Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 EAC/3–1345

Draft Minutes of a Conference on the Work of the European Advisory Commission and on Plans for Control of Germany, Held at the Department of State, March 13, 1945

March 13, 1945

Present:

War Department		Navy Department
Mr. McCloy		Capt. W. H. Vanderbilt
Col. R. Ammi Cutter44		Comdr. Sargent46
Col. David Marcus		Lt. Harding Bancroft
Col. Richard Wilmer45
	State Department
	Mr. Matthews, Chairman
	Ambassador Murphy
	Mr. J. W. Riddleberger
	Mr. Philip Mosely
	Mr. Emile Despres47
	Mr. Edmund Gullion48

Relations of European Advisory Commission to Washington

Mr. Matthews made it clear that the U.S. Representatives on the Commission had acted independently in making certain criticisms of JCS 1067 and that in so doing he had not received any suggestions or communications, formal or informal, from Washington. Mr. Mosely confirmed this and pointed out that Mr. Winant cabled queries to Washington requesting clarification of many points, primarily with the intention of equipping himself for effective negotiation of JCS 1067 in the Commission. He added that General Meyer had not participated in formulating Ambassador Winant’s three cables,⁴⁹ with respect to JCS 1067, since those cables referred only to economic and political aspects of 1067.

Mr. McCloy indicated that the War Department’s interest was in having an established policy and directive as soon as possible but that he understood the necessity for independent action on the part of the EAC.

Summary of London Operations

Mr. Mosely outlined the present position of the work of the Commission as summarized in the attached memorandum, which he circulated. The EAC was generally ready, or was working toward, the establishment of middle-range plans to deal with Germany. There had been approved by the Commission the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender for Germany, the Protocol on Zones of Occupation, and the Agreement on Control Machinery. In addition, sixteen U.S. draft-directives were pending before the Commission, and the other Representatives had agreed to accept most of them as bases for discussion. Some eighteen additional draft-directives had not yet been cleared in Washington. (A list of those pending in Washington is attached.⁵⁰)

Plans for Interim Period After Surrender and Before Functioning of Control Commission

Mr. McCloy expressed concern over the absence of any clear-cut and firm plan to guide SHAEF and the military authorities, should Germany collapse at an early date. He referred to Mr. Leon Henderson’s⁵¹ recent visit to the European Theater and his reports which confirmed his apprehensions in this respect. He pointed out that the only combined directive which SHAEF had was CCS 551, the pre-surrender directive,”⁵² which was insufficient for a post-surrender interim period. Ambassador Murphy shared this concern and agreed with Mr. McCloy that, in the absence of plans to meet the situation, SHAEF would be compelled to improvise. Mr. Mosely hoped that by the time when Germany was defeated, a minimum area of agreement would have been obtained through EAC and gaps could be filled in by directives to the separate Commanders.

The meeting considered the desirability of attempting to obtain agreement in the Commission upon a modified directive 1067 which would be a quadripartite directive, whereas the former is at present only for the guidance of U.S. troops.

It appeared that this would be impracticable, because

a) The British do not seem prepared to accept the idea of a combined directive, as they were gradually tending away from the idea of combined administration and appeared to be looking toward the time when SHAEF would be dissolved. On the other hand, as Mr. McCloy indicated, British representatives in this country and in the Combined Chiefs of Staff were more sympathetic to the idea of preparing a combined directive to SHAEF for the immediate post-surrender period.

b) It was thought that, judging by the tempo of EAC operations thus far, it would take too much time to obtain agreement on a general over-all directive. Mr. Mosely pointed out that the draft of such a document would have to be translated and referred anew to the interested government agencies in Moscow and Paris; the Russian members of EAC did not enjoy great freedom of action and had to refer substantive questions of this importance to their superiors. On the other hand, the individual directives now before the Commission had already been largely accepted as bases of discussion by the other representatives.

