Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume V

751G.92/198

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

The State Department’s aide-mémoire on the subject of Thailand and Indo-China which Dr. Hornbeck handed to Mr. Butler on January 10th has been carefully considered by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, who find themselves fully in agreement with much that it contains; they appreciate in particular that the permanence of any settlement which may be reached in the near future is doubtful. On the other hand they are profoundly convinced that to allow the dispute between the Thai Government and the French authorities to continue would be fraught with grave risks, and they feel that the value of opening negotiations for even a transient settlement requires to be considered in the light of other possibilities.

2. Recent information from Bangkok suggests that both Thailand and Japan are contemplating a further step, probably in April, namely the Japanese occupation of Southern Indo-China and Saigon and a simultaneous advance by the Thais into Laos and Cambodia. Indo-China would thus disappear, and even if Japan did not proceed at once to swallow up Thailand also, the latter would become no more than a puppet state. Japan would then have reached, with the minimum of effort, a position extending to the boundaries of Burma and providing powerful bases for operations against that country, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

3. Japan is so placed already that by helping or hampering each side at will she can influence the course of the present hostilities between Indo-China and Thailand, and their continuance can only work out to her advantage by weakening both countries and creating opportunities for further penetration. A settlement of the dispute, or even an effort to settle it, would interfere with Japan’s plans and gain time in which it may be possible to encourage and strengthen French resistance to Japan. In such circumstances the latter may hesitate to put into operation her further designs against Southern Indo-China, whereas an attitude on the part of the United States and Great Britain which allowed aggression to take its course seems likely to render it more certain that Japan’s advance will eventually only be stopped by war. While the ultimate occupation of Indo-China and Thailand by Japan may conceivably be inevitable, to remain passive in the face of the situation being created by Japan would, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, be to accelerate the pace of her advance and to hasten the day when she will be in a position to launch an attack upon Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

4. If on the other hand the process of infiltration and absorption can be retarded and Japan’s doubts as to the wisdom and success of her policy be increased, there may yet be hope of reaching a stage when the forces opposing her will have become so formidable that she will elect to abandon that policy.

5. In order to bring the Japanese to this frame of mind His Majesty’s Government believe broadly speaking that it is desirable that, if possible, at each successive stage of Japan’s advance some reaction should be displayed and an indication given by the United States and Great Britain that they are not prepared to remain passive while Japan attempts to alter the status quo in the Far East.

6. At this particular juncture however and in relation to the Thai-Indo-Chinese situation His Majesty’s Government believe that there would be great utility in the United States Government using their influence with the French Government to induce them to open negotiations in Bangkok. If the United States Government are not convinced as to the wisdom of pressing the French Government to make the concessions which His Majesty’s Government believe to be necessary to effect a settlement with Thailand, and are therefore unwilling to recommend this course to the French Government, His Majesty’s Government think it would be of great value if the United States Government found it possible at an early date to make some public statement referring to the well-known view of the United States regarding the settlement of disputes by negotiations, and appealing to the two countries to compose a quarrel which, if continued, is likely to work out to the ultimate disadvantage of both sides. Such a statement, His Majesty’s Government believe, coming from the United States Government would carry great weight, and might have the advantage of focussing public attention on the dangers latent in the existing situation.

7. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom for their part have been doing their best to impress on the Thai Government their desire to see negotiations take place. In addition to representations in this sense made by His Majesty’s Minister in Bangkok, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on January 8th, informed the Thai Minister in London that His Majesty’s Government had been distressed to note the situation developing between Thailand and Indo-China. As a great power and neighbour Great Britain was naturally interested to see a just and peaceful settlement of this dispute. She did not wish to see trouble in the Far East, and if British interests or possessions were in any way threatened, directly or indirectly, the Thai Government must expect immediate reaction from His Majesty’s Government.

8. His Majesty’s Government wish the United States Government to have a full record of this conversation and a summary of the remainder is attached in a separate note, Annex A. They believe that it would be useful if language on parallel lines could be held to the Thai Minister in Washington.

9. As an additional step in the direction of bringing the parties together the Commander-in-Chief of the British China Squadron was instructed by telegram on January 11th, to make a very confidential communication to Admiral Decoux, Governor of Indo-China, with reference to the visit to Singapore of his Aide de Camp, Captain Jouan, mentioned in the Embassy’s aide mémoire of January 6th. The substance of this communication is shown in the attached Annex B.⁴⁵

10. In the two lines of action indicated above His Majesty’s Government believe that they have done what lies in their power to induce the two parties to the dispute to enter into negotiations, which, whether successful or not, offer some prospect of causing valuable delay in the advance of Japan towards Singapore and other objectives.

Washington , 22 January, 1941.

[Enclosure]

annex a

Summary of Conversation on January 8th Between Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. R. A. Butler, M. P., and the Thai Minister in London

Mr. R. A. Butler proceeded to draw the Thai Minister’s attention to certain disquieting information which had been received about the intentions of Japan, regarding Thailand, particularly to the report that the Japanese were sending aircraft and instructors to Thailand. Mr. Butler declined to believe that Thailand would make the mistake of entering the Japanese camp, as this would mean entering the Axis camp and running the risk of becoming embroiled in a world conflagration. It was one thing for the Thai Government to interest themselves in frontier adjustments on the Mekong River, but quite another to play the Japanese game by becoming the base for Japanese operations in a possible extension of the war. His Majesty’s Government did not wish either to extend the war or to enter hostilities with the Japanese, such unfortunate events would only occur through a miscalculation either by the Japanese or Thais of spirit and determination of Britain to defend her possessions and guard her interests. The best way to preserve the independence of Thailand which was of paramount importance to His Majesty’s Government and to resist Japanese encroachments would be for the Thais to avoid becoming involved in very wide and dangerous problems.

The Thai Minister said he was sure that his Government had no wish to enter the Axis camp but referred to the difficulty his Government were experiencing in securing munitions and aircraft elsewhere than in Japan. They were nervous about French intentions and he said must look after their own armies. He asked as a personal question whether His Majesty’s Government would come to the assistance of Thailand were she attacked. Mr. Butler replied that he was unable to discuss that question but emphasized that in His Majesty’s Government’s view, any Japanese encroachments were undesirable. In reply to a further question by the Thai Minister, Mr. Butler said that such encroachments would comprise questions of trade also, since His Majesty’s Government were interested in preserving a free market in Thailand and, for instance, would not wish to see the time-honoured trade in tin and rubber between Thailand and British possessions, in particular Malaya, altered by any arrangements which the Thai Government might be contemplating.

The Thai Minister promised to convey to his Government what Mr. Butler had said. Mr. Butler repeated that reports which we had received had made a painful impression in London and he urged the Thai Minister to bring home to his Government the serious view which we took of them.

45. Not printed; it stated that Admiral Decoux was to be told that, for the purpose of being able to assist in bringing about negotiations, the British Government would welcome information as to the scope of negotiations he would be willing to undertake with the Thai Government and the manner in which they could be most: rapidly undertaken, such information to be passed on to the United States Government.