Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 7, 1943, 11 a.m.

secret

1. Approval of Conclusions of C. C. S. 137th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 137th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.²

2. Integrated Command of U. S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area

(C. C. S. 400,³ 400/1⁴ and 400/2⁵)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them C. C. S. 400/2 as amended by the corrigendum issued on 7 December.⁶

Sir Charles Portal said that the attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff to the proposals had already been stated and to these views he had nothing to add. He recognized, however, that the new directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff was designed to meet some of the objections which had been put forward. The British Chiefs of Staff could not signify their approval of the proposals, but recognized the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to issue such directives to their own air forces as they might see fit. If the new directive were issued, he, for his part, was prepared to assume the responsibility laid on him by this directive, and to carry it out to the best of his ability. He would suggest, however, that before implementing the new policy, General Arnold should, if possible, hear the views of General Eisenhower, General Wilson, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder.

General Arnold said he was anxious to implement the proposals as soon as possible. He would, however, discuss the matter as suggested by Sir Charles Portal before taking final action.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Accepted C. C. S. 400/2.

b. Took note:

(1) that although the British Chiefs of Staff do not agree in principle with C. C. S. 400/2, the United States Chiefs of Staff have decided to issue the directive giving effect to their proposals;

(2) that before issue of the directive, the Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces would consult General Eisenhower, Air Marshal Tedder and General Wilson;

(3) that the Chief of the Air Staff undertook to carry out the duties laid upon him by the directive contained in C. C. S. 400/2 (as corrected by corrigendum of 7 December).

3. Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Alternative to “Buccaneer”

(C. C. S. 427 and 427/1)⁷

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a telegram from Admiral Mountbatten (C. C. S. 427/1).

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that no decisions should be taken until the views of the Generalissimo were known.

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given brief consideration to the subject that morning. In general, their views were that since Buccaneer had been postponed, the trained forces earmarked for this operation would be available for use elsewhere. Some might be required for commando operations, if these were decided upon. The service troops might be used to assist in overcoming the logistic difficulties in Calcutta and Assam. The combat troops might be used as a reliable reserve in the rear of the Chinese forces operating on the Ledo Road. He was most anxious to ensure that our Assam bases and the pipeline should not be lost. The report received with regard to the bad morale of the Chinese forces⁸ had, he felt, been given too much weight. It was a report from one officer only, who was not in contact with the troops. The reactions of the Generalissimo could not be foretold, but if Operation Tarzan was called off he felt that the operations outlined by Admiral Mountbatten might well be undertaken with an additional advance by the Chinese forces on the Ledo Road with the United States long range penetration group of 2,500 to 3,000 men operating ahead of them, and with some of the British forces released from Buccaneer forming a reserve.

Sir Alan Brooke said he was in general agreement with the views which had been expressed. If the Generalissimo did not agree to the undertaking of Operation Tarzan, but preferred an additional air lift over the “hump,” then a new directive might be given to Admiral Mountbatten, giving him as his objective the assurance of the Assam lines of communication and instructing him that the combat forces released from Buccaneer should be used in active offensive operations to achieve the object while the non-fighting troops released should be used to assist in overcoming logistics difficulties and in the construction of the facilities required for the operations of the B–29’s. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should inform General Wedemeyer of these views, telling him that they should form a basis for future planning, but could not be taken as a firm instruction until a reply from the Generalissimo had been received. In the meantime, a draft directive could be prepared for Admiral Mountbatten on the assumption that the Generalissimo would prefer the postponement of Tarzan.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. That a new directive along the lines indicated in the above discussion should be issued to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command regarding the campaign to be carried out in North Burma in 1944; and

b. That this directive should not be dispatched until the receipt of the Generalissimo’s reply⁹ to the President’s dispatch of 5 December¹⁰ on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.¹¹

4. Provision of Merchant Shipping Types for the War Against Japan

(C. C. S. 415/3)¹²

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet¹³ and the First Sea Lord,¹⁴ as set out in C. C. S. 415/3.

