893.00/2–2845: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 3:07 p.m.]
324. The situation in China appears to be developing in some ways that are not conducive to effective prosecution of the war, nor to China’s future peace and unity.
1. The recent American attempt through diplomatic and persuasive means to assist compromise between the factions in China was a necessary first step in the handling of the problem. Unity was correctly taken to be the essence not only of the most effective conduct of the war by China but also of the peaceful and speedy emergence of a strong, united and democratic China.
But the cessation of Japanese offensives, the opening of the road from China, the rapid development of our Army plans for rebuilding Chiang’s armies, the increase of other assistance such as the WPB.16a the expectation that the Central Government will share in the making of important decisions at San Francisco, and belief that we are intent upon the definite support and strengthening of the Central Government alone and as the only possible channel for aid to other groups—these circumstances have combined to increase greatly Chiang’s feeling of strength and have resulted in unrealistic optimism on his part and lack of willingness to make any compromise. (See our 301, February 26, 4 p.m.)
This attitude is reflected in, among other things, early hopes of a settlement with Russia without settlement of the Communist problems, when nothing was finally offered but an advisory inter-party committee without any power or place in the Government, and in [Page 243] recent military-political appointments which place strong anti-Communists in the strategic war areas and name reactionaries17 such as Admiral Chan Chak (Tai Li subordinate) to be mayor of Canton and General Ho Kuo-kuang (former commander in chief of Gendarmerie) as chairman of Formosa.
2. The Communists for their part have come to the conclusion that we are definitely committed to the support of Chiang alone, and that we will not force Chiang’s hand in order to be able to aid or cooperate with them. In what they consider self-protection, they are therefore following the line of action (forecast in statements of Communist leaders last summer if they continued to be excluded from consideration) of actively increasing their forces and aggressively expanding their areas southward, regardless of nominal Kuomintang control, [to?] reach southeast China. The Department is referred to our 284, February 24, 9 a.m., reporting large movements and conflicts with Central Government forces already taking place. In grasping time by the forelock, the Communists intend to take advantage of the isolation of East China by the Japanese capture of the Canton–Hankow Railway, to make themselves as nearly invincible as possible before Chiang’s new armies now in process of formation in Yunnan are ready, and to present us the dilemma of accepting or refusing their aid if our forces land anywhere on the China coast. Communists close to the leaders are now talking of the necessity of their seeking Soviet assistance. The party itself is broadcasting demands for Communist and other non-Kuomintang representation at San Francisco, and is actively considering creation of a unified council of their various independent guerrilla governments.
3. The conclusion seems clear that, although our intentions have been good and our actions in refusing to deal with or assist any group but the Central Government have been diplomatically correct, if this situation continues and our analysis of it is correct, chaos in China will be inevitable and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated. Even for the present it is obvious that this situation, in which we are precluded from cooperation with the large, aggressive and strategically situated armies and organized population of the Communist areas, as well as the forces such as the Li Chi-shen [and] Tsai Ting-kai group in the southeast, is unsatisfactory and hampering from a purely military standpoint. As indicated above, the situation is also dangerous to American interests from a long-range point of view.
Unless checked, this situation is apt to develop with increasing acceleration as the tempo of the Avar in China and the whole Far East [Page 244] is raised and the inevitable resolution of China’s internal conflict becomes more urgent. The time is short and it will be dangerous to allow affairs to drift.
4. If the high military authorities of our Government agree that some cooperation with the Communists and other groups who have proved themselves willing and are in position to fight the Japanese is or will be necessary or desirable, we believe that the immediate and paramount consideration of military necessity should be made the basis for a further step in American policy. The presence of General Wedemeyer in Washington as well as General Hurley should be a favorable opportunity for discussion of this matter.
Predicated on the assumption that the military necessity exists, the first step we propose for consideration is that the President inform the Generalissimo in definite terms that military necessity requires that we supply and cooperate with the Communists and other suitable groups who can assist the war against Japan (this would not under present conditions include forces such as the Szechwan warlords who are not in actual position to attack the enemy) and that we are taking direct steps to accomplish this end. We can assure the Generalissimo that we are not contemplating reducing our aid to the Central Government (any aid we give the Communists or other groups must because of transport difficulties be at first on a small scale and will probably be less than the natural increase in the flow of supplies into China). We may include in the statement that we will keep the Central Government informed of the extent and types of such aid. We can also tell the Generalissimo that we will be able to use the lever of our supplies and cooperation to limit independent and aggressive action on their part, restricting them to their present areas. And we can point out the advantages of having the Communists helped by us rather than seeking Russian aid or intervention, direct or indirect.
