860H.00/8–1248: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Cannon) to the Secretary of State
1078. Current lull in local political activities is attributable to Danube conference and we anticipate no disturbances surface calm while conference continues. Tito is remaining at Bled1 and entire Politburo has dropped from public eye except for appearance Rankovic and Kardelj at Danube conference reception on tenth. There they talked openly but not with apparent cordiality to Vyshinsky.2 It is possible Vyshinsky and subalterns are engaging in extracurricular conversations but we think Yugoslavs can be relied upon pointedly to demonstrate he is not visiting Rumania or Bulgaria. Yugoslavs line at conference is the predetermined one of displayed solidarity and renewed proof that they are Soviet Union’s most energetic associate. We think it wholly erroneous regard their conference activities thus far as in any way linked to Vyshinsky or satellite pressure.
Below this surface lie several propaganda levels and below all of them an entirely new political situation is taking shape. It is important recognize extent and number these propaganda overlaps. First and most superficial is type represented by Danube conference where no hint Yugoslav schism has been permitted intrude and where Soviet bloc seems resolved to regard events of past six weeks as non-existent. Neither this type of spectacle nor current Yugoslav attendance Warsaw Youth Conference nor continuance conventional propaganda themes in Yugoslav press should obscure underlying evolution.
Slightly less frivolous is second level of analysis and reaction which holds entire matter as party dispute and insists on distinction between party and government in Communist affairs. This thinking apparently rests on assumption situation can be frozen as of June 29 at publication Cominform and Yugoslav CP statements.
More incisive but not yet realistic is third level represented by truce announcements of Cominform and Yugoslav leaders. While former express confidence healthy elements in Yugoslav CP will bring about changed policies or changed leaders, latter insist that Cominform action cannot change basic Yugoslav policy, that Yugoslav leaders will do everything possible liquidate differences between themselves and Soviet CP, and that reconciliation can be effected if Yugoslav CP is even more active in struggle against imperialism and reaction. Inference is that Soviet Union will eventually be forced acknowledge error [Page 1101] their charges and will in effect make public apology to Yugoslavs. These positions basically are projection doctrine hermetically distinct parties and governments and seem intended for consumption respective publics. Insistence on neither position offers real modus vivendi. Yugoslavs have maintained Soviet confidence in activity by “healthy elements” is actually invitation to civil war. And Soviets have made it clear Yugoslav CP is already outside family fraternal parties and that liquidation differences depends not on Yugoslav leaders actions but on their liquidation. Most importantly neither party has publicly considered its further steps if this interim truce fails to effect its anticipations.
Press of events, however, has in fact already carried both sides beyond their furthest public positions. The concept of party as an outer bulwark protecting intergovernment relations has been breached and is being undermined Yugoslav-Albanian relations in their fields of full collaboration, Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations over the Macedonian future, Yugoslav-Yugoslav [Hungarian?] relations over Yugoslav minority rights have all attained government status. Publication and clandestine distribution Soviet and Yugoslav CP letters preceding Cominform break (Embtels 1036 August 3; 1054, August 5; 1068, August 73) mark sharp deterioration Yugoslav-Soviet relations and show original disputes were clearly governmental and not party. Together with fact of interchanges on Tito–Stalin level this helps gauge distance of breach even before Cominform consideration.
Steady progression in deterioration on official level is not at all surprising. Personal psychology, national characteristics, and the international power situation all combine to make it impossible over long run to quarantine dispute within party limits. Moreover, history of schism whether in arts, religion, or politics demonstrates that parties to secession have generally been under stronger compulsion to destroy each other than to maintain common front against outer world.
In present lull and in developing new configuration we feel basic policy recommendations Embtel 849, July 7 still sound. Both respect to Yugoslav-Soviet relations initiative seems entirely in their hands and well practiced battle of nerves has been joined. Yugoslav efforts in reestablishing their status as second leading power international Communism as at Danube conference and before SC on Trieste must be opposed but whenever possible we should seek avoid position which will lessen Yugoslav importance vis-à-vis Soviet satellite.
[Page 1102]Re US-Yugoslav relations our informational program must still be our principal instrument. We must be prepared promptly to exploit any sudden situation particularly in current areas of border tension but time is not yet ripe, although it is progressively becoming so, for active and open intervention economically.
Sent Department. Department pass Moscow 201. Repeated London 158, Paris 148, Rome 154, pouched Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, Warsaw, Trieste, Athens, Vienna, Berlin.
- Marshal Tito’s vacation retreat on the Adriatic coast.↩
- Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Soviet Delegation at the Danube Conference at Belgrade, July–August 1948.↩
- None of these telegrams is printed. They reported upon the circulation within Yugoslavia of a Soviet pamphlet containing three letters of March and May 1948 from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Yugoslav Communist Party and the subsequent publication by the Yugoslav Communist Party of the full exchange of letters with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March, April, and May 1948. The text of these letters is printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1947–1948, pp. 348 ff.↩