Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President¹

secret

Washington, November 23, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

As the Russian Army approaches the Polish frontier the Polish Government is showing its extreme anxiety over the future of Poland and I believe that I should send you a rather full summary of developments.

The following are the principal points of a confidential memorandum from the Polish Premier to you which has been handed to me by the Polish Ambassador:²

The Prime Minister referred to the Polish Government’s memorandum of October 6³ which among other things expressed the hope that normal Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations could be restored in order that the Polish and Soviet Governments could then endeavor to settle their mutual problems and asked for British-American guarantees of the independence and integrity of Polish territory as well as the security of its inhabitants. To assure this the October 6 memorandum made the impractical suggestion that American-British troops should be stationed in Poland to prevent friction and possible reprisals. That memorandum indicated that if the Soviet Government should openly attempt to communize Poland after its armies had occupied Polish territory this might cause the Polish population as an act of desperation to retaliate in self defense.

The latest memorandum dated November 18 appeals to you “to intervene with Marshal Stalin with a view to restoring Polish-Soviet relations, safeguarding the interests of the Polish State and the life and property of its citizens after the Soviet troops have entered Poland.”

The memorandum asserts that “the unwillingness of the Polish Government to enter into discussions on frontier questions is based on the following considerations:”

1. Poland has never given up the fight against Germany since 1939 and is fully entitled to emerge from the war without reduction of territory.

2. Soviet claims to Eastern Poland comprises half of total Polish territory and contain important centers of Polish national life.

The memorandum continues: “The Polish Government could not see their way to enter into a discussion on the subject of territorial concessions above all for the reason that such a discussion in the absence of effective guarantees of Poland’s independence and security on the part of the United States and Great Britain would be sure to lead to ever new demands. The attribution to Poland of East Prussia, Danzig, Opole, Silesia and the straightening and shortening of the Polish Western frontier are in any case dictated by the need to provide for the stability of future peace, the disarmament of Germany and the security of Poland and other countries of Central Europe. The transfer to Poland of these territories cannot therefore be fairly treated as an object of compensation for the cession to the USSR of Eastern Poland which for reasons adduced above does by no means represent to the USSR a value comparable to that which it has for Poland. The attempt made to prejudice the fate of Polish Eastern territories by means of a popular vote organized under Soviet occupation by the occupying authorities is without any value either political or legal. It would be equally impossible to obtain a genuine expression of the will of the population inhabiting these territories in view of the ruthless methods applied there today and those which have been applied in the past by consecutive occupants.”

The memorandum then states that “a rising in Poland against Germany is being planned to break out at a moment mutually agreed upon with our Allies either before or at the very moment of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland.

“In accordance with the principles adopted in Quebec,⁴ the Polish Government is entitled to exert sovereign authority over Polish lands as they are liberated from the enemy. Consequently, in case the entry of Soviet troops into Poland takes place after the reestablishment of Polish-Soviet relations, the Polish Government would be anxious, as it has already informed the American Government, to return immediately to Poland together with the Commander-in-Chief, and to cooperate there in the further struggle against Germany.

“The entry of Soviet troops on Polish territory without previous resumption of Polish-Soviet relations would force the Polish Government to undertake political action against the violation of Polish sovereignty while the Polish local administration and army in Poland would have to continue to work underground. In that case the Polish Government foresee the use of measures of self-defence wherever such measures are rendered indispensable by Soviet methods of terror and extermination of Polish citizens.”

Asserting that the Moscow Conference did not bring the question of resumption of Polish-Soviet relations nearer to a satisfactory solution, the memorandum states that the Polish Government has reason “to fear that in present conditions the life and property of Polish citizens may be exposed to danger after the entry of Soviet troops into Poland and the imposing on the country of Soviet administration. In that case desperate reaction of the Polish community may be expected following the violation of the principle adopted in Quebec assuring to the United Nations their liberty and their own administration.”

The memorandum further indicates that the Polish Government does not believe that the principles applied to Italy as adopted at the Moscow Conference⁵ would be satisfactory for Poland which is not an enemy country but a member of the United Nations. Moreover, it is stated that the presence of a few American and British liaison officers in Poland would not assure proper safeguards in the administration of the territory occupied by the Red Army.

When the Ambassador handed me the above memorandum he also delivered a personal message to you from the Polish Prime Minister stating that he is anxious to submit to you personally and verbally certain alternatives for the solution of existing difficulties and would be grateful for the opportunity of doing so. He added “I am ready to undertake the necessary journey at any time and in complete secrecy.”

