Office of the Historian

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

secret
C. C. S. 407 (Revised)1
[Cairo,] 26 November 1943.

Collaboration With the U. S. S. R.

1.
During the forthcoming conference with the Soviets it is recommended that the following broad lines of action be adopted:
a.
That the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree upon the U. S.–British strategy in Europe and seek the approval of the President and Prime Minister before meeting the Soviets.
b.
That the Soviets be urged to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations offensive by effective coordination with Overlord.
c.
That the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to consult together before making reply to proposals upon which there has been no previous agreement.
d.
That, specifically, an agreed answer be obtained to any Soviet proposals which involve the undertaking of major operations through the Balkans or the Aegean.
e.
That a common policy be adopted concerning Turkey, to include briefly the support of the Soviet proposal to force Turkey into the war2 but to stand firm on the principle that no diversion of forces or supplies for Turkey can be accepted to the prejudice of approved operations elsewhere.
2.
Throughout the deliberation with the Soviets it should be made clear that the United States and Great Britain are involved in military operations not only in the European Theater but also in the Pacific-Asiatic Theater, and that their heavy commitments of resources throughout the world compel them to decide on operations only after careful analysis of the over-all situation.
3.
At the Moscow Conference, the United States and British representatives were primarily engaged in explaining and defending their own position. In the future, the United States and Great Britain should make specific requests on the Soviets.
4.
A proposed agenda is attached as an enclosure.
[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Proposed Agenda for U. S.–British–U. S. S. R. Conference

1. Coordination of Military Effort

The coordination of Soviet operations with Anglo-American operations in Europe.

2. Italy

Discuss current and planned military operations in and from Italy.

3. Turkey

Turkish action on entry into the war.

4. Supplies to Russia

5. Strategic Bombing

Discussion of Soviet capabilities to initiate strategic bombing of targets in Germany or her satellites in extension of Pointblank. (Current intelligence indicates German fighter strength is extremely weak on the Russian front—130 serviceable fighters.)

6. Japan

On the assumption that the U. S. S. R. will bring up for discussion its entry into the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany, the following should be considered:

a.
Request Soviets to furnish combat intelligence information concerning Japan; if agreed to we will present specific questions through the military mission at Moscow.
b.
Request Soviets to indicate whether they consider it desirable at this time to set in hand arrangements to base Soviet submarine force in U. S. territory.
c.
Request Soviets to indicate what direct or indirect assistance they will be able to give, if it is found possible to launch an attack on the Northern Kuriles.
d.
Soviets to indicate what ports, if any, they could allow the Allies to use. Request Soviets to furnish data on ports through Military Mission in order that we may determine the size and type of Naval Task Forces we can employ.
e.
Soviets to indicate what air bases, if any, they could allow our air forces to use for operations against Japan, and what facilities, including gasoline and bombs, could be supplied. What air routes to these bases could be provided?

  1. C. C. S. 407, dated November 25, 1943, differed from this document in that, among other things, it did not contain, in the enclosure, the items numbered 3 and 4 in the enclosure to this document, and it contained, as numbered items in the enclosure, the material which was subsequently incorporated in C. C. S. 407/1 (infra) under the headings lettered A, B, and C.↩
  2. See ante, p. 135.↩