860H.00/7–2348: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
priority
1398. For the Secretary’s eyes only. Refrence Secretary’s 830, July 21. Policy outlined in Depcirtel June 301 with respect to Yugoslay situation has seemed to me correct even if slightly side since in the present state of Yugoslav-Soviet relations it appears better for us to be a little overcautious than to appear overeager to draw Tito in our direction. We might easily jdo him great deal of harm by alienating sections of Communist support in Yugoslavia proper as well as such covert Communist support as he may have elsewhere in the Balkans. On the other hand, it seemed to me that if Yugoslav overture recently made to our Chargé Belgrade (infotel July 6) appeared bona fide it might have been received a little more warmly. Thus, while I still believe that any concrete approach should come from Tito, I think hints might be dropped in the proper quarters to effect that his overtures would not be summarily rejected. Also, I think development of Berlin crisis2 now warrants a more positive attitude on our part than would be advisable under normal circumstances. However, with specific regard to Ambassador Harriman’s suggestion believe we should say nothing to indicate our belief that Tito is likely to be attacked. As stated in one of my previous messages, I think this most unlikely, and such a suggestion on our part would have a bad effect. Any approach which we make should certainly be secret, preferably indirect (unless a really suitable occasion should arise to make it under cover of other legitimate business) and limited to an indication that overtures on his part might be received by us with sympathy. If this were decided upon it might be worth considering whether it could be done better by the British as they had a number of close contacts with Tito during the war.