In presenting the Polish Prime Minister’s request to see you the Ambassador indicated that Mikolajczyk wished to join you and Mr. Churchill to which I replied that I did not believe it would be possible to arrange this since you would be busily engaged in military matters of great urgency.

Subsequent to this Ambassador Biddle telegraphed on November 20 that Mikolajczyk and the Polish Foreign Minister had insisted that they should be consulted in advance concerning any decisions that might be taken involving Polish interests.

The Poles indicated that decisions taken without full consultation with the Polish Government upon which the underground in Poland stakes its hope would undoubtedly lead to a serious crisis in that quarter. Furthermore, it would create a crisis in Polish circles in England, the Middle East, and might have “serious repercussions among Americans of Polish origin.” Mikolajczyk interjected that even a man condemned to death was granted a last word before the court.

The Polish Foreign Minister referred to a formula which Mr. Eden, he said, is considering which envisaged dividing Poland into regions in which respectively the military administration of the “liberating forces” and the Polish Government might function. He added that it was logical that whatever formulae were advanced would meet with counter proposals and the Polish Government considered it of the utmost importance that its representatives be on hand during these discussions.

In pressing for arrangements so that he could meet you Mikolajczyk said that there were things he could present orally but could not put in writing at this time.

On the basis of the foregoing and the extremely agitated state of mind of the Polish Ambassador here it is apparent that the Polish Government feels that it is in a desperate position. This may well lead to unfortunate public outbursts. In an effort to calm the Ambassador I made it clear to him that I had emphasized at Moscow my friendly and earnest interest in his country and had urged Molotov to find a basis for reestablishing diplomatic relations with Poland; that once these relations were restored ways and means could be found to work out and adjust their differences. I told the Ambassador that as a friend of Poland I would continue to watch every opportunity to be of service to both Governments.

I also pointed out to the Ambassador that I regretted to find on my return Polish attacks on the Four-Nation Declaration when this Declaration means everything to the future of Poland. I also indicated my regret at shortsighted Polish agitation in this country of a thoroughly unfriendly nature which has manifested itself in other ways than condemning the Four-Nation Declaration.

We are making every effort here and through Biddle in London to convince the Poles, official and unofficial, that they must take a calmer outlook and not prejudice their case by undue public agitation regarding our policies.

With the approach of the Red Army to former Polish territory it would appear that every friendly opportunity should be taken to bring about a resumption of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. If this is not possible at the moment, I believe we should exert all our influence to persuade the Polish Government to give instructions to its underground army to launch at the opportune moment a full-fledged attack on the Germans behind their lines and to assist the Red Army in its battle. The Polish Government should realize that if this is achieved the British and ourselves will be in a better position to convince the Soviet Government of the Polish Government’s desire to make a material contribution to the shortening of the war, and to collaborate with the other United Nations after the war in working for the establishment of an organization of peace-loving nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Hull

1. Channel of transmission not indicated.
2. The memorandum from the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) was dated November 18, 1943, and the one from the Polish Premier (Mikolajczyk) was dated November 16, 1943 (760.61/2120). For a similar memorandum dated November 16, 1943, from Mikolajczyk to Churchill, see Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 267.
3. Not printed herein.
4. The reference here is apparently to a proposed joint statement regarding liberated areas, the text of which was agreed upon by Roosevelt and Churchill at a meeting on August 22, 1943, during the First Quebec Conference. It was decided at that meeting that the statement would first be communicated to the Soviet and Chinese Governments and the refugee governments directly concerned, with a view to its eventual publication on or about September 15. The statement was duly transmitted to the Soviet and Chinese Governments; but on September 11 the Department informed Biddle, in London, that at the request of the British Government the date for communication of the statement to the refugee governments had been postponed. On September 15 the Department instructed the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) and the Chargé in China (Atcheson) to inform the respective Governments that issuance of the statement had been postponed and that it should continue to be regarded as confidential. On September 28 Campbell, of the British Embassy, stated to Dunn, of the Department of State, his Government’s view that the time and appropriateness for the issuance of the statement had passed and its desire that the statement as agreed upon at Quebec be “definitely cancelled”. Dunn thereupon agreed to the cancellation. The documents available do not indicate from what source the Polish Government learned of the proposed statement. (800.0146/155½, 159a, 160, 160a, 161, 161a, 163a, 164, 165, 170, 171a, 209, 228)
5. For the Declaration regarding Italy, November 1, 1943, see Decade, p. 12.