Mr. McCloy proposed, in view of the difficulty in obtaining agreement on a new over-all directive, that the following procedure be adopted: Directive CCS 551, as a combined directive, should be modified to make it adequate for the interim period; JCS Directive No. 1067, with necessary modifications, in the light of Yalta and the Department’s proposals now being considered by the President, should stand as a directive for United States troops, and SHAEF should be notified accordingly; consideration of the individual specific directives now pending with the Commission or in Washington should be expedited and these should be taken as bases for combined administration on the assumption that SHAEF would continue to operate for several months after the surrender. SHAEF should be advised so that it would know exactly where it stood.

The sense of the meeting was favorable toward Mr. McCloy’s proposal, but the point was raised by Lieutenant Bancroft that the several directives had been drafted as supplementaries, with reference to 1067 as an over-all directive. The individual directives would require, therefore, a thorough revision if 1067 were not coordinated with them and passed by the Commission. It was generally agreed that the separate directives covered in more detail most of the points of 1067 except de-Nazification. This difficulty was discussed but no decision on the feasibility of Mr. McCloy’s proposal had been reached by the time the meeting adjourned. A subsequent meeting was arranged for the next day, March 14.

Estimate of Duration of Post-Surrender “Interim”

In consideration of proposed plans, the meeting sought an agreed estimate for the period which might intervene between the surrender of Germany and the beginning of CC⁵³ operations. Ambassador Murphy reported that the planning groups at SHAEF were assuming a period of as much as six to eight months duration. He also thought that in spite of the reluctance of the British to commit themselves to over-all combined directives, they might go along on combined instructions for this interim period.

Use of Wording “General Order” with Reference to Directive for Control, of Germany

It was the sense of the meeting that the word “General Order” was ill-advised since it carried the implication that the content of the directives constituted a decree which would be public knowledge of the enemy. It was understood that “General Order” was designed primarily to serve as an agreement on additional non-military requirements to be imposed on Germany by the occupying Powers; the question of what orders should be issued to the Germans might be left to the Control Council to decide. Mr. Mosely submitted a report on the “General Order” which is attached.

The Principle as to Zones

Mr. McCloy referred to the confusion prevailing as to centralization versus regional or zone administration. It was his understanding that the opportunities for conflict would be strictly limited since the commander of a zone would also be a member of the Council. The decisions of the Council would be administered locally by the zone commander. He did not believe that there should be an effort in Berlin to administer regional problems, but he agreed that some matters would have to be directed from the seat of the Council. The Army would want merely a sort of “military visa” in order to pass on the practicality of a policy.

There was substantial agreement in the meeting on this analysis.

Personnel

Mr. McCloy referred to Mr. Henderson’s reports indicating that the American conception of the problem of administering Germany was too narrow. He referred to the contrast afforded by British plans which envisaged employment of many thousands and close regulation of wages, prices, et cetera. Mr. McCloy was inclined to share Mr. Henderson’s concern, except that he recognized that the British had a different goal and problem in that they wished to coordinate factory development in the zone that they were to administer with Britain’s own industrial and foreign trade policy. There was also an implication of post-war commercial interest. The United States on the other hand would not have much industry in its assigned area.

He stated that General Draper had been selected to take over the economic post in SHAEF and that he had a very good opinion of his qualifications although he had not personally known General Draper before the war. General Draper was formerly a partner in Dillon, Reed.⁵⁴

With reference to the head U.S. post on the Council, Mr. McCloy said that Judge Patterson⁵⁵ would not be in a position to go immediately and that he thought that the person who would occupy this post should be prepared to leave for Europe now in order to get the feel of the situation. It was the War Department’s inclination to assign a soldier to this position. It was believed that a soldier could better assure the liaison with SHAEF and General Eisenhower.

Mr. McCloy thought that the job of control of Germany ought to be broadened and that selection of a larger well-qualified staff should be expedited. It was agreed that many of the persons selected would be civilians and that the Department and other agencies would hasten preparation of lists of candidates for the positions.

Consideration of Directives

It was agreed that the consideration and clearance of the various separate directives should be expedited both in London and Washington.

