501.BB Palestine/5–1648
The Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie) to the Secretary of State
personal
My Dear Secretary of State, I am sending to you with this a copy of a secret and personal letter which I have sent to all permanent members of the Security Council in connection with the communication from the Egyptian Government dated 15 May 1948, which is now being considered by the Council.
You will appreciate, I am sure, the position which I have taken as Secretary-General in this matter. My primary concern is for the future usefulness of the United Nations and its Security Council.
I am convinced that the Security Council must act decisively and quickly in dealing with this matter under the Charter, irrespective whether its efforts succeed or fail. If the Security Council, by slow and ineffective action, permits the Egyptian Government, through the use of its forces, to establish a de facto position beyond its own frontiers, then I believe a precedent will have been created which will prejudice the future usefulness both of the United Nations and its Security Council. I must do everything in my power to prevent this.
Time is the vital factor in this situation. The longer action by the Security Council is delayed, the less chance will there be of halting the forces which are now in movement. I appreciate the political factors which might influence certain Great Powers to let matters in the Middle East take their course, but I am convinced beyond all doubt that if this happens—when the case has already been brought [Page 1000] to the attention of the Security Council—that the Security Council will have destroyed its usefulenss, and indeed will have created a precedent for any nation to take aggressive action in direct contravention to the Charter of the United Nations.
I have been informed of some of the difficulties which presently exist between the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom in approaching this problem. For this reason, because of the great influence those two powers can exercise [with others] in ensuring that effective action is taken in the Security Council, and because time was so short, I was most anxious that you and your Under-Secretary of State should have been consulted personally on this matter so that you might have known my views and so that—with your concurrence—I might have been able to approach the British Government in dealing with this vital problem.
I appreciated that my personal presence in Washington at this time could have been misinterpreted, and for that reason from 7:00 p. m. on Saturday evening last efforts were made to arrange for my personal representative to wait on you and Mr. Lovett. I greatly regret this consultation could not take place for if there had been any action which I could have taken as Secretary-General to influence the Government of the United Kingdom and other Governments, I would have been prepared to do so, and if necessary to despatch my personal representative to London immediately after he had reported to me the result of the consultation in Washington.
Yours sincerely,