711.51/8–547
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) for the Secretary of State
(1) On Saturday63 evening about six o’clock Ambassador Bonnet called Mr. Lovett at home and for forty minutes expressed the greatest [Page 1018] concern over what he referred to as the “renewed crisis” in France arising out of the statements made by the Secretary of War in a Berlin press conference on August 1. He stated that the Communists had seized on the statements made by the Secretary of War as proof of the fact that this Government was not sincere in its agreement to give the French views full consideration. Bonnet said Bidault was greatly upset and that he had had three telephone calls and a long cable during the day asking the French Ambassador here to make a démarche and protest.
Bonnet’s greater concern, however, was that, in the light of the French press reaction to the Berlin statements, the delivery on Monday morning to the French Foreign Office of the Department of State’s cable No. 286864 would greatly upset Bidault. This cable, sent with signed War Department concurrence and timed for delivery at the same time with a British message of identical content, stated that “the U.S. Government is now prepared to give careful consideration to any representations which the French Government may care to make to it upon the subject of the level of industry plan,” etc., and went on to say that “in these circumstances, and in view of the desirability of doing nothing to complicate the work of the Paris Conference, it is hoped that the French Government, should they wish to raise any questions about the level of industry plan, will do so direct to the U.S. and also to the U.K. Governments and not at the Conference.”
This message followed up a promise made in our cable of July 2165 in which the French Government was notified that this Government agreed to “suspend further announcement with respect to the U.S.-U.K. proposals for the revised bi-zonal level of industry in Germany until the French Government has had a reasonable opportunity to present its views in this connection for full consideration”.
Lovett told Bonnet that he felt that the assurances in this message of full consideration for the French views should calm Bidault rather than excite him. Bonnet answered quite bluntly that it would, except for the fact that it seemed clear to the French, from what had been said in Berlin, that American assurances were merely a device and that there would be no true discussion or consideration but that, after the French had made their statement, the U.S. and U.K. bi-zonal commanders would go right ahead and “do what they had always intended to do”. Lovett replied that cable 2868 clearly indicated that careful consideration would be given to representations and stated further that he felt that the French were evidencing more interest in [Page 1019] the form of conversation rather than in the substance of the problem. It was agreed that both parties would check late despatches from abroad and would consult the next day.
(2) After searching the files on Sunday morning, Lovett decided that Bonnet’s concern partly arose out of a misunderstanding regarding the form the discussions were to take and he therefore called on the French Ambassador at the Embassy at noon and spent an hour and a quarter with him. Bonnet had the press clippings, notably the Herald Tribune of August 2, a United Press report, an INS French report, and the New York Times follow-up story on Sunday morning. The Ambassador was visibly upset and showed Lovett a message from Bidault66 which constituted almost a personal appeal to the Secretary of State not to put Bidault in a position where he might lose control of the delicately balanced French political machine and thereby be compelled to withdraw from the Paris conferences on the rehabilitation of Europe.
It was repeatedly pointed out to the Ambassador that every engagement made by this Government was being scrupulously carried out and that his Government would have the next morning an invitation to start making their representations, both to the U.S. and U.K. Governments. This had no real effect on Bonnet, whose sole desire was to obtain a commitment that we would “sit down and discuss this matter with the French”. He admitted that the French views had not been presented and that he was in the position of claiming that he was hurt without an occasion to point to.
The Ambassador calmed down visibly, partly because he took the personal visit as a “friendly and considerate act” and asked advice as to what steps he should take. I urged him to wire the French Foreign Office and refer Bidault to the telegram of July 21 and the precise language in it which, when read with the follow-up which was promised in the earlier telegram, ought to remove Bidault’s doubts. Bonnet again said frankly that the language was clear if the intent was to discuss and not merely give the French a hearing but no consideration of their views.
Lovett urged Bonnet furthermore not to attach too much importance to the Berlin press conference, pointing out that everything in the newspaper reports indicated that it was something of a shambles and that the Secretary of War might very well have been misquoted. He said that, while that was possible, it was not likely, as the French Agency reporters were also present.
[Page 1020](3) On Monday morning at ten o’clock, at the request of the Embassy in Paris, a teletype conversation was held by Lovett with Mr. Clayton, with Ambassadors Caffery, Douglas and Murphy present.67 In this teletype conversation, Clayton stated that he had read them the Department’s cable 2868 (attached hereto) and that he (Clayton) expressed the opinion “that it would be better to have informal talks with the French on these two questions rather than request them for a formal expression of their views because political considerations would probably compel them to express in writing more extreme views than if substantial agreement could first be reached informally. Once having expressed such extreme views, it would be very difficult to change. With this, all were in complete agreement.” Clayton suggested deferring the delivery of the message for a few hours until Clayton and Lovett could discuss this point. However, the British had just advised that, while they fully agreed to the desirability of this approach, they had already presented their note to the French. Under these circumstances, Caffery would deliver the U.S. note in the late afternoon.
At this point the telecommunication was interrupted by the following message: “Have just this minute been informed by British that the French have ‘blown up’ over the British note.” The British note was, of course, identical with ours, as indicated above.
Lovett gave full background to the Paris group as outlined above and urged Caffery to calm Bidault and ask him to accept the assurances given in 2868 that any French views would receive full consideration. Clayton replied that, after getting the background just given him of the press reports and in view of British delivery of the note, he and Caffery felt that it should be promptly delivered. He stated, “Caffery confident he can persuade Bidault in way you suggest.”
Bonnet called Lovett on Monday to state that he would not request an appointment with the Secretary of State but would await further advices. He indicated however that he had been warned that a message was coming through which he must present on Tuesday. He did not disclose its content but indicated that it was along the lines of Bonnet’s communication to Lovett.
- August 2.↩
- Telegram 2868, August 2, to Paris, had given instructions for the delivery of the communication of August 4 to Bidault, supra.↩
- The reference here is to a message from Marshall to Bidault. p. 1003.↩
- Possibly a reference to the message of July 17 from Bidault to the Secretary of State, p. 991.↩
- Under Secretary Clayton and Ambassadors Caffery, Douglas and Murphy were meeting in Paris to consider matters related to the Conference of Economic Cooperation and the Marshall Plan.↩