Military Government Handbooks and Materials Requested by the Soviet Union

SHAEF had directed General Wickersham⁵⁶ to refrain from making available to the Russians American Military Government handbooks and material unless the Russians should reciprocate. The Russians claimed that they did [not?] possess any such material to give us.

Ambassador Murphy suggested, and the meeting agreed, that there was nothing to be gained in withholding our materials from the Russians and that, on the contrary, an opportunity existed to influence Russian planning toward conformity with our own. It was agreed that the War Department would issue appropriate instructions.

[Annex 1]

Memorandum by Mr. Philip E. Mosely, Political Adviser to the United States Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Winant)

[Washington,] March 13, 1945.

U.S. Draft Directives for Control of Germany

1. Why Directives?

From the beginning of the work of the European Advisory Commission it has been assumed that the skeleton framework of Allied control, set forth in the Agreements on the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender, the Protocol on Zones of Occupation and the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, would have to be supplemented by agreed directives. The intention to have the E.A.C. proceed to negotiate agreed directives was stated explicitly in a series of instructions issued to Mr. Winant by the State Department with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February and March, 1944.

The three Agreements, which have now been approved without reservation by the three Governments, provide for the taking of absolute power over Germany, for the assignment of zones and areas of occupation and for the joint occupation of Berlin, and for the establishment of Allied control machinery. They do not provide any concrete agreements for the exercise of those powers. Obviously, the dangers of future disagreements among the Allies would be greatly diminished if the range of Allied agreements respecting Germany could be expanded, in advance of actual occupation, to embrace agreement on the fields in which that joint responsibility will be exercised.

2. The UK. Draft Directives.

During the spring and summer of 1944 the U.K. Delegation on the E.A.C. circulated a series of thirty-eight directives. In October, 1944, these directives were again circulated in bound form.⁵⁷ The U.S. Delegation is not satisfied with certain features of the U.K. directives. They are too detailed in laying down procedures of implementation. They fail to distinguish between matters which will be regulated mainly by the Control Council and those functions which will be performed mainly by the separate zonal authorities.

Two alternative procedures were open to the U.S. Delegation. It could prepare comments and amendments to the U.K. directives, taking the latter as the basis of negotiation in the E.A.C. Or it could present U.S. draft directives as an alternative basis of negotiation. After careful study the Ambassador and his Advisers came to the conclusion that it would be more effective to present independent U.S. drafts. This procedure, while more laborious, would have the added advantage of placing before the other Delegations, in advance of negotiation, considered U.S. thought on these problems and would also serve to emphasize the tri-partite, now quadri-partite, character of the E.A.C. negotiation.

3. Origin of the U.S. Directives.

The U.S. Delegation hoped that a series of brief policy statements would be prepared in Washington, with full Governmental clearance, and transmitted to Mr. Winant for negotiation in the E.A.C. A series of such statements was promised repeatedly during 1944, but none was ever received. As precious months were slipping away, Mr. Winant’s Joint Advisers undertook to prepare a series of U.S. draft directives. Between June and December 1944 thirty-five draft directives were prepared in the Delegation and transmitted to Washington.

It was realized that these draft directives would probably be thoroughly rewritten in Washington. But it was hoped through this device to focus the attention of Washington on the need for working out U.S. views regarding the treatment of Germany and thus to provide both the E.A.C. Delegation and the various military authorities concerned with the future control of Germany with a set of authoritative U.S. views.

During November and December, 1944, fifteen draft directives, usually with slight changes, were approved in Washington and thereupon circulated in the E.A.C.⁵⁸ More recently Washington has transmitted draft directives on United Nations Prisoners of War⁵⁹ and Primary Disarmament of the German Armed Forces.⁶⁰ Eighteen additional directives are awaiting action in Washington.

4. Preparation of the U.S. Draft Directives.

The U.S. draft directives were prepared on the responsibility of the Joint Advisers in London. A small Planning Committee, with State, Army, Navy and Air Force representation, carried on the work of drafting, with the full cooperation of the appropriate experts of the U.S. nucleus group Control Council and of civilian experts available in the London Embassy. In some instances U.S. SHAEF officers also took part in their preparation.

