if adjustments were made, the form and means of those adjustments should not be such as to involve ugly consequences for Europe and the world.

To this argument Herr Hitler had replied that, as regards Austria, Germany had the agreement of the 11th July, which she had observed and intended to observe.

As regards Czechoslovakia, Herr Hitler made two statements or rather one statement which appeared in different forms in Lord Halifax’s own notes and in the notes supplied to him afterwards by the interpreter. The notes supplied to him by the interpreter had been built up on the notes he had jotted down during the interview; they were not official, but had been seen by Baron von Neurath before they were sent to him.

According to Lord Halifax’s own notes, Herr Hitler said that, as regards Czechoslovakia, he hoped that the reasonable elements in that country would make it possible for the Sudetendeutschen to enjoy a status which would safeguard their position. According to the interpreter’s notes, Herr Hitler said that Czechoslovakia was herself in a position to clear away existing difficulties. She only needed to treat the Germans living within her borders well and they would be entirely happy. Germany herself set great store by good relations with all her neighbours.

While discussing these things, Herr Hitler said that it was desirable to get away from the atmosphere of “imminent catastrophe”. If one believed what one read in the newspapers, one might expect to find German forces in Vienna or Prague next week. In the same way, 20,000 Germans had been reported as having landed in Morocco, when, in fact, there were none. Herr Hitler emphasised that he did not consider Europe to be in a politically dangerous state.

During his conversation with General Goring, the general said that he thought that it should be recognised that Germany was entitled to have special spheres of influence in Europe; and that it would be unreasonable for France and Great Britain to block any agreements Germany might reach with her neighbours. To this Lord Halifax replied that, so far as His Majesty’s Government were concerned, and he imagined the same was true of France, there was no intention to block agreements freely reached, but that we were concerned that matters should not be so handled as to involve dangerous and far-reaching consequences.

During the conversation with Field-Marshal von Blomberg, the latter stated that the vital questions for Germany, with her expanding population and situated as she was in the middle of Europe, were those which concerned Central and Eastern Europe. Just as France had her position in Western Europe and the Mediterranean, so Germany was entitled to a similar position in Central Europe.

That, apart from Lord Halifax’s own impressions, was all he had to report as regards Austria and Czechoslovakia. Danzig and Memel were not seriously discussed.

league of nations

As regards the League of Nations, Herr Hitler said that there was no question of Germany’s return in present circumstances. This was not a question to which a reply could be given at present. In any event, Germany would never return to a League constituted and functioning as at present.

It was evident to Lord Halifax that the League appeared to Herr Hitler as an instrument for the preservation of the status quo. It was also, in Herr Hitler’s eyes, unreal for the representatives of great and small States to sit side by side and to give the appearance of being free and equal.

Disarmament

As regards disarmament, Herr Hitler said with some bitterness that every offer he had made had been refused, and that constant opportunities of progress had been missed. He was regarded as the black sheep of Europe. No offer that he made was ever treated on its merits.

To this Lord Halifax replied that the German offers had not been rejected because of the hostile influence of political parties or newspapers as Herr Hitler had suggested; but because Herr Hitler, for reasons which had seemed good to him, but which Lord Halifax would not now discuss, had violated a number of treaty engagements. It was this that made other Governments look jealously at anything that Germany proposed.

According to the record by the German interpreter, Herr Hitler (though Lord Halifax had missed this in his own record made before he had seen the record of the German interpreter) stated that he still thought it desirable to abolish bombing aeroplanes.

On the general question of disarmament, Herr Hitler asked who was to bring the question forward and how, confessing that he himself did not know.

colonies

As regards colonies, the general line taken by the Chancellor was one with which we were familiar, namely, that it was unreasonable that Germany should be thought unworthy to have colonies; that a good many other countries had a good many colonies, and why not Germany also?

The Chancellor said that the colonial question was the only direct issue between Great Britain and Germany. He hoped that His Majesty’s Government would be able, in consultation with the French Government, to propose a solution of the matter. If the question was settled, well and good; he would be much pleased, and this would help the relations between the United Kingdom and Germany. If the question were not settled, he would note it and regret it.

The Chancellor added—and this was as near as he got to a definition of what he had in his own mind—that if there were any colony which, for strategic reasons, we did not wish to give up, we might propose some other territory in compensation. He made it clear that he did not want any colony which would be a source of strategic trouble; nor a colony in the Sahara, nor in the Mediterranean (that would be dangerous), nor in the Far East (where the guns were already going off).

What General Göring said about colonies was that this was the chief issue between Great Britain and Germany; but he recognised that so far as Great Britain was concerned, the only colonies in question were Tanganyika and the British parts of Togoland and the Cameroons, and that there were special difficulties about Tanganyika. Nevertheless, he thought the problem could be solved without great difficulty.

Lord Halifax’s general conclusion from these conversations was that, in the German view, it was now for Great Britain and France to propose a solution of the colonial question if they wanted one.

M. Delbos asked whether the conversations proceeded on the assumption that France and Great Britain should make proposals only on the basis of the German demand, or whether they should be made on the basis of more general considerations.

Lord Halifax said that the question, as put from the German side, seemed to be that France and Great Britain ought to make a contribution towards meeting Germany’s just claims. Lord Halifax had replied that he could only speak for His Majesty’s Government, but so far as His Majesty’s Government were concerned, it would be impossible for this or any other Government to deal with the colonial question in isolation. If there were to be any solution, it could only be as part of a general settlement, based on contributions from everyone concerned in the interest of European appeasement.

Mr. Chamberlain thought it would be true to say, with reference to M. Delbos’ question, that Germany thought that all her former African Colonies should be restored; but that if there were difficulties about any particular colony, she was ready to consider territorial compensation elsewhere.

