Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The American Republics, Volume V

711.85/184

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Armour)

Washington, June 28, 1943.

Dear Norman: The change of Government in Argentina makes it desirable, I think, to review the objectives of our policy with respect to that country.

Over a decade ago the President announced his policy of the Good Neighbor.¹⁴ Our strict adherence to this policy, demonstrated time after time, convinced the people of the other American republics of the sincerity of our intentions. The spontaneity and sincerity of the popular welcome accorded the President when he visited Buenos Aires in the fall of 1936¹⁵ was ample testimony of the favorable popular response in Argentina.

As the rise of the Axis forces cast its long shadow over this hemisphere the American Republics almost instinctively drew together for the safeguarding of their mutual interests, namely, their freedom and independence and right to live their lives peacefully within a world governed by law. The Argentine people once again responded favorably and enthusiastically endorsed the efforts to develop the solidarity of the hemisphere on a practical and effective basis. The Argentine Government, after much coddling both at the several inter-American conferences and through the regular channels of inter-governmental contact, did, albeit somewhat reluctantly, go along with the other governments in the development of the plans for the political, economic, and military solidarity of the hemisphere. Indeed, the outbreak of the war in 1939 with Ortiz as President¹⁶ found the Argentine Government analyzing the issues of the war as clearly as those of any other government in this hemisphere.

With the untimely and unfortunate withdrawal of Ortiz from the Presidency on account of his illness, Argentine policy, under Castillo and Ruiz-Guiñazú, took a new orientation. Its first manifestation was the reluctance to accept the arrangements suggested at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Habana¹⁷ for taking over the possessions in this hemisphere of European states if these possessions were utilized to threaten the security of the American Republics. From that time until Pearl Harbor it was evident that the policy of the Argentine Government in its attitude towards the world crisis was lagging behind that held generally by the other American governments.

The meeting at Rio de Janeiro brought out very clearly that the Argentine Government did not see in the Axis aggression the same threat to its own independence and freedom as the other American republics did to theirs. Whereas the other countries agreed upon measures of cooperation and put them into effect, Argentina hung back. The other countries as a consequence of these cooperative measures incurred very real risks. Some of these risks, unhappily, materialized—for instance, the sinking of Brazilian and Mexican ships, with consequent loss of considerable life. Whether these risks materialized or not, the fact is that these countries took them because of their belief that issues were at stake which were so important to their independence that no risk was too great.

At the Rio de Janeiro Conference, as you know so well, every effort was made to find a formula regarding break of relations that would enable Argentina to keep in step with the other American republics. This was done even at the expense of weakening the language of the resolution. Argentina accepted this resolution, and in fact all the other important resolutions, without reservation. Nevertheless, the Argentine Government, through its own free choice, did not follow the recommendation at Rio de Janeiro signed by its own Foreign Minister regarding break of relations, nor did it apply effectively the other basic resolutions of a mandatory character. It apparently thought that its best interests could be served by going it alone. This attitude was not shared by many millions of Argentines, probably not by a majority of the Argentine people. They were not enabled, however, freely to express their point of view or to take the measures guaranteed them by their Constitution that might have brought about a change of Government policy.

Now a military coup d’état has occurred. I judge from your reports that you believe this took place as a necessary step to the procurement of armament by the Argentine Army and Navy. So far as domestic issues are concerned the new Government seems no more inclined, and possibly less, to observe constitutional forms and return to democratic political methods than its predecessor. This probably accounts for the complete public apathy which greeted the new regime. Indeed, one of the reasons which suggest caution in our dealings with the present Argentine Government is the fact that the Argentine people have in no way expressed themselves in regard to it.

Regarding foreign policy the new Government has issued certain declarations which, although of a somewhat two-faced variety, seem to look towards a greater collaboration with the countries of this hemisphere. Indeed, it has taken one measure of very great importance to the United Nations, namely, the prohibition of the transmission by radio of messages in code. Nevertheless, no fair-minded observer of recent Argentine developments could but be uncertain, if not skeptical, about the course of future developments. The appointments of General Rawson, who obviously is still closely identified with the new regime, the designation of General Pertiné,¹⁸ the closure of the Standard for an alleged offense committed last February, the dissolution of Congress and the postponement of elections, the measures for control of the press and the radio—all of these add up to create a doubt as to the real intentions of the Argentine Government.

In these circumstances, the wise policy on our part would appear to be to wait and see what happens. The new Argentine Government has stated that its foreign policy will be marked by acts and not words. Let us therefore see what these acts are and observe their nature, and then determine upon what change, if any, should be made in our present policy vis-à-vis Argentina.

I think that it is a fair conclusion that one of the reasons for this military coup d’état, if not indeed the most important one, was to secure military assistance. It may be that the military leaders of the regime believe that substantial military assistance will be accorded if the Argentine Government now accepts the proposal made in March 1942 that Argentina participate in convoys. What would have been considered in March 1942 as a measure of cooperation for hemisphere defense¹⁹ warranting the diversion of war materials in the light of June 1943 would appear totally inadequate, not only to the people of this country but to our friends in all the other American republics. Clearly, if Argentina expects military assistance today it can only be furnished if Argentina breaks all relations with the Axis powers of whatever type and engages wholeheartedly in activities designed to defend the hemisphere.

