840.50 Recovery/7–2248
Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, to the United States Special Representative in Europe (Harriman)
Dear Mr. Harriman: I am writing to you at the suggestion of Mr. Lovett and in order to inform you more fully with regard to certain aspects of the Yugoslav situation, which was one of the main subjects of your conversation with Bill Draper, Bill Foster,1 Tick Bonesteel2 and myself on Saturday, July 17.3 I understand from Bill Draper that he has advised you by cable that he called upon the President on Monday and conveyed to him the substance of your views and recommendations regarding the Berlin and Yugoslav situations.4 He was accompanied by Messrs. Lovett and Royall on this occasion, Mr. Lovett having previously had an opportunity to discuss your views and recommendations with General Marshall.
I believe that you will be interested and gratified to hear that the policy of our Government has been and still is to respond to such overtaxes as may be made by the Tito government in such manner and to such extent as is considered most appropriate in each particular case, and that measures have actually been taken of the kind which are calculated to stiffen the Yugoslav will to resist without at the same time involving the United States in any embarrassing commitments or prejudicing Tito’s position within his own country. You will recall that you specifically mentioned the desirability of providing short-range “shots in the arm” in the nature of shipments of petroleum products if it should appear that such were greatly needed. Actually, there have been two recent indirect approaches by the Yugoslavs to ourselves and the British for the purpose of obtaining crude oil from us, and in both cases the requests have been promptly complied with. The amounts involved some 30,000 tons from A.M.G. Trieste, and 20/30 thousand from the United Kingdom. Moreover, you have no doubt observed the conclusion on Monday of agreements providing for the unfreezing of certain Yugoslav assets in the United States, including approximately [Page 1096] $47 millions of Yugoslav gold.5 I think you will agree that this was also a very “timely” development.
I find that it is the in the unanimous view of those in the Department of State who are principally concerned with the Yugoslav developments (and these include the Secretary and the Under Secretary) that under the circumstances it would be unwise for our Government aggressively to solicit requests for assistance on the part of the Yugoslav government. It is felt that the cumulative effect of the favorable responses with which Tito’s requests have been met thus far should be sufficient to indicate to him that we are not unwilling to give favorable consideration to such further requests as he may see fit to make of us. Concern is felt on the score that for us to adopt a more aggressive policy would carry the risk of jeopardizing Tito’s position with the Yugoslav Communist party, which is no doubt full of individuals whose true allegiance is to the Kremlin and who would not hesitate to make anti-Tito capital of any evidence coming into their hands that the Western Powers, and particularly the United States, are seeking to support Tito. The uncertain loyalty of almost any given member of Tito’s entourage makes the secrecy of any approach very unsure and is regarded as another factor rendering it better to employ to the fullest extent in helping Tito, negotiations which had their origins prior to the Yugoslav defection and by responding to such bids as Tito himself may feel safe in making for our support. Moreover, there is involved the very important consideration of the rectitude of our position and the attendant necessity for avoiding the appearance of a headlong rush to the support of a government which we have consistently condemned for its policies and practices in respect of political persecution and the general denial of individual liberties, etc.
Finally, you need have no doubt whatever that the Yugoslav development has received the top level consideration in this Government which is commensurate with its importance. This development was immediately identified by the State Department’s Russian and Cominform experts, including particularly Messrs. Bohlen, Kennan and Llewellyn Thompson, as a break of the greatest significance—probably the most important single development since the conclusion of hostilities as far as internal Soviet and Communist internal affairs are concerned, on a plane with the Trotsky fall from grace.
Thank you very much for the courtesies which were extended to us by yourself and the various members of your staff during our two visits to Paris, and most particularly for the excellent luncheon which we enjoyed at your apartment.
Sincerely yours,
- William C. Foster, United States Deputy Special Representative in Europe.↩
- Lt. Col. Charles H. Bonesteel, in the Office of the Coordinator for Foreign Aid and Assistance, Department of State.↩
- No record has been found of the substance of the conversation referred to here.↩
- Documentation on the White House meeting of July 19 is included with the other materials on the Berlin crisis presented in vol. ii, Chap. 4. That documentation does not, however, indicate the substance of the discussion regarding Yugoslavia nor the nature of Harriman’s views and recommendations. Presumably those views and recommendations are the same or similar to those reported in telegram 830, July 21, to Moscow, supra.↩
- Regarding the agreement under reference here, see the editorial note, p. 1093.↩