5. Character of the U.S. Draft Directives.

The U.S. draft directives are designed to lay down basic medium-range agreements for the joint handling of problems affecting Germany as a whole. They define in broad terms the responsibilities of the Control Council for arriving at agreed policies for Germany as a whole and the special responsibilities of the zone commanders for their application to the separate zones.

The draft directives are not detailed. The only detailed directives are those relating to the armed forces, which the armed services tried to have written out in even greater detail. The political and economic directives could hardly be more general in character than they are.

The draft directives do not prejudge long-range decisions. For example, provision is made for the control and recording of German war material, but no attempt is made to determine its ultimate disposition. Similarly provision has been made for central determination of critical aspects of financial policy, but no attempt has been made to decide such a basic question as to whether inflation should be curbed or encouraged.

The U.K. draft directives were derived from the separate paragraphs of the U.K. draft General Order and treat the various fields of Allied control according to the subject matter of the General Order. The U.S. draft directives, on the other hand, have been based upon an analysis of the prospective functions of the twelve Divisions of the Control Machinery, with a view to defining a minimum of the procedural arrangements required for the effective functioning of each Division.

6. Need for Negotiation of the Directives.

The military authorities directly responsible in the field for control of Germany hope that fullest possible agreement can be reached in advance among the controlling Powers, for immediate application upon the surrender or collapse of Germany. They feel that the more such directives can be agreed among the four Powers, the surer will be the basis of Allied cooperation. In the absence of agreed directives, the Control groups would have to begin operation with the Control Machinery Agreement as their only agreed basis of control. The more procedures for joint administration and immediate policies for application can be worked out ahead of time, the better the prospects of continuing and harmonious Allied cooperation will be. Even if there should be insufficient time to negotiate all or most of the directives in the EAC, there are great advantages in having placed U.S. thinking on these problems before the other Governments prior to German surrender or collapse, particularly since the British, Russians and French have agreed informally to take the U.S. draft directives as a basis of negotiation, and hence of preliminary planning.

The U.S. draft directives represent a coherent whole. The value of individual directives is diminished through failure to present the complete set. Clearance of the remaining draft directives, and their circulation in the E.A.C., would greatly strengthen the impact of U.S. policy or the shaping of Allied policy in the control of Germany.

P[hilip] E. M[osely]

[Annex 2]

Memorandum by the Secretary, United States Delegation, European Advisory Commission (Lightner)

[London,] February 9, 1945.

1. History of the General Order.

The idea of having a General Order originated in February 1944 when, in order to get the British to agree to consider a short-term Surrender Instrument for Germany, the Soviet and U.S. Representatives agreed to the British request that the substance of the British Delegation’s long (seventy-paragraph) draft Armistice⁶¹ would be incorporated in Proclamations and General Orders to be issued to the Germans.

Authorization to make this commitment was contained in a Memorandum in Support of U.S. Views which was sent to Ambassador Winant with the Department’s instruction No. 3735 of February 12, 1944.⁶² This memorandum had received the written concurrence of General Hilldring.

The Ambassador’s action in making this commitment in the European Advisory Commission was reported to the Department in telegram No. 1944 of March 10, 12 noon, Cornea 38.⁶³ The State Department confirmed its understanding of this arrangement in its telegram No. 1976 of March 16, 3 p.m., Eacom 13.⁶⁴

The E.A.C.’s report transmitting the Instrument of Surrender to the three Governments on July 25⁶⁵ states: “The Commission will submit in due course, Orders, Ordinances or Instructions laying down additional requirements as provided in the general Article.” The Orders referred to have been interpreted in the E.A.C. as General and Special Orders.

On August 1 the Ambassador forwarded to Washington with despatch No. 17220⁶⁶ a set of draft Proclamations and General Orders prepared by the U.S. Delegation. Comments on these documents prepared by the Working Security Committee and approved by the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were submitted to London with the Department’s instruction No. 4665 of October 24.⁶⁷ They were based on JCS 1103 of October 13.

