760H.61/9–1649
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)1
Subject: Suggestions Regarding Policy To Be Followed in Relation to Yugoslav-Moscow Controversy.
With reference to the discussion at the Under Secretary’s meeting September 16 on the Yugoslav paper (UM D–60),2 I should like to submit the following observations:
If the Soviet Union should succeed in re-establishing in Yugoslavia a subservient, government such as existed prior to the Tito-Cominform break in June 1948, the consequences with respect to Greece would be most serious. The blow to Greek morale would be tremendous, and the opportunities for renewed and intensified guerrilla pressure on Greece would obviously be great. I have grave doubts that we could, over a period of time, save Greece from Communist domination under such circumstances.
If the Soviet Union were to establish itself in direct control of Yugoslavia, with Soviet officials running the country and Soviet troops stationed on its territory, the results would be even more disastrous for Greece. I believe the pressure which would then be brought on Greece would certainly cause the failure of our efforts to preserve it.
In view of this picture, I feel strongly that we should be prepared to take positive action, within the limitations of over-all policy, to support the Tito regime against the overt type of attack envisaged in Sections I and II of the paper under consideration. Specifically, I think we should be ready to rush all needed military and other supplies to Tito as soon as any attack is launched. We should be able to assure Tito, or any other or successor group resisting the USSR, that this support would be forthcoming in the event of open attack. Our objective should be to assist Tito, by every available means short of involving ourselves directly in the conflict, to maintain control at least of the more defensible mountain areas of Yugoslavia.
If, despite our assistance, the Tito Government should lose control [Page 962] of the greater part of the country and be reduced to carrying on guerrilla warfare against the USSR and its satellites, I believe we should continue our support and should utilize Greek territory for the support of Yugoslav guerrillas just as the Cominform has used Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav territory for the support of Greek guerrillas in Greece. Under these circumstances, the mountainous nature of the terrain and the difficulty of sealing the Greek frontier would work to our advantage arid to the disadvantage of the Cominform. It would seem probable, furthermore, that many more Yugoslavs could be recruited to fight as guerrillas in Yugoslavia than the Communists have been able to enlist from among Greeks to fight in Greece. By using these methods, we would at least have some hope of keeping the Cominform so occupied with maintaining its position in Yugoslavia that it would not have time to devote to the overthrow of the Greek Government.
I would suggest that EUR be assigned the responsibility for working out a plan for the support of Tito along positive lines, such as those suggested above. NEA will of course be glad to assist in any such planning.