711.93/4–2545
Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs28
Our major objectives with respect to China are: effective joint prosecution of the war against Japan; and from a long-range standpoint, the establishment of a strong and united China as a necessary principal stabilizing factor in the Far East.
Political
Toward both the immediate objective of defeating Japan and the long-term objective of peace and security, we seek to promote establishment of a broadly representative Chinese government which will bring about internal unity, including reconcilement of Kuomintang–Communist differences, and will effectively discharge its internal and international responsibilities.
While favoring no political faction, we continue to support the existing Government of China, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, as the still generally recognized central authority which thus far offers the best hope for unification and for avoidance of chaos in China’s war effort. However, with regard to our long-term objective and against the possible disintegration of the authority of the existing Government, it is our purpose to maintain a degree of flexibility to permit cooperation with any other leadership in China which may give greater promise of achieving unity and contributing to peace and security in east Asia. We are, meanwhile, assisting China, as a nation, to attain a position of recognized equality among the major powers.
[Page 94]We seek the cooperation of the Soviet Union and Great Britain as essential to the success of such policies. Toward that end we aim to promote friendship and mutual trust in Sino-Soviet and Sino-British relations. Where specific territorial or other issues exist, we would welcome, and assist when appropriate, amicable remedial arrangements, including for example: facilitation of the passage of Soviet trade through Manchuria, with the possible designation by China of a free port; restoration of Hong Kong to China and the perpetuation by China of its status of a free port; and adjustment of China’s claims to outlying territories, such as Tibet and Outer Mongolia, with the concerned Soviet or British interests, as well as with aspirations of the native peoples of such territories for local autonomy.
As a further basis for peace and stability, we favor the establishment by China of close and friendly relations with Korea, Burma, Thailand, Indochina and other neighboring areas, without Chinese domination over such areas.
Economic
Our short-term policy is directed toward the strengthening of the economic basis of China’s war effort through: expansion of supply routes and services into China; lend-lease supplies to the limit of transport facilities; and joint Sino-American measures to strengthen China’s war production, increase its supply of consumer goods, improve its internal transport systems, and combat its serious inflation.
Our long-range policy centers on the development of an integrated and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flow of trade between China and other countries. Toward these objectives we seek full economic collaboration among China, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and other peace-loving nations on a basis of equality of opportunity, respect for national sovereignty, and liberal trade policies. We hope that China, for its part, will contribute to such collaboration, so necessary to China’s agricultural and economic development, through the institution of reasonable policies calculated to encourage legitimate trade and enterprise.
We ourselves would expect—taking due account of the policies which may be followed by the Chinese Government and of actual conditions affecting American trade with and in China—to extend to China all practicable economic, financial and technical assistance which she may request in connection with her efforts to plan an integrated and well-balanced economy. We look forward to promoting mutually profitable Sino-American trade by all practicable means and to negotiating soon with China a comprehensive, modern commercial treaty.
[Page 95]Military
Our established military policy relating to China is thus far confined to the immediate objective of effective joint prosecution of the war through direct military assistance to China, promotion of Sino-American military cooperation, and assistance in mobilizing all of China’s human and material resources against Japan. Parallel with our efforts to strengthen the political and economic bases of China’s war effort, already outlined, we are undertaking to reorganize, train and equip part of the Chinese National Army as a compact striking-force capable of playing a major part in driving the Japanese from China. We are also seeking to bring about vitally needed Chinese military unity through integration of the Chinese Communist forces with those of the National Government.
From the standpoint of our long-range political objective of a strong China able to contribute to peace and security, we would logically expect to assist China to develop a modern and effective postwar military organization. In view, however, of the uncertain present political situation in China and its potentialities for civil war and complications with Soviet Russia, we are not prepared to commit ourselves with the present Chinese Government for the rendering of such assistance until we are convinced that that Government is making progress toward achieving unity and toward gaining the solid support of the Chinese people.
- Transmitted to President Truman by the Acting Secretary of State with memorandum of April 27, which stated that this memorandum was prepared “at the request of the Secretary of State for use in connection with the San Francisco Conference”; copy transmitted to the Ambassador in China by the Acting Secretary of State in instruction No. 133, May 15, not printed.↩