Athens Post Files: 1945:848–UNRRA: Telegram
The Senior Deputy Director General of UNRRA (Jackson) to the Director General of UNRRA (Lehman)
C. 1. My two immediately preceding telegrams Nos. A and B. The following general reflections on the situation here may be of use to you.
2. It would be very much easier if in accordance with our general policy UNRRA could stand aside and allow the Greeks to get on with reconstructing their country, or to fail in doing so, as the case may be. Unfortunately, through no fault of UNRRA’s we cannot do this. If UNRRA and the major contributing Governments stand aside now, we believe that not only will Greece collapse, but UNRRA will be involved in her ruin, since it will be argued that we have failed in the one country in which we have had the best opportunity to show what we can do. This would be an unfair argument. If we fail here it will be because of the conditions which have prevailed in this country for [Page 251] the last 10 years and because of the present inability of the Greeks by themselves to set about the rehabilitation of their country in a determined fashion. The fact that the argument is unfair, however, is not likely to be easily understood in Congress and Parliament, and our strong feeling is that a collapse here in the next 8 weeks would prove so embarrassing to you in your endeavor to get further financial support as to make your task well nigh impossible. This is why we venture to suggest that you should approach the Governments concerned on the broadest political front, and with great urgency.
3. The situation here demands some Allied intervention both to save Greece and to save UNRRA. We believe that economic intervention now will be necessary if military intervention later on is to be avoided, but UNRRA itself cannot be the authority to intervene. The major Governments must make the running if intervention is to be effective. If UNRRA intervenes by itself we do not think that this could provide more than a very temporary solution, even if it were not ruled out on general policy grounds. If, however, the major Governments are prepared to take a strong line here, we think that conditions can be brought about under which the UNRRA Mission could make a great contribution both in advising the Greek Government and the U.S. and British representatives, and in maintaining the supply programme which is an essential basis of life in Greece.
4. Finally, we must stress the time factor. Action must be taken in the next 4 or 5 weeks if the internal situation in Greece is not to deteriorate beyond the point at which a fresh collapse can be prevented. Quite apart from this, UNRRA will itself pass through the crisis of its existence during the next 8 weeks when the case for further funds must be made, and for this reason alone, it is essential that action should be taken immediately to avert the return of economic and political chaos in Greece. Jackson will be able to give you further background but in view of the great urgency of the situation we believe that you should yourself take this matter up in Washington without waiting for Jackson’s return.