Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1845

Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

[Babelsberg,] July 18, 1945.

Yalta Agreement Affecting China

The recent conferences in Moscow between Dr. T. V. Soong and Generalissimo Stalin have resulted in agreement on the following points:

I. China raises no objection and accepts the return to Russia of the southern part of the Sakhalin Island and the accession of the Kurile Islands.

II. Chiang Kai Shek agrees that “the status quo for Outer Mongolia shall be preserved” and, in addition, that the Chinese National Government will, after the war is terminated with Japan, recognize the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic, assuming that a plebiscite will be held which re-affirms the desire of the people of Outer Mongolia for independence.

(It should be noted that this latter goes beyond the strict interpretation of the Yalta agreement. On the other hand, it is not considered that the interests of the United States are adversely affected by this concession to the demands of the Soviet Government.)

III. The Soviet Government has offered to the Chinese National Government a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Post-war Cooperation as agreed to at Yalta. The terms of this agreement are satisfactory to the Chinese and in general follow similar treaties concluded by the Soviet Government with European countries.

In this connection, Stalin has indicated the Soviet Government’s desire for a strong and unified China and has agreed to support Chiang Kai Shek’s government in the unification of China under his government and to withhold moral and material support from the Chinese Communist Party and the insurgents in Sinkiang.

In this connection, the Soviet Government also agreed to conclude a civil affairs agreement (along the lines of the Czech agreement) which provides for political representatives of the Chinese National Government accompanying the Red Army, when it enters Chinese territory, in order to organize Chinese administration liberated by the Red Army therein. Stalin agreed that, if the Chinese Government so requests, the Soviet Government will withdraw Soviet troops from Chinese territory within three months after the termination of hostilities against Japan.

Agreement was not fully reached between Soong and Stalin on the question of the ports and railroads referred to in the Yalta agreement.

1. Railroads

It has been agreed that the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad shall be equally owned by a joint Soviet-Chinese company. Neither government shall have the right to transfer its share of ownership to a third party. Joint ownership shall be for a period of thirty years at the termination of which all interests shall revert to the Chinese Government. The arrangements relate only to the main lines from Dairen to Harbin and from Harbin to Manchuli and Pogranichnaya.

The Soviet Government has agreed that it should not have the privilege of stationing troops in Manchuria or to have Soviet guards on the railroads or to move troops through Manchuria except in time of war or in the event of a threat of war.

The Soviet Government has demanded that there be seven directors of the railroad companies; four Russian and three Chinese, and that the managers of each of the railroads be Russian and the assistant managers Chinese.

On the other hand, Dr. Soong has proposed that there should be eight directors, four Chinese and four Russian; that the chairman of the board (a titular position without administrative authority) as a courtesy should be Chinese; the manager of the Chinese Eastern to be Russian and the assistant manager Chinese; the manager of the South Manchurian Railroad Chinese and the assistant manager Russian. Dr. Soong is prepared to agree that the interests of the Soviet Government in its transit traffic shall be fully provided for.

2. Ports:

(a) Port Arthur:

Agreement has been reached regarding the use of Port Arthur by the Soviet Government as a naval base for a period of thirty years; the port and the adjacent area to be under Soviet military control. As a matter of form, the Chinese will also have the right to use the port.

(b) Dairen:

The Soviet Government has demanded that the military zone under Soviet control shall extend to and include not only the area of Port Arthur but also the entire area of the original Russian lease of the Kwantung Peninsula which includes Dairen; that one of the bays of Dairen shall be set aside as an additional naval base for Soviet use; that the management of the port be under a mixed Russian-Chinese commission, that the manager be Russian, and that although the Chinese are permitted to deal with civilian matters, the civil government be under the orders of the Soviet military authorities, including the secret police.

