800.00B Communist International/8–3148: Telegram
The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Reams)1 to the Secretary of State
1177. Political implications Soviet-Yugoslav letters (Embdes PS 665, August 6, and 668, August 112) make them of continuing importance for general problems of this area and for appreciation practical operation of Stalinism.
We will shortly forward detailed analysis correspondence and charges in light specific Yugoslav policies and actions past year. Meanwhile, following observations seem important.
Basic issue was attempt by Soviets at direct control Yugoslav Communist Party. All other matters of substance are secondary. Crisis was precipitated by Yugoslav resistance to Soviet espionage and subversion inside Yugoslavia. Open break came when Soviet officials here found they could not cope with Yugoslav security organs, when Soviet attempts to split Yugoslav leadership failed, and when Zujovich and Hebrang, acting as Soviet agents inside Yugoslav Communist Party, were discovered and arrested as traitors to nation and party. Withdrawal Soviet military and civilian specialists was its first manifestation.
This aspect of letters distinguishes them from public Cominform resolution and Yugoslav reply. Chief informational importance latter documents was their admission that Soviets regard land reform as being interim measure in eventual collectivization, popular fronts as designed only to facilitate complete Communist Party control, and Cominform not as voluntary information agency but as same organ of control as Comintern predecessor.
Purport of letters, however, is clearly that Soviet Communist Party demands same authority over foreign Communist Parties as it exercises [Page 1103] over subordinate organs inside USSR and that foreign governments, even though headed by national Communist Parties, must submit to same Soviet espionage infiltration and subversion as is carried on against bourgeois enemy world. What Soviets demanded in Yugoslavia was freedom to gather information independently, to construct intelligence nets, and to develop party blocs whose first allegiance was to Soviet Union. This the Yugoslavs could not permit and retain independence of party or nation.
Thus arose fundamental issue: relation between Soviet Communist Party and other Communist Parties which are also governments of nations. On it there could be little room for compromise.
We think dialectical charges are less important and note that in early letters matters such as agrarian police [policy], class struggle, party management, received slight attention. Full dialectical indictment as published in Cominform resolution was not drawn up by Soviet Communist Party until May 4 after Yugoslavs announced arrest Zujovic and Hebrang on April 13, and after attempts first to split off Djilas, Vukmanovic,3 Kidric and Rankovic and then to drive wedge between Tito and Kardelj had been tried and failed. Thus charges regarding class struggle which occupy fully half Cominform resolution were passed over in single short paragraph of letters as late as April 13.
Soviet suspicions that their own espionage activities were not proceeding well because Anglo-American intelligence was too effective in Yugoslavia undoubtedly contributed to break. Note long passages regarding former assistant Foreign Minister Velebit, Yugoslav Ambassador to London Leontic, and others as British spies and regarding US Ambassador as master in Yugoslav house with his intelligence agents both increasing and moving about freely. These charges doubtless responsible for new Embassy restrictions and harassments in April and May.
Unsatisfactory trade relations contributed element resentment and it must have been bitter pill for Yugoslavs who had gone down line, albeit reluctantly, opposing Marshall Plan, to be told that their trade delegation on eve departure for Moscow in March did not need to make trip since matter would not be considered before end 1948. Soviet refusal to give any satisfaction in this regard during course of correspondence could not have improved affairs.
On timing Soviet attack and collateral issues, we find particularly significant final paragraph Yugoslav Communist Party’s explanatory introduction “We did not enter into political and theoretical questions—these [Page 1104] questions, the disputable ones, are not in letters CC CPSU or in resolution of Cominform”, plus passage in resolution “Basis of mistakes made by leadership Communist Party lies in undoubted fact that nationalist elements which previously existed in disguised form managed in course past five or six months to reach dominant position in leadership Communist Party and that consequently leadership Communist Party broken with international traditions Communist Party and taken road of nationalism.”
Suggested date origin conforms to our impression that relations between Soviet and Yugoslav Communist Parties were at least tolerable when Cominform headquarters set up in Belgrade last fall and that whatever caused conflict occurred subsequently. The disputable questions of principle we feel were those regarding status Yugoslav Communist Party and its relation to Soviet Communist Party, both as involving integrity and sovereignty within Yugoslavia and assertion of Yugoslav interests abroad.
Thus issue may well have begun to sharpen late last fall when Yugoslavs began playing big power role in earnest. They developed their treaty network in Eastern Europe prior to Soviet’s Balkan treaties with ex-enemies and at least in pomp and publicity their exertions outshone subsequent Soviet efforts. Yugoslav trade delegates and missions were sent on tours Middle East. Yugoslav propaganda stressed “Balkan-Danubian federation” whose formal consummation might only be subsequent formality. Belgrade became site international conference and received visits foreign delegates last winter in increasing and unprecedented measure. And Yugoslavs gave every external indication of pursuing their own lines in Trieste, Austria, and Greece. Soviets were obviously unable to reconcile this new Yugoslav enterprise at home and abroad with their pattern for satellite conduct and attempted to increase their efforts to subvert Yugoslav leadership.
Our policy toward Yugoslavia in this new situation must be conceived almost exclusively in terms of its effect on USSR. If we are reluctant to accept theory of parallelism between present Soviet drive on Yugoslavia and 1937–38 purges in USSR as preparedness for war, we cannot disregard possibility, Our strategy should seek maximum exploitation increasing opportunities to widen gulf between Yugoslavia and USSR and extend Tito’s influence among Soviet satellites. Ultimately Tito’s brand of communism may well be more alluring to non-Communist countries than Stalin’s; his nationalism may well be truer internationalism; but these possibilities are speculative and remote. The correspondence now available shows that the Tito rebellion has maintained itself for six months. It represents today the outstanding political possibility in the Soviet sphere. We must be prepared to [Page 1105] extend affirmative forms of assistance whenever situation shall require them.4
Sent Department 1177; repeated Paris 162, London 167, Rome 164; pouched to Sofia, Warsaw, Bucharest, Budapest, Praha; Department pass Moscow 213.
- Counselor Reams was in charge of the mission during Ambassador Cannon’s absence from August 30 to October 20, 1948.↩
- Neither printed; they transmitted to the Department the texts of the Soviet and Yugoslav communications referred to in footnote 3, p. 1101.↩
- Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Chairman of the Council for Mining and Power; Candidate-Member of the Politburo of the Yugoslav Communist Party.↩
- Telegram 1939, September 10, from Moscow, not printed, commented that this message “provides excellent analysis Tito–Cominform conflict which from Moscow viewpoint appears thoroughly sound.” (860H.00/9–1048)↩