793.94/15964
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, June 19, 1940—7
p.m.
[Received June 19—12:54 p.m.]
[Received June 19—12:54 p.m.]
473. Our 470, June 19, 5 p.m., and 471, June 19, 6 p.m.
- 1.
- The British Ambassador saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon alone after the signing of the Tientsin agreement,54 informed him of the substance of the communication received from a military source set forth in our 470, June 19, 5 p.m., and asked the Minister whether the communication represented the views and intentions of the Japanese Government.
- 2.
- The Minister replied that the communication “should not be taken seriously” and that communications from the Japanese Government to other governments would be conveyed through the Minister himself. He added that consideration was given to the presentation [to] the British and French Governments of some of the points brought out in the military communication but that such points would be presented in an entirely different way from the military presentation.
- 3.
- Prefacing my own talk with the Minister for Foreign Affairs later in the afternoon I said to Mr. Arita that the British Ambassador had advised me of the substance of the military communication and of the Minister’s comments thereon and that Sir Robert Craigie had authorized me to inform the Minister that I was aware of the nature of their conversation. I told the Minister that my Government would be deeply concerned when receiving my report of the military communication to the British Ambassador and I inquired whether I might inform my Government that the Minister had confirmed to me his statement to the British Ambassador; the Minister thereupon authorized me to inform my Government that he confirmed his statement to the British Ambassador as set forth in paragraph numbered 2 above.
- 4.
- The British Ambassador in his conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out with regard to the question of closing the Burma-China frontier that the forthcoming rainy season will automatically prevent traffic over that frontier for several months, and he furthermore pointed out the extremely small percentage of British exports over the Burma road.
- 5.
- The Ambassador said to me that without the support of the United States Great Britain, owing to the situation in Europe, would undoubtedly be obliged to withdraw the British troops from Shanghai [Page 29] in the face of a Japanese demand but that his Government had no intention of leaving the United States in the lurch.
- 6.
- The Ambassador understands that Prince Kanin, the Chief of Staff, is to see the Emperor today, presumably in order to discuss the matters presented in the military communication, and Sir Robert Craigie doubts whether the Emperor will approve of the proposed procedure of the army. The Ambassador characterizes the military communication as in line with previous saber rattling prior to the opening of negotiations but he recognizes the fact that the present communication under reference is of an unusually serious nature.
Grew