761.91/210: Telegram
The Chargé in Iran (Engert) to the Secretary of State
Tehran, March
16, 1940—7 p.m.
[Received March 17—11:45 a.m.]
[Received March 17—11:45 a.m.]
46. By an odd coincidence for the third time in 3 years the Shah’s birthday has been celebrated when attention was focused on the triumph of aggression. See, e. g., my telegram 22, March 16, 1939.12 It was natural therefore that at the Crown Prince’s dinner party last night the news from Finland should form the chief topic of conversation.
- (1)
- The first reaction among highly placed Iranians was one of dismay. They did not conceal their great concern over the new international situation created by Finland’s surrender. They feel frontiers everywhere are threatened if all such modifications of the map are permitted to go unchallenged. As stated in paragraph 3 of the Legation’s 40, March 7, 9 p.m. the Iranian Government had been watching the Finnish war with intense interest and had hoped until the last that Finland might yet prevent extension of Soviet ambitions. But now they fear the Soviets may reach out after fresh objectives and as the world seems to be completely in the dark as to Moscow’s real motives and intentions the implications of the events in the Baltic have not been lost on Iran.
- (2)
- While Iranian official circles profess great satisfaction that the commercial agreement13 referred to in my 44 of March 14, 9 a.m.14 should have been concluded just at this juncture and cite it as proof of the improved atmosphere which now obtains between Iran and Russia, they are always prepared for disagreeable surprises from Moscow. Although Iran has displayed a genuine desire to reduce the tension and can justly claim the chief credit for such improvement in their relations as may exist, the unscrupulous system and methods for which Stalin stands may force her to adapt herself to a new relationship with Soviet Russia. In fact, the Russian Ambassador is reliably reported to have intimated to the Foreign Office here that his country desired settlements “on broad lines” which is interpreted as an intention to tighten Russia’s grip on all border states.
- (3)
- Iran’s and Afghanistan’s geographic position is such that close commercial relations with Russia are natural and both show anxiety lest the trade relationships be exploited by the Soviets to revive policy of aggression in Central Asia. Without taking the many recent rumors regarding Russian projects in the Middle East too literally, Iran has undoubtedly been marked out for greater commercial and diplomatic activity which may well translate itself into a demand for nonaggression or mutual assistance pact. Iran does not want such a pact with Moscow and she does not want to suffer the fate of Poland and Finland.
- (4)
- As pointed out in earlier reports, e. g., my telegrams 112, 120, 128, and 151 [152] of 1939 and despatch No. 1755, January 10, 1940,15 the Iranian Government is firmly convinced that the Soviets have reverted to and adopted most of the imperialism of the old Czarist Russia and are using the expansion of Bolshevist doctrines as an instrument of the new revolutionary imperialism. Influential Iranian circles are therefore longing for a sign that the democracies are prepared to call Stalin’s bluff and the fact that Turkey, Egypt and Iraq are now all linked with the democratic nations would probably make the Government receptive to proposals to consolidate Iran’s position in the Middle East. In any event, informed opinion here is now under no misapprehension as to what a German-Soviet victory would mean for the future of Iran.
Engert