867N.01/7–3046
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
I called on the British Ambassador at the Embassy at my request and informed him that I was making this suggestion to reduce to the minimum the possibility of press speculation. I told the Ambassador that the President had been giving the most careful consideration to the recommendations of the alternates on the Cabinet Committee on Palestine. Since he had received those recommendations yesterday he had had a long meeting of the Cabinet and had consulted members of both houses of Congress. With the greatest reluctance and regret the President had concluded that he could not make the statement supporting the recommendations which had been prepared for him in Paris since he could not carry with him the support necessary to fulfill the proposals23 which he was called upon to make. I said that under the proposals the important part to be played by the United States, in addition to its moral support, was that the President was to recommend to the Congress legislation admitting an additional 50,000 displaced persons, granting aid to Palestine of $50,000,000 and loans for the Middle Eastern area development projects up to $250,000,000 in the event that for any reason loans were not available through the [Page 674] International Bank. In view of the extreme intensity of feeling in centers of Jewish population in this country neither political party would support this program at the present time and the President’s statement, therefore, would be wholly personal and most misleading.
I said that the President was recalling Mr. Grady and his associates for consultation and that until this had taken place I would not be able to suggest to the Ambassador what the next step in the program might be. I asked the Ambassador to communicate urgently with Mr. Attlee who was to speak in the House of Commons the next day. I told him that we were also sending word to Mr. Byrnes in Paris24 and the American Embassy in London.25
The Ambassador expressed regret as well as the thought that this development would cause an embarrassing situation for the Prime Minister. He said that he understood fully the considerations which had moved the President to this conclusion since he was thoroughly informed of the discussion of this matter in the American press. I discussed briefly what Mr. Attlee might say and agreed that the less said the better. I told the Ambassador that we were preparing a very short statement for the President26 which would be as non-committal as possible and that I would read it to him after it had been prepared. On my return to the Department I dictated this statement to the Ambassador so that he might send it to Mr. Attlee.
- Presumably those in telegram 3701, supra.↩
- In telegram 3732 (Secdel 546), July 30, 5 p.m.↩
- In telegram 5728, July 30, 5 p.m., to London, repeated to Paris as No. 3734 (Secdel 548).↩
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The statement, released by the White House on July 31, read:
“The President has been considering certain recommendations of the Alternates of the Cabinet Committee with regard to Palestine and has decided in view of the complexity of the matter to request Ambassador Grady and his associates to return to Washington to discuss the whole matter with him in detail.
“The President hopes that further discussions will result in decisions which will alleviate the situation of the persecuted Jews in Europe and at the same time contribute to the ultimate solution of the longer term problem of Palestine.”
The text of this message was transmitted to Ambassador Harriman in telegram 5727, July 30, 1946, 5 p.m., with an instruction to inform the British Government that the President intended to issue the statement at 2 p.m. on July 31, 1946. The telegram was repeated to Secretary Byrnes in Paris as No. 3733 (Secdel 547).
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