5. Relation of Available Resources to the Operations Decided Upon

(C. C. S. 428)¹⁵

Sir Alan Brooke said that the paper under consideration had been prepared in great haste as an interim report, and as such it could be accepted. Further work would have to be done in the light of the final decisions yet to be taken.

General Marshall agreed with this view. He suggested certain amendments to the report, which were agreed.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Accepted in principle the relation of available resources to agreed operations outlined in C. C. S. 428 with the modifications approved in the course of discussion. (Amended paper subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 428 (Rev.)¹⁶)

6. Development of Facilities in the Azores

(C. C. S. 270/13 and 270/14)¹⁷

Sir Charles Portal said that there were two sides to this problem. Firstly, with regard to the political position, the latest information from Lisbon showed that Dr. Salazar was ready to allow the operation of United States anti-submarine forces and the ferrying of United States aircraft through the Azores on condition that acceptable formulae to cover these operations could be found. The British Chiefs of Staff memorandum (C. C. S. 270/14) suggested certain formulae. These were contained in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the paper. He would like to know if these were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had already put forward a draft memorandum for the President to send to the State Department with regard to the changing of the insignia on the United States aircraft to be used in the Azores.¹⁸

Sir Charles Portal said that he did not believe that this would now be necessary. It seemed to him that provided Dr. Salazar could be satisfied that the United States anti-submarine forces were operating on loan to His Majesty’s Government under command of a British officer from a British base, and that the American transit aircraft were controlled by the British Air Transport Command, he, Dr. Salazar, would be satisfied.

With regard to the military aspects, it had been found necessary to obtain additional facilities; for instance, more land was required, and it was desired to run a pipeline to take the place of the long haul for gasoline by road. In this connection, it was proposed that the British Government should make a further approach to the Portuguese Government, asking for these additional facilities, on the ground that these were a natural development on the agreement already in force.

General Arnold said that the formulae suggested by Sir Charles Portal were entirely acceptable to him, except for the proposal in the second half of paragraph 4 of C. C. S. 270/14 with regard to the second airfield. He suggested, therefore, that the British proposals with this exception should be accepted and that he and Sir Charles Portal should work out the necessary details.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved C. C. S. 270/14 with the elimination of the last sentence of paragraph 4.

b. Agreed that details regarding the use of the Azores facilities by United States Army air forces should be settled directly between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal.

7. New Command Arrangements

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the date on which the new Mediterranean Command¹⁹ should be set up, and the most suitable time for General Eisenhower to leave this theater and assume command of the Allied Expeditionary Force.²⁰

It was generally agreed that it was undesirable to publish the fact that unification of command in the Mediterrean had been set up, or to announce General Eisenhower’s new appointment. In this latter case, however, it was accepted that for political reasons the announcement of this appointment would be necessary.

Sir Hastings Ismay put forward a draft memorandum covering these points.²¹ The Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted this memorandum for submission to the President and Prime Minister.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Agreed that the unification of Command in the Mediterranean shall take effect from 10 December.²² There should be no public announcement of this change of organization.

b. Agreed to recommend that General Eisenhower should hand over Command of the Mediterranean Theater on 1 January, or as soon after that date as General Eisenhower himself thinks desirable, having regard to the progress of the operations to capture Rome.²³

c. Agreed to recommend, that, if there is to be a public announcement of General Eisenhower’s move from the Mediterranean to the U. K., his new appointment should be described as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.²⁴

d. Recommend that concurrently with the above, the announcement should be made of the new Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater.²⁵

e. Took note that the approval of the President and Prime Minister would be sought to the above before transmission of the necessary instructions.²⁶

8. Operations in Southeast Asia Command

(C.C.S. 411/5²⁷)

The United States Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum (C C. S. 411/5) setting out certain proposals with regard to the air lift to China.

After a brief discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved C. C. S. 411/5.

