851.01/6–1943
The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 62
[316?] Your No. 288.63 It is imperative that the French Army in Northwest Africa should be in loyal and trustworthy hands especially on the eve of great operations which impend. I agree with you that no confidence can be placed in de Gaulle’s friendship for the Allies and I could not myself be responsible to the British nation whose armies have been placed under Eisenhower’s command in North Africa if our base and lines of communication were disturbed or endangered through the existence of a French army under potentially hostile control and not properly subordinated to the Supreme Commander. I am glad therefore to learn of the clear instructions you have given General Eisenhower not to “permit de Gaulle to direct himself or to control through the partisans of any Committee the African French Army either in the field of supplies, training or operations”.
- 2.
- I am not in favour at this moment of breaking up the Committee of 7 or forbidding it to meet. I should prefer that General Eisenhower should take your instructions as his directive and that Murphy and Macmillan should work towards its fulfillment by whatever means they find most appropriate. His Majesty’s Government will associate themselves with this policy.
- 3.
- Committee will then be confronted with a choice of either accepting our decision by a majority or placing themselves in definite opposition to the two rescuing powers. If as I deem probable they accept the decision by a majority it will be for de Gaulle to decide whether he and other dissentients will submit or resign. If de Gaulle resigns he will put himself in the wrong with public opinion and necessary measures must be taken to prevent him from creating a disturbance. If he submits we shall probably have further trouble in the future but this will be better than our sweeping away a Committee on which many hopes are founded amongst the United Nations as well as in France. We should prescribe conditions essential for the safety of our forces and place the onus on de Gaulle. At any rate it would be wise to try this first.
- 4.
- I have already notified Massigli through Macmillan that no further
payments will be made from British funds to the French National
Committee in London and that any further payments will only be made
to the new Committee of 7 acting by a majority. I have received from
Macmillan the following paraphrased message.
[Page 160]
“I take the right interpretation of your wishes to be full support of General Eisenhower in order to ensure that Giraud remains in effective command of French forces. This must include measures to ensure that reorganisation of personnel and appointments only take place with his concurrence. If this can be achieved while French unity is preserved, and de Gaulle remains on the Committee, well and good. Failing this, our first requirement must be military security.”
- 5.
- In view of the situation that has now developed “the measures to secure that any reorganisation of personnel and appointments should have his (Giraud’s) concurrence” would not be satisfied by any division of military control between Giraud as Commander-in-Chief and de Gaulle as Minister of Defence. This last office should be put in the hands of General Georges or some other officer equally acceptable to the rescuing powers.