740.0011 P.W./7–1645
Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Truman 6
[The first two sections of the memorandum deal with the conduct of the war with Japan and a warning to Japan; see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, pp. 1265–1267.]
The Yalta Agreements
As for the Russian participation and the so-called Yalta Agreements, I believe that these agreements, so long as they are interpreted consistently with our traditional policy toward China, should not cause us any concern from a security point of view, assuming always we keep clear our control over the Pacific islands. By our traditional policy toward China I refer, of course, to the Open Door and the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria.
Manchuria
We can afford to permit Russia to have access to ports in Manchuria, and I interpret the Yalta Agreements as giving her full commercial access to Dairen, with the necessary facilities. Likewise I understand the late President Roosevelt’s willingness to permit the Russians to have what in effect is the lease of a naval base at Port Arthur on the peninsula for a limited time. However no concessions should be made which would permit Russia to control or prohibit trade through Dairen or any other commercial port in Manchuria. In other words I would insist that Manchuria be treated precisely as China proper in this regard, except that Russia be permitted to acquire the facilities necessary to develop and support her trade from and to Russia through the port by her joint-control with China of the railway and the normal acquisition of the necessary port facilities. The operation of the railway must be conducted on the usual public carrier basis without discrimination against the trade in Manchuria of any power. I understand Dr. Soong to take this view and I would not hesitate to support China on this, as any other course could constitute an abandonment of one of our longest established and most highly respected American policies. It would also be antagonistic to our clear and growing interests in the orient.
Except for the lease of a naval base at Port Arthur, which in itself is a trend in the wrong direction, no further military rights or control [Page 944] should be granted in the Dairen peninsula or elsewhere in Manchuria.
[Final two sections deal with trusteeship for Korea and Allied occupation of the main Japanese Islands.]
- Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Secretary of War in a covering letter dated July 16, not printed.↩