740.00112 European War 1939/8943: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

4722. The meeting at the Foreign Office with Prytz referred to in our 4705, July 19, 10 p.m., has been postponed to Wednesday July 21. We have had several conferences today between MEW, Foreign Office and Embassy on the strategy to be followed at that meeting. We have now agreed that, as Prytz formally presents aide-mémoire from the Swedish Government relayed to you in reference telegram, we will question him orally on following points:

1.
The meaning of the word “negotiations” with respect to the transit traffic in the aide-mémoire. We shall state that it had been the understanding of the British and American Governments that the Swedes planned to stop the transit traffic as a unilateral act simply announcing the date without preliminary negotiations. If they are now undertaking to negotiate the stoppage of the transit traffic and the commodities to which such stoppage will apply, does this not mean that some of the economic concessions made to us in the draft agreements may be jeopardized.
2.
We plan to ask for a clearer definition of the phrase “general transit” as stated in yesterday’s reference telegram.
3.
We shall comment with reference to the Swedish answer to question 6 and 7 that the reply leaves us completely uncertain as to what parts of the text of the draft declarations and letters are acceptable to them and what parts they may wish to amend.

After making these verbal comments on specific phrasing of the aide-mémoire, we shall tell the Swedes that we think the answer as a whole does not constitute a real answer from the Swedish Government, either to the letters which the British and American Governments conveyed to them on July 9 containing the terms on which they would be prepared to sign the agreement with the Swedes, or to the very specific questions asked of the Swedes on July 15 as described in Embassy’s 4617, July 15, 10 p.m. We shall request Prytz, therefore, to ask his Government to submit a new reply indicating (a) whether it is the intention of the Swedish Government to observe from now onwards [Page 793] all the provisions without exception contained in the declarations and letters agreed upon in London (expect [except] such as specifically refer to the manner of closing the transit traffic), (b) if this is not the intention of the Swedish Government, what are the provisions which the Swedish Government will be prepared to accept as they now stand and what are the provisions which they desire to amend, (c) what will be the nature of such amendments.

The above procedure was formulated on our part after receiving your 4364, July 19, 9 p.m.79 We await anxiously your reactions to the Swedish reply and to the questions we are asking.

It was not possible to charter the Swedish ships today because the Swedish shipping representatives had not yet received word from Stockholm that they could proceed. They stated that they were expecting the word at any moment.

Both the Foreign Office and MEW here are contemplating the possible necessity of stopping navicerts and export licenses for Sweden if the new Swedish reply is still unsatisfactory. We have hesitated to adopt this procedure because we are not sure that it will be wise to use a club of this kind at the present delicate phase of the situation in Stockholm over stopping the transit traffic. In any case we have decided that it would be unwise to stop navicerts prior to the chartering of the Swedish ships to the WSA80 unless we were convinced that such charter was being delayed by the Swedes as a tactical device. We would appreciate it, however, if the Department and OEW would make the necessary preliminary preparation so that this sanction could be invoked smoothly and quickly if it should appear tactically wise to use it.

Winant
  1. Not printed; it stated that the Department would await Swedish reply before taking any position on the new situation (740.00112 European War 1939/8921).
  2. War Shipping Administration.