Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 E.W./4–445

The Department of State to the British Embassy ¹⁵

Aide-Mémoire

1. The United States Government is in agreement with the views expressed in the first three paragraphs of the aide-mémoire from the British Embassy of 4 April 1945.

2. It is believed that the procedure proposed in the aide-mémoire, while probably desirable in a relatively static military situation, may be too time-consuming for rapidly moving operations on a local front. A less cumbersome procedure would appear to be suggested by existing circumstances and can be achieved without endangering desirable political safeguards.

3. It is proposed that a commander should be authorized to accept immediately the unconditional surrender of the forces under the opposing German commander, handling the matter on a military basis and keeping the governments informed through military channels. It is understood, of course, that the governments are in a position to interpolate at any time their wishes on what they consider may be political aspects. In the fluid situation which has now developed in Germany, a chaotic condition can readily develop in a matter of hours. The delay which our experience to date in handling other matters has indicated might well be prejudicial to the earliest termination of the fighting.

4. It is considered that Russian representation, if so desired by the Government of the Soviet Union to observe any surrenders to United States-United Kingdom forces should be assured by prior arrangements to be made immediately. In this connection, it should be made clear to the Russians that the actual conduct of an unconditional surrender would be a matter for the military commander of the United States–United Kingdom forces involved. The United States Chiefs of Staff have already made this proposal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and it is believed the matter can be worked out on a military level in the same way as the representation of the Soviet authorities at the questioning of von Papen.¹⁶

5. It is agreed that in any future case it is preferable to avoid sending military representatives of our supreme commanders to meet German representatives on neutral soil, and that any contacts on neutral soil should be confined strictly to establishing bona fides and making arrangements for immediate transportation of German representatives to one of our headquarters. However, in case the situation requires sending representatives of one of our commanders to neutral soil, the political safeguards seem adequate without accepting the delay which our experience has shown occurs when these matters are passed through several levels and handled between governments. Again, such delay might well be injurious to the earliest termination of the fighting.

6. It appears the proper action is to approach the Government of the Soviet Union along the foregoing lines and if the British Government agrees, the United States Ambassador in Moscow will be instructed to do so in collaboration with his British colleague.¹⁷

Washington , April 23, 1945.

15. This aide-mémoire was based on a memorandum, not printed, from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee containing the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy (740.00119 EW/4–1945).
16. Franz von Papen; for documentation relating to the interrogation of war criminals, see pp. 1151 ff.
17. No record of such action, nor of British agreement, can be found in Department files. However, for information that this matter was taken up with the Soviet Government through Combined Chiefs of Staff channels, and that representatives were designated, see Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 476.