Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/8–547

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Reber)⁶⁸

[Washington,] August 5, 1947.

Participants:	The Secretary
	The French Ambassador
	Mr. Reber, WE

The French Ambassador called this afternoon to give the Secretary a message from M. Bidault with reference to the United States offer to give consideration to French representations on the subject of level of industry in Germany and the management of the Ruhr mines.

M. Bonnet explained the French position along the lines of the attached memorandum,⁶⁹ as follows:

(1) Since the two problems of German industry and the management of the Ruhr mines were so vital to French security and to its relations with the United States and Great Britain, the French Government cannot agree to limit its expression of views on the subject to a written presentation, but must insist upon a frank discussion.

(2) The letter which Mr. Caffery had given to M. Bidault two weeks ago⁷⁰ had indicated that the United States Government was prepared to suspend any announcement with respect to these problems until the French Government had had the opportunity of discussing these questions with the United States and United Kingdom Governments. From this the French had believed all that was necessary was to establish the manner in which these discussions should be held.

(3) The instructions of the French delegation which was to have taken part in these discussions had been prepared, since the French Government thought it would be possible to find a basis of understanding which would permit France, without concern for its security, to continue to associate itself in the work of the Paris Conference. In the opinion of the French Government the differences of opinion between the three powers related to the method of presentation rather than to the substance of the problem.

(4) The French Government, therefore, must insist that the proposals which had been made by the American Ambassador in Paris be given effect. Given the seriousness of the situation if the American Government considers it necessary today to abandon the idea of tripartite conversations, M. Bidault is ready to proceed immediately to Washington to explain France’s position directly to the Secretary of State and to set forth the consequences of any refusal to discuss these problems with the French Government.

M. Bonnet then went on to say that the French Government was aware of the necessity of including German industry and German production in any plan for European recovery. Without this it realized that not only could any plan never be accepted by the American people and the American Congress, but it would not be a complete program for Europe, since any such must include German production. The Ambassador had been instructed, however, again to point out how impossible it would be for prance to accept any program for European recovery built around an agreement with respect to German industry in which it had not participated. An agreement which had been drawn up solely by the bi-zonal commanders in relation to Germany alone could not be considered acceptable by the French people. Furthermore, his government could not place itself in the position of accepting such a program merely for the purpose of obtaining credits, however badly needed they might be.

M. Bonnet then said that the tenor of his instructions clearly showed the conviction of the French Government that an agreement in substance on these matters would be possible as a result of discussion. Everything which he had received from Paris indicated not only the desire of France to reach agreement with the United States and Great Britain in this matter, but that such agreement was definitely possible.

Without it, however, a serious situation would be faced at the meeting of the Deputies in October and at the Council of Foreign Ministers in November, as the United States and United Kingdom would have one position, France would have another, and Soviet Russia another. Although full agreement among the four was unlikely, at least agreement among the three could be achieved if properly prepared. M. Bonnet then said he wished to conclude his explanation by once again repeating that M. Bidault’s offer to come immediately to Washington demonstrated the seriousness with which this question was viewed in France.

The Secretary replied that he had been informed of M. Bonnet’s recent conversations with Mr. Lovett, and he wished to confirm what Mr. Lovett had told the Ambassador. In order to avoid any misunderstandings at this stage he could not at this time comment upon the Ambassador’s communication. He promised to give it very careful study and to let the Ambassador know, but at this time he could say nothing more.

68. The source text is signed by Secretary Marshall.
69. The paper under reference, a French Embassy aide-mémoire dated August 5, 1947, not printed, is filed separately under 840.50 Recovery/8–547.
70. The reference here is to the message of July 21 from the Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Bidault, p. 1003.