On the basis of this instruction the U.S. Delegation revised the Proclamations and General Orders and transmitted copies of the revision to Washington with despatch No. 19080 of November 4.⁶⁶ On November 13, the revised Proclamations and General Orders—now combined as a General Order—were circulated in the European Advisory Commission as E.A.C. (44)27, November 14.⁶⁶

In its telegram No. 10371 of December 12, 7 p.m.,⁶⁸ the Department stated that this General Order did not fully reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in instruction No. 4665 of October 24 and in JCS 1103. General Hilldring wrote to General Meyer on December 16 and 23 to express the same views in greater detail.⁶⁹

2. Basis of the Criticism of the General Order.

The criticism of the draft General Order is based on the contention that it should contain only specific commands to the Germans to do or not to do certain specific things; and that provisions should not be included merely for the purpose of stating authority and powers possessed by the occupation authorities.

General Hilldring has also expressed concern that the British, who have indicated they liked the U.S. proposed General Order, were supporting it because they allegedly held the view that some such document was necessary in order “to take power” in Germany; and that our powers in Germany were derived from agreements with the Germans or orders in which we would announce our general powers.

3. Misunderstanding as to the Nature of the General Order.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose views have been officially concurred in by the State Department, seem to confuse the General Order with the type of direct, specific military orders, proclamations, ordinances, et cetera, which would be issued by the Allied Commanders-in-Chief to the German people on the basis of agreed directives given to those Commanders-in-Chief by their Governments. The General Order, despite its misleading name, is not an order in the usual sense. It is, rather, an extension of the Surrender Instrument to cover non-military requirements not contained in that Instrument. Furthermore, it has nothing to do with the “taking of powers”, which is fully provided for in the blanket authority conferred on the Allied Powers by Article 12 of the Surrender Instrument.

The question of whether all or part of the General Order would be issued to the Germans has never been discussed in the E.A.C. Informally, the other Delegations have expressed the view that parts of the General Order might be published to the Germans, perhaps at various times, and that other parts might never be published but would be held in reserve as a basis of agreed policy decisions.

No doubt large parts of the General Order would not be suitable for issuance to the Germans. However, the most important reason for negotiating a General Order is the need to arrive at a preliminary agreement with our Allies on the range of matters of joint responsibility required for the exercise of Allied control over Germany.

4. Present Status.

In the meeting of the European Advisory Commission on January 29, 1945, Sir William Strang recalled previous understandings to proceed with the work of drawing up agreed Proclamations and General Orders. He stated that his Government was now pressing for action on them on the basis of the earlier arrangement whereby the British Government had agreed to the short-term Surrender Instrument on the understanding that the remaining clauses of the long British draft would be dealt with in agreed articles to be issued under Article 12b at or shortly after the surrender of Germany.

The French Delegate at the same meeting also pressed for action on the General Orders since the French Government had refrained from pressing for amendments to the Surrender Instrument on the assumption that French desiderata could be included in the General Order. The French Delegate had made this clear in a memorandum circulated in the Commission on December 29, 1944 (E.A.C.(44)47),⁷² which expressed the French Government’s approval of the Surrender Instrument. The French Delegation has now submitted a series of questions, which, if not taken care of in the General Order, might require amending the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender (E.A.C.(45)9, February 7).⁷³

The Soviet Delegate in the meeting on January 29 indicated that his Delegation is preparing to submit comments on the General Order circulated by the U.S. Delegation.

E. A[llan] L[ightner]

44. Assistant Executive Officer to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy.
46. Lt. Comdr. Willis Sargent, Assistant Naval Adviser to the United States Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Winant).
45. Of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department.
47. Adviser on German Economic Affairs.
48. Of the Division of Western European Affairs.
49. Apparent reference to telegrams 947, January 26, 9 p.m.; 1277, February 5, 11 p.m.; and 1278, February 5, 11 p.m., from London, pp. 396, 403, and 405, respectively.
50. See bracketed note, p. 370.
51. Between December 1944 and February 1945, Leon Henderson, former Director of the Office of Price Administration, visited Europe as the representative of the Foreign Economic Administration and surveyed the state of planning for the economic control of Germany.
52. For text of the directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, in respect of military government in Germany for the pre-surrender period, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 217.
53. Control Council.
54. Investment banking firm in New York.
55. Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War.
56. Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham, Acting Deputy, United States Group, Control Council (Germany).