At the time of making this statement to the Generalissimo, he might also be told, if it is considered advisable, that although our effort to persuade the various groups of the desirability of unification has failed and we can no longer delay measures for the most effective prosecution of the war, we consider it obviously desirable that our military assistance to all groups be based on unity and the coordination of military command; that we are prepared to continue to lend our good offices to this end, where feasible and when asked for; and that while we believe that the proposal should come from the Generalissimo, Ave would be disposed to support: (1) The formation of something in the nature of a supreme Avar council or war cabinet in which Communists and other groups would have effective representation and some share in responsibility for the formulation and execution of joint war plans, and (2) the nominal incorporation of Communist [Page 245] and other selected forces into the Central Government armies under the operational command of American officers designated by the Generalissimo on the advice of General Wedemeyer, on agreement by all parties that these troops would operate only within their present areas or specified extended areas. It should be made clear, however, that our decision to cooperate with any forces able to assist the war will not be delayed by or contingent on the completion of such internal Chinese arrangements.
Such a modus operandi, we believe, would bridge the present deadlock in China and serve as a preliminary move toward full solution of the problem of ultimate complete unity. As one result of the recent negotiations the principal and over-riding issues have become clear. The Generalissimo and his Government will not at this time on their own initiative take any forward step which will mean loss of face, prestige or personal power. The Communists will not, without guarantees in which they have confidence, take any forward step which will involve dispersion and eventual elimination of their forces upon which their present strength and future political existence depend. The step we propose taking will exert on both parties the force necessary to break this deadlock, and the modus operandi embodied in those two proposals should initiate concrete military and, as an inevitable result, political cooperation and accordingly provide a foundation for increasing future development toward unity.
These proposals would not exclude the political consultation committee plan which, if adopted, could function alongside the war council and the Government. In fact, it should be expected that the committee would be greatly strengthened.
The statements to Chiang should, of course, be made privately. But the possibility of the logical and much more drastic step, in the event of his refusal to accept it, of a public statement of policy such as that by Churchill in regard to Yugoslavia would be clearly understood.
Even though not made public, however, the fact of our assistance to the Communists and other forces would soon become generally known throughout China. This, we believe, would have profound and desirable political effects in China, There is tremendous internal pressure in China for unity based on a reasonable compromise with the Communists and a chance for the presently repressed liberal groups to express themselves. However, these liberal groups, even within the Kuomintang such as the Sun Fo group, and the minor parties were ignored in the recent negotiations by the Kmt but not by the Communists (with whom they present what amounts to a united front) and they are disillusioned and discouraged by what they feel is American commitment to the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang. By the steps we propose we would prove [Page 246] that we are not so committed, we would greatly raise the morale and prestige of these liberal groups, and we would exert the strongest possible influence through these internal forces to impel Chiang to put his own house in order and make the concessions necessary to unity.
There is no question that such a policy would be greatly welcomed by the vast majority of the Chinese people (although not by the very small reactionary minority in control of the Kuomintang) and that it would raise American prestige.… The majority of Chinese believe that the settlement of China’s internal problem is not so much a matter of mutual concessions as reform of the Kuomintang itself. They also declare, with justification, that American “non-intervention” in China cannot help but be in fact intervention in favor of the present conservative leadership.
Also by such policy, which we consider realistically accepts the facts in China, we could expect to secure the cooperation of all of China’s forces in the war, to hold the Communists to our side rather than throw them into the arms of Russia (which is otherwise inevitable if Russia enters the war against Japan), to convince the Kmt of the undesirability of its apparent present plans for eventual civil war, and to bring about some unification which, even though not immediately complete, would provide the basis for peaceful future development toward full democracy.
5. This telegram has been drafted with the assistance and agreement of all the political officers of the staff of this Embassy and has been shown to General Wedemeyer’s Chief of Staff, General Gross.