On the other hand, Dr. Soong for the Chinese Government has offered the establishment of Dairen as a free port under Chinese administration, giving the Soviet Government a commercial lease on certain docks and storage yards within the port for exclusive Soviet use. The military zone under Soviet control should not include the port of Dairen or the connecting railway and Dairen should not be used as a Soviet naval base.

Dr. Soong has requested that I lay before the President the points of difference regarding the arrangements for the port of Dairen and the railroads. He further requests that the President inform Chiang Kai Shek of his interpretation of the Yalta agreement in these respects.

He hopes that the President can during the present conference reach an agreement with Generalissimo Stalin along the lines of his (Soong’s) proposals. If this is done, Soong is prepared to return to Moscow immediately after this conference in order to conclude the agreements covering all questions discussed. He would prefer, however, to have the opportunity to discuss these matters personally with the President and Generalissimo Stalin in Berlin during the last days of the conference.

Discussion and Recommendations

I believe that Dr. Soong’s final proposals as described above adequately fulfill the Yalta agreement. In the discussion leading up to the Yalta agreement, Stalin first asked the President’s support for a lease of the railroads and the ports to the Soviet Government. President Roosevelt resisted this demand and proposed that the operation of the railroads and ports be placed under an international trusteeship. He finally agreed, however, to Stalin’s counter proposal that the operation of the railroads should be by a “joint Soviet-Chinese Company.” It should be pointed out that although the Yalta agreement regarding the railroads states that “the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded” it mentions that “the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad which provide an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated.” I feel sure that President Roosevelt had in mind that the “preeminent interests” of the Soviet Government related to transit traffic and not to any general Soviet interests in Manchuria. There appears, therefore, no reason why Russia should have complete domination of the railroads in which the interests of the Chinese and other nations are also involved.

As to the disagreement over the port of Dairen it is inconceivable that there can be any real free port in a Soviet controlled military zone. We have ample experience that Soviet military security considerations would make free commercial operations impossible under such controls. The language of the Yalta agreement states that “the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded…”⁷ Soviet military control of the port would run completely counter to the whole spirit of what President Roosevelt had in mind. I believe President Roosevelt looked upon the lease of Port Arthur for a naval base as an arrangement similar to privileges which the United States has negotiated with other countries for the mutual security of two friendly nations.

It should be noted that when Stalin requested a lease for the port of Dairen President Roosevelt refused to agree to it, indicating that it was against American Chinese policy. There is no reason, from the discussions leading up to the Yalta agreement, to presume that the safeguarding of the “preeminent interests of the Soviet Union” should go beyond Soviet interests in the free transit of exports and imports to and from the Soviet Union. Dr. Soong’s offer of a commercial lease to the Soviet Government of an area of the port for its exclusive use would appear adequately to safeguard this interest.

Stalin, in his talks with President Roosevelt, at no time asked for the right to use Dairen as a naval base.

Stalin was fully familiar with President Roosevelt’s attitude toward foreign concessions in China and I am quite satisfied that President Roosevelt never intended or never would have agreed to special privileges to the Soviet Union which would adversely affect our long standing policy towards China. President Roosevelt did, however, feel that the Soviet Union was entitled to free access to a warm water port for its exports and imports.

If there is to be a compromise as to the management of the port, it might be proposed that the American Government participate therein with the Soviet and Chinese Governments. This would appear to come within the meaning of “internationalization.” Dr. Soong told me that he would welcome such participation as a compromise if the United States Government wished to propose it.

Our experience with the control which the Soviet Government exercises over all matters under its direction, convinces me that there would be interference with the development of commerce and trade of the United States and other nations in Manchuria if the port of Dairen and the railroads are under Soviet domination. An agreement at this time to grant to the Soviet Government such control would violate the established policy and principles which the United States has held for a long period of time.

Stalin has agreed on a number of occasions to support America’s open door policy for China and to respect the sovereignty of China in Manchuria.

I, therefore, recommend that we stand firm on the interpretation of the Yalta agreement as indicated above.

7. Omission in the original memorandum.