893.00/2–2745

Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Sprouse), Temporarily in the United States13

Deterioration of Relations between Lung Tun and the Central Government during the Latter Part of 1944.

[Here follows review of events.]

Conclusion.

It was generally felt by informed reliable Chinese sources at Kunming that this move on the part of the Generalissimo to bring Lung Yun into line14 was prompted by an effort to reinforce the Chungking Government’s position vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists. There were rumors at Kunming that the Generalissimo had sent similar emissaries to Chengtu to approach the Szechuan militarists. These Chinese observers believed that the Generalissimo realized that neither the Yunnanese nor Szechuanese provincial authorities represented a threat on a national scale to the Central Government and that Chungking could at this time make concessions to these factions, which would on the one hand lessen the possible present opposition to the Central Government and would on the other hand strengthen Chungking’s position vis-à-vis the Communists. Whatever the post-war situation in China, war-lordism could not endure and the elimination of provincial elements was merely a matter of time and of gradual extension of Central Government economic and financial influence into the provinces. Chinese observers at Kunming felt that Lung had agreed to these proposals as a means of strengthening his provincial military position and that he would “sit tight” and await future developments.

The appointment of General Lung Yun as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Armed Forces, as described in Embassy’s telegram no. 257, February 20, 2 p.m.,15 may represent a further step in the process of bringing Lung Yun into the Central Government fold and may be a logical result of earlier discussions between Lung and both Liu Chien-chun and General Ho Ying-chin himself, who arrived in Kunming on November 25. The appointment of General Yang-Sen, a Szechuan general, as Chairman of the Kweichow Provincial Government, might represent part of a similar understanding with the Szechuan authorities. If General Chang Chun is succeeded as [Page 242] Chairman of the Szechuan Provincial Government by a Szechuanese pleasing to the local interests (Chang Chun’s removal from this office is suggested by reports that he is to take an important post in the Central Government at Chungking), there would seem to be grounds for assuming that the Generalissimo had arrived at some understanding with Szechuan provincial interests.16

  1. Notation at end of memorandum stated that “the period covered by this memorandum is that between July and November, 1944, inclusive, during which Mr. Sprouse was stationed at the Consulate General at Kunming.”
  2. It was reported that through an agent Chiang Kai-shek had promised Lung Yun to allocate lend-lease supplies for Yunnan provincial troops in return for Lung Yun’s cooperation in measures to suppress dissident elements in Yunnan.
  3. Ante, p. 51.
  4. In a memorandum of February 27, addressed to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) and the Deputy Director (Stanton), the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent) commented on Mr. Sprouse’s remarks as follows: “It should be pointed out that any understanding of this nature reached between the Central Government and provincial interests does not preclude the possibility of provincial support of any movement against the Chungking Government if provincial interests felt that it was assured of success and that it was to their advantage to join such a movement.”