9. Employment of French Forces

Sir Alan Brooke reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that General Giraud had put forward a proposal for employing at least one French armored division from the United Kingdom.²⁸ He felt that in view of shipping limitations and the fact that Operation Anvil had now been decided on, it would be better to maintain the principle that the main French effort should be made in the South of France.

General Marshall agreed with this view. The training of a French armored division in the United Kingdom would prove difficult. It would be better that the French armored division and other French forces should if possible be given a period of active service in Italy, and then used for Operation Anvil. It must be remembered of course that General Giraud did not know that this operation had been decided on. As he saw, it would probably be best for the Anvil forces to be principally United States and the remainder French. The majority of the forces in Italy would then be British. It was most important that the French forces for Anvil should have had experience in battle before this operation. There would, of course, have to be a token French force for Operation Overlord.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. That for shipping and other reasons it was undesirable that a French armored division should be sent to take part in Operation Overlord.

b. That as a general policy:

(1) A French force should participate in Anvil and only a token force in Overlord.

(2) It will probably be best to undertake the Anvil operation with U. S. forces with French participation, and to continue the campaign in Italy with British forces.

c. That all French formations should be given battle experience in Italy.

10. Final Remarks

Sir Alan Brooke said he would like to express on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff their deep gratitude for the way in which the United States Chiefs had met their views.

There was one other point he would like to mention. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their appreciation of the unstinting help given to the British and other Allies from American production. This aspect of United States assistance was not mentioned in the consideration of strategy, but nevertheless had the widest repercussions on all our plans, and was playing a great part in the successful development of the war. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their deep admiration of the stupendous efforts which the United States had made in the field of production.

General Marshall said that he very much appreciated Sir Alan Brooke’s gracious tributes. He felt that it was most important that during the next month or so the British and United States Chiefs of Staff should both study how best the magnitude of future conferences could be reduced. They would undoubtedly in future have to take place at shorter intervals.

Admiral King, in agreeing with this view, said that every effort should also be made to cut down the number of subjects discussed at these important conferences.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. That it was desirable to cut down as much as possible the attendance at future U. S.-British Conferences.

b. That a study with this in view should be carried out within the next month.

2. The minutes, as amended, are printed ante, p. 734.
3. Ante, p. 228.
4. Ante, p. 432.
5. Post, p. 787.
6. See post, p. 788, footnote 2.
7. Post, pp. 800 and 815.
8. This may have been the report summarized in Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 69.
9. For Chiang’s reply of December 9, 1943, see Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 74.
10. Post, p. 803.
11. For subsequent developments, see Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 73 ff.
12. Post, p. 809.
13. Admiral Ernest J. King.
14. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham.
15. Not printed herein.
16. Post, p. 828. The parenthetical reference to C. C. S. 428 (Revised) of December 15, 1943, was presumably added to these minutes of the meeting of December 7, 1943, later in the month, by the military editors of the minutes.
17. Post, pp. 807 and 808.
18. Not printed herein. The draft memorandum was not sent to Roosevelt, on the basis presumably of Portal’s thought set forth in the next paragraph of the minutes.
19. Agreed to on December 5, 1943; see ante, p. 704.
20. See ante, p. 734, footnote 1.
21. Not found. The memorandum presumably corresponded to some or all of the points contained in the lettered paragraphs which follow.
22. On December 9, 1943, Eisenhower was designated Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, as of December 10.
23. Eisenhower departed from the Mediterranean Theater at the end of December 1943, going to Washington first before moving on to London. The Mediterranean Command was transferred to General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson as of January 8, 1944.
24. The public announcement was made on December 24, 1943.
25. Wilson’s designation was announced on December 24, 1943.
26. By December 9, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill had approved of points a and b, and Churchill had approved also of points c and d; message of December 9, 1943, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower (Fan 308), not printed herein. Roosevelt presumably approved of points c and d later.
27. Post, p. 821.
28. Not found. See, however, Eisenhower’s memorandum of November 26, 1943, ante, p. 431.