57. United Kingdom draft directives for Germany and Austria previously introduced in the European Advisory Commission were collected in a bound volume entitled: “Germany and Austria in the Post-Surrender Period—Policy Directives for the Allied Commanders-in-Chief”, dated September 1944. Subsequently, the volume was enlarged to include thirty-eight draft directives and was circulated in the European Advisory Commission by the United Kingdom Representative as document E.A.C. (44) 26, dated October 27, 1944, transmitted to the Department in despatch 19155, November 10, from London, neither printed. The following is a list of the draft directives included in the volume:

    1. Germany in the post-surrender period.

    2. Austria in the post-surrender period.

    3. Relations of Germany with countries at war with any of the United Nations.

    4. Neutral missions in Germany, and communication with German missions to neutral countries.

    5. Treaties, conventions and other international agreements.

    6. Reform of Nazi law and release of political prisoners.

    7. Dissolution and disbandment of Nazi organizations.

    8. Re-education of Germany.

    9. Recall of German and Austrian nationals resident abroad.

    10. Prevention of German nationals from leaving German territory.

    11. Prisoners of war and internees in German hands.

    12. Nationals of the United Nations interned in neutral countries.

    13. Displaced persons.

    14. German records and archives.

    15. The German police.

    16. Preservation of law and order, and guard duties: use of German forces.

    17. Definitions of “the German armed forces”, “the forces under German command”, etc.

    18. Discharge and disbandment of German armed forces.

    19. Control of German aircraft movements and disposal of German aircraft in German service.

    20. Disposal of ships, aircraft and personnel of other enemy countries found in Germany at the time of surrender.

    21. Evacuation of territory by the German armed forces, officials and civil population.

    22. Surrender of arms and War material by forces under German command in contact with United Nations forces.

    23. Surrender of arms and war material by forces under German command not in contact with United Nations forces.

    24. Information regarding German war material.

    25. Ownership and disposal of German war material.

    26. Control of broadcasting.

    27. Control and censorship of public information and means of. intercommunication.

    28. Regulation of movement and travel.

    29. Inland transport.

    30. Exercise of German rights in international transport bodies;

    31. Shipping and associated matters.

    32. Establishment and control of the Austro-German frontier.

    33. Finance and property.

    34. Food and property.

    35. Rationing and distribution of textiles.

    36. Building and housing.

    37. Leather and footwear.

    38. Determination of Austrian nationality.

    In 1945, during the remainder of the existence of the European Advisory Commission, the United Kingdom circulated in the Commission eight additional directives as follows:

    39. German Church Affairs.

    40. United Nations’ Renegades and Quislings.

    41. Finance and Property in Austria.

    42. Price Control in Germany.

    43. Status and Treatment of German Merchant Seamen.

    44. Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training in Germany.

    45. Trade Unions, Wages, and Labour Disputes.

    46. Danubian Affairs in Austria.

58. For a list of approved directives circulated in the European Advisory Commission, see bracketed note, p. 370; for an earlier list, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 424.
59. See instruction 5087, February 9, to London, p. 409.
60. Not printed, but see footnote 27, p. 428.
61. Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 112.
62. Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 167.
63. Ibid., p. 197.
64. Ibid., p. 199.
65. Ibid., p. 256.
66. Not printed.
67. Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 365.
66. Not printed.
66. Not printed.
68. Ibid., p. 418.
69. Communications not found in Department files.
72. Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 427.
73. Memorandum by the French Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Massigli) entitled “Protection of United Nations’ nationals in Germany and questions arising in German-occupied territories after surrender”, designated E.A.C. (45) 9, dated February 7, 1945, transmitted to the Department in despatch 20898, February 8, 1945, from London (740.00119 EAC/2–845).