740.00119 Control (Japan)/11–24)45: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 23—10:40 p.m.]
3943. Following is translation of statement handed me by Molotov this evening in reply to communication I transmitted to him on November 19 in accordance with my 3903, November 20:
Moscow, November 23, 1945.
1. The Soviet Government, having considered the amendments of the United States Government concerning the control of Japan transmitted by Mr. Harriman November 19, believes it necessary to dwell upon the two chief questions raised by the United States Government. This refers, in the first place, to the procedure for taking decisions in those important cases in which questions of principle, [Page 866] such as questions of changing the regime of control over Japan and changes in the composition of the Japanese Government, et cetera, are decided, and in the second place to the question of interim directives.
2. Since the United States Government expresses the desire to work out a policy which is agreed upon (soglasovannaya) in all spheres involving the control and also the future of Japan, the Soviet Government assumes that there is no ground for objection against the deciding by agreement (soglasovaniye) among the chief Allies of the above-mentioned questions of principle which have important significance in the implementation of control over Japan. This is all the more true since in all other questions the Commander in Chief of the American occupation troops in Japan has sufficiently broad opportunities and real force for the taking of prompt measures, having the decisive voice in all these matters. Given such broad rights on the part of the Commander in Chief and given the factual situation in which the occupation troops all through Japan are completely subordinate to the Commander in Chief, there is no ground for apprehension that the above mentioned principle of agreement (soglasovaniye) between the four Allies in the decision of the few questions of principle will lead to a weakening of the authority of the Commander in Chief. The Soviet Government also sees no ground for the assumption that the above-mentioned procedure would endanger the effective implementation of Allied policy in Japan since the state of agreement (soglasovannost) among the four Allies would ensure more effectiveness in the implementation of Allied policy toward Japan. Therefore, the Soviet Government believes that major questions of control over Japan should not be decided at the individual disposition of the Commander in Chief. The Soviet Government believes that those deciding such questions cannot limit themselves to consultations with the other representatives of the Allied Powers in the control body for Japan but that there must be assured a state of agreement (soglasovannost) in the decisions adopted among the four Allied Powers—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China. Otherwise, the participation of the Allied Powers in control over Japan will be only nominal and the agreement expressed by the United States Government to the principle of unanimity of the four chief Allies will have no real meaning.
3. In accordance with this the Soviet Government assumes that voting procedure in the Far Eastern Commission should ensure the realization of the principle of unanimity of the four Allied Powers not only in questions concerning basic changes in the constitutional structure or in the regime of control of Japan but also in such a question as a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, including the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Soviet Government finds it possible that in cases of necessity the Commander-in-Chief might take decisions on the change of individual ministers of the Japanese Government after appropriate preliminary consultation with the representatives of the other Allied Powers on the control body.
4. The Soviet Government believes that, providing agreement is reached regarding the procedure of deciding questions of principle such as questions of changing the regime of control over Japan and changing the composition of the Japanese Government as a whole [Page 867] and so on it would also be possible to bring about agreement (soglasovaniye) of the points of view of our Governments regarding the procedure of issuing interim directives on other questions.
5. The Soviet Government assumes that the other proposals presented by the United States Government on November 19 should be considered after agreement (soglasovaniye) has been achieved of the positions of four Governments on the major questions.
6. As regards the observations made by Mr. Harriman concerning the control mechanism in Rumania and Hungary, these are not shared by the Soviet Government. It should be recalled that in connection with the conclusion of the war in Europe the Soviet Government on July 12, 1945 proposed to the Governments of the USA and Great Britain38 that the Allied Control Commission in Hungary should in the future conduct its work on the basis of the following statute:
“The directives of the Allied Control Commission on questions of principle shall be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after agreement (soglasovaniye) on these directives with the British and American representatives.”
A decision was adopted at the Berlin Three Power Conference to extend this procedure of work of the Allied Control Commission also to Rumania and Bulgaria.39 Thus, as evident from the above, a procedure of issuing directives on questions of principle only after agreement (soglasovaniye) of these directives with the representatives of the other Allied Powers on the control body was provided for in the statute concerning the Allied Control Commission for Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.
- Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 689.↩
- August 1, document 1383, section XII, Potsdam, vol. ii, pp. 1478, 1493.↩