Lord Halifax agreed.

M. Delbos asked whether, apart from the question of a general settlement, Lord Halifax had the impression that Germany looked at the colonial question in its territorial aspect only, and set aside all alternative suggestions such, for example, as economic concessions or chartered companies.

Lord Halifax said he would come to that when he reported on his conversations with Dr. Schacht.

He thought it true to say that both Herr Hitler and General Goring contemplated a definitive return of territories, either the original territories themselves or other territories in substitution.

Lord Halifax was not sure what Dr. Schacht now represented, but he spoke frankly and irresponsibly—no doubt on the strength of his imminent departure from his post.

Dr. Schacht said that Germany did not want the Oceanic Islands or South-West Africa or Samoa. She recognised that there were special difficulties about Tanganyika. There remained the West Coast of Africa. He thought the Cameroons and Togoland could and should be returned to Germany; and that, in addition to that, Germany should receive a block made up of parts of Belgian Congo and Angola, under something like a mandate.

Lord Halifax asked Dr. Schacht what he supposed Belgium and Portugal would think about this. Dr. Schacht replied that, as a contribution to world appeasement, they might be persuaded of its wisdom, and that Great Britain might perhaps consider compensating Portugal on the east coast from Tanganyika.

M. Chautemps asked whether, in drawing this new map of Africa, Dr. Schacht included the French Congo in his references to the Congo.

Lord Halifax said he referred only to Belgian and Portuguese territories. If the French contributed Togoland and the Cameroons, that would be sufficient.

Dr. Schacht had also suggested whether, as M. Delbos had remarked, some international chartered company might be formed.

Dr. Schacht thought the United States might join in, and Germany might have 51 per cent of the interests. This would make it easier for Portugal and for those who spoke for native interests. In that event Herr Hitler might be willing to give guarantees about black armies and the like.

personal impressions

Lord Halifax said he would give his personal impressions, subject to the observation that he had been in Germany only three days; that he was not a trained diplomat, and might, in consequence, have been deceived; and that the Germans might have meant something different from what they said, or might have changed their minds.

The main impression left with him was that the Germans intended to press their colonial claim, but that they would not press it to the point of war. Unless that claim could be met in some form, it would be impossible to improve relations in such a way as to make an advance towards the object which we all had in view. The question we had to ask ourselves, therefore, was whether it was possible to use this problem as a lever for getting some of the things both the French and British Governments wanted, such, for example, as a contribution by Germany toward European peace. Putting it at the lowest, unless this demand could be met, Germany would probably maintain and extend her nuisance value to us everywhere in the world.

His broad impression was that Germany was extremely anxious for friendly relations with us. The Germans to whom he had spoken were also anxious to convince him that Germany had no direct cause of difficulty with France.

Lord Halifax had said, and Herr Hitler had assented, that His Majesty’s Government had no more desire to divide Berlin from Rome than he presumed and hoped the German Government had to divide London from Paris.

At the same time, while he desired to be friendly with us, the Chancellor was not prepared to run after us, and was conscious of his own strength. He was not bent on early adventures, partly because these might be unprofitable, and partly because he was busy building up Germany internally.

As he had said before, Herr Hitler had remarked that he did not think Europe was face to face with imminent catastrophe. In the same way, General Goring had assured him that not one drop of German blood would be shed in Europe unless Germany was absolutely forced to it.

The Germans gave him the impression of being convinced that time was on their side and of intending to achieve their aims in orderly fashion. They were likely, he thought, to persist in any action which might further the achievement of the desired adjustments in comparatively orderly fashion, but not to take any action in any manner that would give other Governments cause to oppose or intervene.

Lord Halifax had suggested at the end of the conversation that His Majesty’s Government would welcome a visit from German representatives to discuss all these matters in greater detail. Herr Hitler replied that he did not think conferences were useful unless success was assured. If Baron von Neurath were to come to London now, every German would believe he had been sent to discuss colonies. If he came back without a colony, the situation would be more difficult than before. Herr Hitler hoped, therefore, that the matter could be pursued through the diplomatic channel, and he looked forward to direct discussions later, in which France and Italy would be associated.

M. Chautemps thanked Lord Halifax for his interesting statement. He would ask one question. He had noted the important statement made by Herr Hitler about Czechoslovakia, though he had also noted that the sense of von Blomberg’s remarks on the same subject had been somewhat different. Did Lord Halifax think that Herr Hitler’s reassuring words about Czechoslovakia represented German policy, not only at present but as it would be in the future?

Lord Halifax said that he was not in any better position to answer that question than anyone else. He had been surprised at the moderation of Herr Hitler’s remarks on this point. He could only suppose that the degree of permanence would in part depend on Germany’s general international position and on the influence which we might exercise on the later development of German policy.

M. Chautemps also wished to ask whether any connexion had been established during Lord Halifax’s visit between the colonial question and the Central European question. Was the suggestion that Germany should be given satisfaction in the colonial sphere, in the hope that in other spheres there might be appeasement later; or was it suggested that, in return for satisfaction in the colonial sphere, Germany should give assurances as regards other questions here and now?

Lord Halifax replied that, as he had said, Herr Hitler’s view was that the colonial question was the only direct issue between Germany and Great Britain. He himself had repeated on other occasions that we could only consider the colonial question as part of a wider set of problems. At the end of the conversation, Herr Hitler had seemed to have in mind some further examination of all these problems through the diplomatic channel, but that it was useless to pursue these matters unless we came forward with concrete proposals on the colonial issue. The connexion between the two problems therefore lay in our hands and would depend on how we handled matters if we got as far as having further conversations.

2. Handed to the Under Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on December 15, 1937.