740.00119 EW/4–2545: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
1528. Foreign Minister Günther sent for the British Minister19 and me at 11 o’clock this evening to meet with him, Mr. Boheman,20 [and] Count Bernadotte21 who has just returned from Germany. [Page 760] Count Bernadotte was on April 23 at Flensburg near Danish border. Himmler who was at some point on German eastern front sent word that he wanted to see Count Bernadotte urgently and the latter said that he would meet him at Lübeck. This meeting took place at 1 o’clock in the morning April 24. Bernadotte reports that Himmler although tired and admitting that Germany was finished, was calm and coherent. Himmler told him that Hitler was so ill that he might be already dead or could not be expected to live more than 2 days longer (General Schellenberg,22 Himmler’s confidential staff officer, told Bernadotte that Hitler was suffering from brain hemorrhage). Himmler said that while Hitler was still active he would not have been able to take the step he now proposed to take but as Hitler was finished he, Himmler, is in a position of full authority to act. He asked Count Bernadotte to forward to the Swedish Government his request that the Swedish Government should intervene in order to arrange for him to meet General Eisenhower. The purpose of this meeting would be to capitulate on the whole western front (including the Netherlands). Bernadotte remarked that such a meeting was not necessary as Himmler could simply order his troops to capitulate and that he was not willing to forward this request to the Swedish Government if Norway and Denmark were not included in the capitulation. Because of special technical arrangements in regard to how and to whom Germany would capitulate in Denmark and Norway Bernadotte remarked that in his opinion there might be some point to a meeting between General Eisenhower and Himmler. Himmler said that he would order his troops in Norway and Denmark to surrender to American, British or Swedish troops. He hoped to be able to continue to fight on the eastern front at least for a time. Bernadotte said that this would be scarcely possible to put in practice and would not be acceptable to the Allies. Bernadotte had the impression that Himmler hopes the Allies would be the first to enter into northern and western Germany into Mecklenburg for instance, which district was mentioned by Himmler) rather than the Russians for the sake of the civilian population.
General Schellenberg is in Flensburg near the Danish border eagerly waiting to hear anything which Bernadotte can convey to him. He is in hourly contact with Himmler and could ensure immediate delivery to him of any message it may be desired to send.
Mr. Günther thought this information was of such importance that it should be communicated at once to the American and British Governments.
[Page 761]Both Sir Victor Mallet and I remarked that Himmler’s refusal actually to order surrender on the eastern front looked like a last attempt to sow discord between the western Allies and Russia because obviously the Nazis would have to surrender simultaneously to all the Allies. Mr. Günther and Mr. Boheman while admitting this motive could not be excluded pointed out that the fact that the Nazi chief would order capitulation of all troops on the whole Western Front and in Norway and Denmark must be of great advantage to all the Allies including Russia and would in fact lead to early total capitulation. In any case Mr. Günther thought that Count Bernadotte’s information should be passed on to the British and American Governments who were, as far as the Swedish Government was concerned, at complete liberty to transmit it to the Soviet Government as Sweden would in no way be or thought to be an instrument in promoting any attempt to sow discord between the Allies. The only reason the Swedish Government could not convey this information directly to the Soviet Government was because Himmler had stipulated to Count Bernadotte that it was exclusively for the western Allies.
Count Bernadotte is of the opinion that if no reaction at all is forthcoming to this proposal of Himmler’s it would probably result in a lot of unnecessary suffering and loss of human life.
- This telegram was repeated to the Secretary of State, then attending the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, at 4:22 p.m. It does not appear to have been brought to President Truman’s attention until after 2 p.m. See the transcript of his telephone conversation with Prime Minister Churchill, p. 762; and cf. Leahy, I Was There, p. 355, where it is stated that Acting Secretary Grew delivered the telegram to the President shortly after the conclusion of the telephone conversation with the Prime Minister.↩
- Sir Victor A. L. Mallet.↩
- Erik C. Boheman, Under Secretary in the Swedish Foreign Office.↩
- Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish Red Cross; for an account of his activities in Germany during 1945, see Count Folke Bernadotte, The Curtain Falls, translated by Count Eric Lewenhaupt (New York, Knopf, 1945).↩
- Walter Schellenberg, Chief of Amt VI of the Reich Security Main Office.↩