It is my opinion that even though Argentina now completely breaks with the Axis this belated action would not be received with cheers on behalf of the other American republics. They took a real risk during the darkest days of the war. Similar Argentine action now involves very little, if any, risk. This is obvious. Inter-American solidarity would receive a severe jolt were Argentina at this late date to be welcomed into the fold like the prodigal son. Although there is no disposition here to be vindictive towards Argentina, nevertheless it would be fatal to the further development of hemisphere solidarity through mutual cooperation if Argentina, in the event of break of relations and real cooperation for hemisphere defense, were to be given treatment that would make the other countries think that Argentina had fared better by not breaking relations in early 1942.

Although a break of relations by Argentina at this time would not constitute the significant contribution to the war effort of action taken immediately after the Rio de Janeiro meeting, nevertheless it would be important in completing the solidarity of the American Republics. With the preparations for the postwar already in full swing it is obviously becoming of increasing importance to Argentina herself to be a party to these deliberations.

I have written you at some length because I believe that the new Argentine regime may try in one way or another to rehabilitate its position either by attempting to negotiate some sort of arrangement regarding action on the Rio Resolutions or as a result of the taking of certain actions it may expect us to tumble all over ourselves in the provision of assistance to Argentina. With regard to the first possibility, we are going to await action before modifying our policy one iota. There is no use in the Argentine Government’s telling us what it intends to do; only positive action, under existing circumstances, means anything. Nor is there any use in Argentina’s attempting a bargain to find out what rupture is worth to us. With regard to the second alternative, we do not propose to “make up for lost time” in assisting Argentina should it now even break relations and take the other steps stipulated at the Rio de Janeiro meeting. Argentina must not expect, for instance, that because it has not received any goods of a certain type during the last eighteen months it is now going to receive all of this back supply together with a continuing supply calculated on a proportionate basis to that being given to the other American republics.

There is, however, advantage to us in a break of relations by Argentina, although not to the same degree as previously. We should be sympathetic to the steps, however fumbling they may be, of the new Government to find a way to rupture. We should be understanding and accommodating. The greatest advantage of full application of the resolutions of Rio de Janeiro, however, would be to Argentina itself. While Argentina cannot expect now to retrieve the past, such action would open to her a useful and constructive path of cooperation with the other American republics in the future. Moreover, it would enable Argentina to participate as an equal in the deliberations of the United Nations and their associates with regard to the reconstruction of the postwar world.

My judgment is that it would be helpful to General Ramírez, Admiral Storni, and their associates to learn from you the way in which this Government now views Argentina’s situation. I should think that they would want to know the general outline of the relationship that might unfold if Argentina breaks diplomatic relations and fully implements the Rio de Janeiro commitments. Our views thus presented would help to orient their thinking on a realistic basis. Otherwise they will be obliged to build up the pattern of our attitude on the basis of our reply to specific initiatives on their part. Moreover, it would seem to me that their knowing now what our opinions are, even though they may not be as favorable as they have hoped, may prevent a sharp repercussion at some future date as the cumulation of a series of negatives on our part.

One basic point which I think you must emphasize in any conversation you have is that the determination of its foreign policy is a matter for the sole determination and decision of the Argentine Government. In such determination this Government has not interfered, does not interfere, and will not interfere. But if the Argentine Government modifies its existing foreign policy so as to comply with the obligations and recommendations entered into at the Conference at Rio de Janeiro and in other existing inter-American agreements so that it joins wholeheartedly, practically, and effectively in the defense of the Western Hemisphere, this Government will of course be prepared to discuss the measures of cooperation which in the judgment of the United States could be offered to the Argentine Government in the general interest of the security of the New World and of the United Nations war effort.

I realize, of course, that the disclosure of our views to Ramírez and Storni will be a matter of great delicacy both as to timing and as to method of procedure. I therefore leave with you the most ample discretion on this point. Furthermore, if you do not think that any disclosure should be made now or in the near future please write me fully in the premises.

I am afraid that the coming weeks are going to be rather trying ones for you because of my belief that the Government will be feeling you out on all sorts of half-way propositions. Although at this end I will do all I can to make clear our policy, because of Espil’s²⁰ unwillingness to be forthright the major burden will have to rest upon your shoulders. There is no one in whose hands I would rather place the difficult task of presenting our point of view than yours. I have every confidence that you will be able to do so objectively and firmly, bringing out the benefits and responsibilities inherent in inter-American solidarity and at the same time being decently receptive to any real solid indication of desire wholeheartedly to collaborate in the implementation today of that solidarity.

My kindest regards to you [etc.]

Sumner Welles

14. In inaugural address, March 4, 1933, Congressional Record, vol. 77, pt. 1, p. 5.
15. President Roosevelt addressed the opening session of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, December 1, 1936; for text of address, see Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, Argentina, December 1–23, 1936 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 77.
16. Roberto M. Ortiz, President of Argentina from February 20, 1938, to July 4, 1940, when ill health led him to turn over the Government to the Vice President.
17. See Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Habana, July 21–80, 1940: Report of the Secretary of State (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941), or Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1940, pp. 127–148.
18. Gen. Basilio Pertiné had been designated Mayor of the Federal Capital of Argentina.
19. For correspondence on efforts to bring about cooperative defense measures between the United States and Argentina, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. v, pp. 371 ff.
20. Felipe A. Espil, Argentine Ambassador in the United States.