501.BB Palestine/9–348: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret

3962. Bevin being absent substance Department’s 3468, 3469 September 11 was conveyed September 2 to Sir Orme Sargent, Wright and Burrows. I have no doubt that Bevin’s personal reaction will be as favorable as that of officials named to the general tenor of these messages. Because British Cabinet has given FonOff full authority to approach Mediator in conjunction with us (my 3879, August 27) and because Department’s forthright approach to PGI has considerably advanced the matter, FonOff officials lost no time in formulating definitive British views which follow:

2. FonOff considers Department’s action in putting to PGI through special representative McDonald substance of US–UK thinking has added major new element to situation. Officials were pleased by the character and content of line taken by Department with Israel. At the same time they point out that there is extreme danger of leaks occurring in Tel Aviv. They fear that if through leaks a Jewish-American label should become attached to US–UK thinking this would stiffen Arab resistance to proposals when US and UK voice support for Mediator and ask Arab States to acquiesce in them. Officials feel it important that from moment proposals become known they should carry as label “Mediator—made in Sweden.”

Since FonOff has cabinet authority to approach Mediator with proposals, officials suggest that time table in my 3927 September 1 should be speeded up and US–UK proposals placed in hands of Mediator by US and UK at earliest possible moment. As put by one official “now cat is half out of bag, quicker bag is handed to Mediator the better.”

3. Officials believe desirability early action with Mediator seems to be supported by recent press reports from Rhodes to effect that Mediator may summon Jews and Arabs there in relatively near future and that he may report to SC on or about September 20.

4. While officials see that there would be some advantage in knowing in advance Israeli reactions to US representations, they see no objection and much to be gained by US and UK taking parallel action with Mediator in very near future without reference to PGI response.

5. Re US approach to PGI, officials inquired whether it meant that Department is coming around to view that circumstances are such that USG will be largely responsible for dealing with PGI and British Government for dealing with Arabs. Embassy replied that it doubted [Page 1374] that Department had given up principle of similar approaches by US and UK to both Arabs and Jews (paragraph 5 Department’s 3187, August 12). Incidentally FonOff recently queried Arab capitals as to effectiveness US–UK approach as compared to approach by UK alone. Replies received today show that British Chiefs of Missions almost unanimously express preference for joint approach. Is Embassy’s reply correct?

6. FonOff study Department’s messages has given rise to certain queries. FonOff asked whether Department’s 3469 in light of Department’s 3468 constitutes Department’s reply to my 3880 and 3881 August 27. In particular officials asked whether they might assume that paragraph 1 Department’s 3468 means that US concurs with ideas re Israeli frontiers as set forth in my reference messages. On basis paragraph 4 and 10 of Department’s 3469 re Jerusalem they asked whether they could assume that US does not favor Jewish corridor to Jerusalem. Officials noted that Department did not refer to free port at Haifa and expressed hope that US still regards this as important point. Officials also hoped that Department’s strong line with PGI re Arab refugees (paragraph 5 Department’s 3469) would prove effective and that US agrees that Mediator’s proposals should refer specifically to Arab refugees (my 3880, paragraph 15).

7. Officials were pleased to learn that Department would be content with acquiescence of parties to an equitable settlement since all evidence available to them (see my 3954 September 32) is unfortunately, to effect that face to face negotiations are presently out of question and that Abdullah of Transjordan is not strong enough to ride out storm which would arise in Arab states were he to embark on bilateral negotiations with PGI.

8. Officials understand fully Department’s desire to study constitutional aspects (paragraph 2 Department’s 3468) of SC power to lay down a permanent frontier for Israel. They remarked that they would welcome Department’s views in this regard and said they were not unshakably wedded to their conclusions if Department had some better ideas. They are inclined to consider this problem “secondary” although they reiterated belief that prolonged debate on Palestine issue at UNGA would be unfortunate. Officials were glad to know that Department has succeeded in convincing Mediator that it would be unwise for him to report in first instance to GA.

9. Wright expressed personal view that despite serious risks of leak (paragraph 2 above) Department’s action in giving such a categorical warning to PGI was well-timed since uneasy character truce continues to be matter meriting deep concern. He said that FonOff is continuing to urge utmost restraint upon Arabs and mentioned in this connection [Page 1375] paragraph 8 of British policy guidance Embassy’s 3909 August 30.3 He added that additional warning in same sense will be despatched to all Middle East Missions very shortly.

10. Both Sargent and Wright expressed strong hope that US will agree to joint approach to Mediator (paragraph 2 above) along lines of stage two (paragraph 3 Embassy’s 3927 September 1) since they understand from Department’s telegrams under reference that stage one is now virtually concluded.

Douglas
  1. Regarding the latter, see footnote 2, p. 1369.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed; this paragraph directed British diplomatic representatives in the Near East to emphasize to Arab leaders the importance of not breaking the trace; The paragraph also stressed that resumption of fighting would be welcomed by and profitable to the Jews, especially if responsibility could be pinned on the Arabs (501.BB Palestine/8–3048).