Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/5–1548: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret
urgent

New York, May 15, 1948—2:30 p. m.

653. From Ross. Beeley came in this morning at his request and read me two telegrams from London as follows:

A. The first telegram dealt with legal questions involved in the problem of recognition and the relation of this problem to possible situations in the SC re Palestine. This telegram may be summarized as follows:

1. Foreign Office view is that it is not correct to consider that the 29 November resolution establishes a legal basis for creation of a Jewish state.

2. The residual authority over Palestine does not revert to the principal allied and associated powers.

(a) The Treaty of Lausanne merely involved a renunciation of Turkish sovereignty without any specific renunciation of authority to the principal allied and associated powers.

(b) It is very doubtful whether these powers can still be regarded as existing as an entity.

(c) It is more than probable that even if these powers had had any rights over Palestine they would have been extinguished when the mandate was duly constituted.

3. With the end of the mandate and pending the emergence of one or more states in Palestine to which international recognition can be accorded, Palestine will be res nullius (belonging to nobody—?).¹ Theoretically sovereignty will probably lie in the people of Palestine but it will be latent and there will be no international entity recognizable as a sovereign state or states in or comprising Palestine.

4. The practical consequences of this doctrine are:

(a) Pending some new decision by the UN claims to recognition cannot be supported by appeal to UN authority.

(b) As regards action by other (Arab) states leaving aside aggressive action (use of armed force) there is probably nothing in law to prevent acts of a peaceful character directed to the setting up by other state or states a government or governments in Palestine or to incorporate part of the country in the territory of neighboring states, provided such other state or states concerned were not acting inconsistently with an Assembly resolution by which they could be regarded as bound.

5. Concrete applications of Foreign Office doctrine as follows:

(a) If the Jews claim to set up a state within the November frontiers and the Arabs governing the whole of Palestine, there is nothing legally to choose between these claims. (It is recognized, however, that public opinion particularly in the US would give an appearance of legality to the November 29 resolution.)

(b) If the Arab armies invade the territory of Palestine without coming into conflict with the Jews, they would not necessarily be doing anything illegal or contrary to the Charter.

(c) If Arabs crossed the November frontier they would not ipsa facto be doing anything illegal.

(d) If Arabs come into conflict with Jews a situation undoubtedly would be created which the SC would be asked to take cognizance of as a breach of the peace.

B. Beeley’s second telegram instructed him to say to us privately that US action in recognizing the Jewish govt seems to have an important bearing on our truce proposals. He is further instructed to ask what we intend to do about the truce proposals in the light of US recognition action.

Beeley observed that he imagined Foreign Office had Article 7 of truce proposals in mind.

I told Beeley that I had no specific instructions but I understood that the general view of the Dept was that the truce efforts should be pushed because we were naturally just as much interested as ever in putting a stop to the fighting. Speaking personally I said I thought that the previously proposed Articles of truce would have to be reviewed carefully in the light of the new situation.

Beeley said he understood British Embassy Washington had been instructed to raise same question with Dept. I would appreciate it if Dept can keep us closely informed here of any exchanges with British in Washington.

In concluding my conversation and in light of call of SC meeting this afternoon, we discussed briefly the question of the status of the JA as representing the Jewish people before the SC. I have just discussed this with Rusk on the phone and we would appreciate getting fairly fully developed views of the Dept as this question may arise fairly soon in SC if not this afternoon. [Ross.]

Austin

1. As in the source text.