Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

Athens Post Files: 1945:848–UNRRA: Telegram

The Senior Deputy Director General of UNRRA (Jackson) to the Director General of UNRRA (Lehman)

Athens, 28 October, 1945.

B. 1. My immediately preceding telegram A. In present circumstances, the policy of UNRRA in this country is so completely bound up with the general economic and political future of Greece and the policies of the major allies towards Greece, that it is useless to consider the policy of UNRRA by itself. We have to think in terms of the action to be taken by the major powers in Greece and where UNRRA fits into this picture. As we see it, the possible ways of approaching the existing situation in Greece are as follows:–

(a) To pursue a policy of “hands off” and leave the Greeks to work out their own salvation.

(b) To extend the functions of UNRRA in Greece so that it virtually becomes the controlling authority in the economic field.

(c) For the major powers to establish some kind of advisory mission to advise on the reconstruction of the governmental machine and the economy of the country and to see that its advice is carried through by the Government.

(d) For the major powers, pending the establishment of such a mission, to ensure that the Regent of Greece succeeds in his efforts to create a new “middle of the road” Government and to continue to give such support to the new Government in its policy.

2. We are uncertain how far policy (a) above represents the present policy of the major Governments. We believe, however, that such a policy would involve a continuation of the present lack of political leadership by the Government and make an economic breakdown inevitable in a matter of weeks, this in turn causing further political disintegration. Quite apart from the results of this for Greece, we believe that such a development would make it impossible to secure the additional funds required from the major Governments supporting UNRRA, and would thus mean the winding-up of UNRRA early in the new year. We are, therefore, in a position in which the future of UNRRA may well depend upon a quick solution being found to the present economic and political problems of this country. It is also worth emphasizing that if a new breakdown occurred here and UNRRA went out of business because of it, the major Governments concerned would be faced with the necessity of reconstructing the supply line to Greece, which we doubt they are at present equipped to do. For these reasons we feel policy (a) would lead to chaos affecting all parties concerned.

3. Policy (b) in paragraph 1 above has been suggested on more than one occasion by the Regent and members of the Greek Government. It would lead, however, to UNRRA becoming openly involved in day to day politics here and would also lead to UNRRA being made a scapegoat, since any economic shortcomings would be immediately blamed on UNRRA. This would be essentially an unstable compromise so that it would do Greece no good even if it were acceptable to UNRRA. We do not believe this alternative, therefore, provides a way out.

4. Policy (c) in paragraph 1 above is in the end undoubtedly the only solution which has a chance of cutting through the difficulties here. There is in the country at the moment no civil service at all as we know it in western countries. The disorganization of the Metaxas⁹¹ regime and the German occupation⁹² together have destroyed whatever machine existed before and we believe that this country cannot get back on to its feet unless a new governmental machine is built up under the guidance of the major allies. It is not of course for us to say whether the major allies would be prepared to accept this solution or the Greeks to tolerate it. As technicians, however, we consider that Greece cannot be rescued without some measure of this sort. If this policy were adopted we believe that a workable basis could be found for the UNRRA programme in this country. UNRRA would not itself necessarily be directly associated with the advisory mission, but through the existence of these advisors we could have some assurance that the Greek Government would carry out the measures necessary to take advantage of UNRRA’s work here and to take sufficient responsibility itself to permit UNRRA to withdraw at the proper time.

5. While in our view the advisory mission idea offers the only way of getting at the root of the trouble here, it must be recognized that some time must elapse before arrangements on these lines could be effective since the necessary staff to do this kind of job does not exist here now.

We feel, therefore, that as a short term measure policy (d) is necessary. What is required is to give the Regent sufficient public support from the outside to enable him to form a reliable “middle of the road” government and for this support to be maintained while the necessary reforms are instituted so that the new government is strong enough to deal with those persons who are interested financially in preventing a general resumption of trade and industry. If the major governments announced this support we feel that this might check the present deterioration and enable UNRRA to continue its work pending the more fundamental measures referred to in paragraph 4 above.

6. If the analysis above is agreed, it will be necessary for you to take the matter up with the State Department and the President and also, we suggest, with the British Minister of State⁹³ who is, we understand, in North America in connection with F.A.O., and the British and Canadian Embassies. It will also be necessary for Gale to report personally on the situation to the Foreign Secretary on his return to London, and to stress the urgency of immediate and realistic action. We believe that in these approaches to the United States, British and Canadian Governments, we should emphasize that action on the lines of paragraph 4 and 5 above is necessary:—

(a) if Greece is not to go into chaos and

(b) if UNRRA is not to fail

It appears to us that the British Government at any rate, are politically committed both to the maintenance of order in Greece and to the success of UNRRA. The United States and Canadian Governments are also politically committed to the second objective, if not to the first.

7. We realize that we are suggesting that you should approach governments on matters which are outside UNRRA’s immediate sphere of responsibility. Nevertheless we believe that the policy we are advocating is the only one which can prevent an economic collapse in Greece which will destroy all the work which UNRRA has done in and for Greece and probably affect the general future of UNRRA. It is therefore necessary in our own interests to request our major supporting governments, in their interests as well as ours, to see that conditions are created in which the contributions which they have made to UNRRA are not thrown away. It is from this angle that we have approached the problem.

See my immediately following telegram.⁹⁴

[

Jackson

]

91. Gen. John Metaxas, Prime Minister and dictator of Greece from August 1936 until his death on January 29, 1941.
92. For documentation on the German invasion and occupation of Greece, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, pp. 714 ff.
93. Philip J. Noel-Baker who was attending the First Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, held at Quebec from October 16 to November 1, 1945.
94. Infra.