Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

Under Secretary’s Meetings, Lot 53 D 250

Record of the Under Secretary’s Meeting, September 16, 1949, Department of State¹

top secret

[Washington, September 16, 1949.]

1. Yugo-Moscow Controversy as Related to U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives (D–60²) (Top Secret)

The major issues developed in the discussion of the above paper were:

(a) The reaction the United States should have in the event that the Soviet attacks Yugoslavia. Mr. Kennan believed that the U.S. should let the Yugoslavs bring the matter before the U.S. [U.N.], and the U.S. should simply treat the matter as a breach of the peace within the framework of the UN procedures. (Mr. Reams believed that the Yugoslavs would bring the matter to the UN.) Mr. Fisher believed that such an attack should be recognized by this Government as an act of aggression, as it would be, and that such recognition would not involve us in the Tightness or wrongness of the causes preliminary thereto. Mr. Kennan expressed the fear that such a recognition would further confuse our public and the world public since those publics already have difficulty in distinguishing the difference between our dislike of Communism in any form from the practical conditions which dictate our assistance to Tito.

(b) Page 7, paragraph 8³—Should this measure be tightened in order to insure that there will be sufficient resources available to Tito to prevent his giving up if attacked by the Soviet? Messrs. Perkins and McGhee were firmly of the belief that such strengthening of the measures should apply. Mr. Fisher pointed out that MAP would offer no assistance in this regard.

(c) Whereas Mr. Kennan’s point of view conceived that an attack by the Soviets on Tito would be a local affair, Mr. Radius pointed out that the first sentence on page 2⁴ indicated that this would represent a threat to the security of Greece and Italy. Mr. Kennan agreed that this was inconsistent with the rest of the paper and his point of view. Messrs. Webb, McGhee, Perkins and Hickerson believed rather that such an attack would be the beginning of a series of a chain of events which would lead toward a major war.

(d) There seemed to be a difference of opinion as between Messrs. Kennan and McGhee et al on the effect of such an attack upon the European populations. Mr. Kennan felt that such an attack would open a Pandora’s box for the Russians and would bring about an impossible occupation problem for them, since the Yugoslav guerrillas could hold out for a very long time and this would show the other people where they would end up under the Soviets. He conceived this would increase the trend toward defection. On the other hand, it was suggested the likelihood that such an attack would illustrate to those who had thought of defecting the hopelessness of their case in the face of Soviet strength and determination.

Mr. Webb and others in discussing the steps which might be taken to better inform the public raised the possibilities of background briefing for the press or speeches on our policy toward Yugoslavia. Mr. Kennan thought this should be handled very carefully and would have to be done over and over again in order to insure that our attitude toward the Yugoslavs is clear. Mr. Nitze pointed out that such preparations were already under way in the Public Affairs area. Mr. Schwinn is planning to bring a paper to him shortly for examination. Mr. Wilgus may wish to check on how these preparations are coming.

Reference was made to the concern expressed by Mr. Bevin to the Secretary on the crucial nature of the next six or eight months in Yugoslavia because of the economic situation and his inquiry as to what could be done about it.⁵ Mr. Reams pointed out that there is adequate food supply but there is great need in the field of mining, forestry and transportation equipment, the last being necessary to meet a dire need of food distribution.

1. The following officers attended the meeting:

   Under Secretary of State James Webb (Chairman)

   Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State (Deputy Chairman)

   William Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence

   W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

   Adrian S. Fisher, Legal Adviser

   John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs George F. Kennan, Director, Policy Planning Staff

   George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs

   Willard F. Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs

   Robert D. Murphy, Director, Office of German and Austrian Affairs

   George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

   John E. Peurifoy, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

   Dallas W. Dort, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

   Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff

   Walter A. Radius, Director, Office of Transport and Communications

   James Q. Reber, Special Assistant, Executive Secretariat

   Robert B. Reams, Counselor of the Embassy in Yugoslavia (in Washington for consultation)

   This record was presumably prepared by Reber. Regarding the establishment of the Under Secretary’s meetings, see footnote 1 to the minutes of the meeting of February 14, p. 863.

2. Same as document P.P.S. 60, September 12, p. 947.
3. The reference here is to the final paragraph of Section I of P.P.S. 60.
4. The reference here is to first sentence of the sixth paragraph of P.P.S. 60 which begins: “Soviet success in destroying the Tito regime.…”
5. For the Secretary of State’s memorandum of his conversation with Foreign Secretary Bevin and Foreign Minister Schuman on September 15, see supra.