740.00112 European War 1939/8936: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:25 p.m.]
4705. For Department and Stone OEW76 from Riefler. Prytz arranged an interview this afternoon at Foot’s office which I attended, at which he presented informally the aide-mémoire, set out below, which the Swedish Government will present to us tomorrow at the Foreign Office in response to our aide-mémoire of July 15, described in Embassy’s 4617 July 15, 10 p.m.
The Swedish aide-mémoire, as you will see, represents a considerable advance over that presented last week77 but is still very unsatisfactory in certain respects. Prytz acknowledged that the absence of a clear and unequivocal reply from the Swedish Government was unsatisfactory from our point of view, but pointed out that the Swedish Government on its side was not asking a specific commitment from us with respect to basic rations. He emphasized that the problem was likely to be short lived, and also that, as soon as the transit traffic had in fact stopped, the Swedish Government would sign a commercial agreement with us. He pointed out that this interim period would be very short and asked our forbearance during it in spite of the difficulties.
Aide-mémoire presented by Prytz is as follows:
- 1.
- Noted.
- 2.
- The Swedish Government cannot state an exact date, as they must have liberty to negotiate. It can only, however, be a matter of a few weeks.
- 3.
- Noted.
- 4.
- Negotiations with the object of stopping the transit of oil and other commodities in the extended war materials list regarding which uncertainty exists will be started at the same time as those regarding transit of war materials and personnel. The result of same will be [Page 791] known and applied simultaneously with the cessation of general transit facilities i.e. within a few weeks. In no circumstances will any increase of oil transit be permitted.
- 5.
- Whilst no fixed ceiling can for the moment be stated, the volume of general transit will under all circumstances be reduced below the earlier level.
- 6 and 7.
- Referring to the aide-mémoire submitted at last meeting, the Swedish Government is not willing to give a formal undertaking regarding future signature of an agreement which would, in practice, mean the conclusion of an agreement now. It repeats its intention of signing an agreement on the general basis of the declarations and letters agreed upon in London, when transit has ceased. Specifically it accepts the additions to the A–list and states that it sees no difficulties with regard to the other export limiting provisions of this declaration which are all being respected since 1st July.
- 8.
- The Government have informed the Swedish shipping committee that they have no objection to an immediate conclusion of a new charter agreement.
- 9.
- It is not possible to discuss now on a hypothetical basis the question of the Swedish Government’s reaction to a possible German threat against the Göteborg traffic. Any retaliatory action must be a matter for the Swedish Government. End aide-mémoire.
We are planning at the meeting at the Foreign Office tomorrow to ask the Swedish Government to define what is meant by the phrase “general transit” in the answer to question 5. If this means that the total transit of German traffic across Sweden will be reduced below the levels hitherto obtaining, it is unsatisfactory because Germany would still have an opportunity to increase the actual flow of nonmilitary traffic. If, on other hand, the phrase “general transit” means Sweden will reduce the transit of general non-military commodities, our objectives will have been gained.
With reference to the answer to questions 6 and 7, we plan to ask the Swedish Government to specify what specific parts of the draft declarations and letters present difficulties to them and concerning which they may ask amendments.
Prytz said that he had informed the Swedish shipping representative here to proceed immediately to the conclusion of the ship charter with us. I have requested Nottman78 to get in touch with him and complete the agreement as rapidly as possible.
In our discussion, Foot and I both emphasized the difficulties that the Swedish answer raised for us. Prytz was told that the Swedish reply came very near to giving us what we desired, but not quite to the point where we could proceed to implement the negotiations in a satisfactory manner. Foot also raised specifically the problem of the letter on Norwegian relief and asked whether the Swedish Government [Page 792] saw any reason why this problem could not be worked upon in advance of the termination of the transit traffic. Prytz stated that he saw personally no reason and agreed to cable his Government asking whether it would be ready to receive the letter on relief immediately. [Riefler.]