Roosevelt Papers: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the President1
Memorandum for the President From the Secretary of State
Lisbon’s 2906 of December 2 reports that the following developed from a further conversation2 between Salazar and Kennan yesterday:
While maintaining neutrality Salazar is unwilling to grant our desires outright.
He is presently unwilling to extend the British further facilities for their or our use but is prepared to do so when he can be shown that the general military situation has changed in a manner to diminish [Page 791] the German menace to Portugal as compared with last August. He will go the limit to extend us immediate use of existing British facilities if an appearance can be maintained of adherence to the British agreement.
He demonstrated willingness to examine arrangements to allow us forthwith to proceed to constructing an airport on Santa Maria Island for Portugal, with a view to Anglo-American use when completed.
Lisbon’s 2911 of December 2 furnishes the following additional comment:
The Prime Minister agrees definitely to our full use of Terceira under a suitable formula reconciling such use with the British agreement,3 but he wishes to know what formula will be used. In his view a nominal marking of the planes as British would suffice.
When Kennan appraised him of our plans for sharing in antisubmarine patrol activity in Terceira, Salazar raised no objection and displayed no surprise but remarked that this must also be under a formula reconciling activities with the British agreement.
Dr. Salazar indicated that he would consider our proposal to construct in Santa Maria a new airport, and Kennan’s impression was that he would consider the proposal benevolently. He felt he could not grant us these facilities outright now. His thought evidently is that we should construct the airfield for Portugal and on completion, if it could be demonstrated that we and the British require such facilities beyond those already granted in the British agreement and that to grant them would not augment Portugal’s risk, the field would then be made available under the existing agreement and utilized by us as in the case of Lagens and Horta. As long as some formula covered Salazar’s position, it would be immaterial that the United States should make ninety-five percent use of the field. This is not a specific proposal, but is the trend of Salazar’s thought.
He mentioned an extraordinary display of curiosity by the German Minister4 respecting American use of the Azores, which led the Prime Minister to suspect that our use of the Islands might constitute a turning point in German policy vis-à-vis Portugal. He wishes to be able, as in the case of Terceira, officially to deny to the Germans that he has accorded us any special facilities in the Azores.
In wishing to make the new airfield available under section eight of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, the interpretation of article eight was his own and did not, according to the British Ambassador in Lisbon,5 result from any understanding with the British.
[Page 792]Since his last conversation with Kennan, Salazar has ascertained for himself that Flores is unsuitable for aviation, but he admits the advantages of Santa Maria. Should our views concerning Santa Maria undergo any early change, or should we have any specific additional desires along these lines, he wished us to inform him immediately.
As Ponta Delgada remains, according to the Prime Minister, the only insular port the Portuguese Navy can now call its own and is also the seat of Portuguese administration, he wishes to avoid granting facilities at this time in San [são] Miguel Island. Kennan said we needed a port with nearby airfield for the use of carrier-based planes and suggested an informal arrangement for utilizing Ribo [Rabo] de Peixe field. The Prime Minister seemed dubious, and pointed out that under the British agreement that field was to be reserved for the Portuguese fighter forces in the Islands. He thought the British and our naval authorities had underestimated the potentialities of Horta, and felt we could have all facilities we require for such aircraft in Horta. We might station an American tanker and repair ship in Horta, for example, if we wished.
The Prime Minister did not wish to relate these questions to any hypothesis [as] to eventual Portuguese cobelligerency against Japan. He instinctively thought there was agreement concerning Timor between Germany and Japan and feared the Timor question might complicate his relations with Germany. In this regard he is extremely anxious to have an answer to his overtures for Portuguese participation in liberating Timor.6 Our Legation in Lisbon thinks it could be useful for us to be helpful in this regard.
The Legation recommends that our military authorities reach agreement with the British as to the formula to be used to cover our activities at Lagens, and that the Legation should communicate this to Dr. Salazar.
The Legation also recommends that we immediately draft a preliminary proposal for the airport construction on Santa Maria, and that this be communicated to the Legation. The proposal should be in broad, concise terms, leaving details for subsequent agreement. It should embody provision for immediate survey by our technicians and should establish most-favored-nation treatment for us respecting later use by commercial aviation. The Legation suggests that this matter be taken care of in a preliminary exchange of notes to permit us to go ahead with technical planning and survey.
With regard to Salazar’s anxiety respecting Germany, the Legation points out that the agreement with the British specifically signifies a desire that Portugal remain neutral, and that if this is our attitude [Page 793] the extent to which Salazar has gone represents real progress of which we should take advantage. The Legation desires to know precisely the extent to which our military and naval authorities desire to make use of the opportunity.
My heartiest congratulations and felicitations on magnificent achievements of yourself, Prime Minister and your other associates.
- Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. Attached to the file copy of this message in the Hull Papers is a memorandum by Matthews stating that, although the message as submitted to Hull for approval was long, “the subject is important and something they should clear with the British during these talks.”↩
- Regarding the Salazar-Kennan conversation of November 23, 1943, see Hull’s telegram of November 24, 1943, to Roosevelt, ante, p. 394.↩
- For the text of the agreement of August 17, 1943, between Great Britain and Portugal regarding facilities in the Azores, see British and Foreign State Papers, 1946 (vol. 146), p. 447.↩
- Baron Oswald von Hoyningen-Hühne.↩
- Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.↩
- See Hull’s message of December 2, 1943, to Roosevelt, ante, p. 775.↩