501.BB Palestine/9–348
Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Formulation of Joint UK–US Position on Palestine Settlement.
I attach Mr. Douglas’ telegrams 3879, 3880, and 3881 of August 27, reproducing a proposed British working paper which might form [Page 1372] the framework for Count Bernadotte’s recommendations for a peaceful adjustment of the Palestine problem, together with London’s subsequent telegram 3927, September 1, setting forth a suggested timetable whereby Bernadotte’s suggestions could be formulated and then approved by the Security Council. I likewise attach the Department’s No. 72 to Tel Aviv, September 1, which sketches our views on a possible territorial settlement in Palestine, as approved by President Truman on September 1. The last enclosure is our telegram to Ambassador Douglas sent the same day, No. 3468, which indicates that our territorial views are almost identical with those of Foreign Secretary Bevin, but that we have pending for further study his suggestion that the Security Council in effect will lay down a permanent frontier for Israel and regard failure to respect this line as a breach of the truce which would call for sanctions under Chapter VII.
The issues before this afternoon’s meeting would seem to be not the question of what the best frontiers for Israel would be, since the UK, US, and Count Bernadotte are all in general agreement. Rather, what must be presently determined are the following points:
- a.
- Should the Security Council affirm Bernadotte’s suggestions by possible Chapter VII action?
- b.
- Should the Security Council seek to affirm Bernadotte’s suggestions in light of the probability that, given UK–US agreement on a line of policy, the USSR may veto any recommendation we seek to have the Council support?
- c.
- Should the General Assembly endeavor to make recommendations in support of Count Bernadotte’s suggestions?
- d.
- What timetable of action should be adopted by the US, UK, and the Mediator?
For what they are worth, my own views are that quite aside from the Charter grounds for possible Security Council action to enforce a political settlement in Palestine it would be inexpedient to bring the issue before the Council, because of almost certain Soviet opposition to any just settlement. It would similarly be inexpedient to ventilate the issue further in the Assembly unless there were prior acquiescence by both Arabs and Jews and one or both required the extra stimulus of an Assembly recommendation in order to convert their public opinion to accept a given settlement. I would suggest that the United Nations role at this delicate juncture should be confined to the activities of the Mediator and that the final pressures to be applied in order to achieve acquiescence to the Mediator’s recommendations should be largely through diplomatic channels. Naturally, the Security Council would continue to discharge its responsibility for the maintenance of the truce in Palestine.