761.00/4–1249: Airgram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State
A–370. While Budapest’s tel. 522 to Dept. April 51 advances several plausible reasons why Sov. Union might be tempted to incorporate now certain satellite states, including Hungary, and while this general [Page 14] question continues one on which only speculation is possible, Embassy is still inclined to regard satellite incorporation as a long-range future rather than imminent development.
Despite the lack of specific detail, basic Marxist doctrine clearly implies existence of this goal. In particular, mention may be made of Stalin’s historic oath to “consolidate and extend the Union of Republics”, which was repeated in Pospelov’s2 Jan. 21 speech on Lenin’s anniversary. Reference should also be made to passage in Stalin’s “Problems of Leninism” (11th Ed. pp. 49–52), in which Stalin refers to:”… that remarkable organization for the collaboration of nations which is called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and which is the living prototype of the future union of nations in a single world economic system”. At the same time, Leninist-Stalinist dogma throws, as far as Embassy knows, little if any light on the conditions (i.e. timetable) of incorporation of new areas into the Soviet Union. The standard treatment of the “nationalities” problem, under prevailing world conditions, stresses the theoretical right of “secession” rather than adherence to the Soviet Union.
However, it seems reasonable to argue that basic dogma would prefer that states to be incorporated should be “ripe”, i.e., patterned on Sov. Union, and that the present development of eastern Europe is in fact based partly on this objective. The satellite states are still clearly only “building Socialism” (compare my A–11 Jan. 53 and 212 Jan. 274), while the Sov. Union is now allegedly advancing from a Socialist state towards Communism. Though the Sov. Union, both during and following World War II, incorporated certain territories (Baltic states, Bessarabia, and parts of Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Prussia) without their being politically and economically “ripe”, political-historical claims “justified” their outright [Page 15] absorption and special circumstances required immediate action, precluding the possibility of first establishing and developing people’s democracies there.
While the short-term objective of establishing firm Soviet control has already been generally achieved, we believe other considerations are still likely to deter the Kremlin from satellite incorporation in the near future, particularly the fact that most of the advantages thereof can be quietly achieved by present methods without dealing a fatal blow to the current “nationalist” line of communist forces in other parts of Europe and the world at large (compare mytels 2098 Sept. 235 and 253 Feb. 9, 19486). The Sov. Govt, already has its hands full both at home and abroad and is likely to prefer the continuation of the satellite setup, whereby local communist stooges execute policy details and Moscow ostensibly avoids direct responsibility for difficulties and shortcomings. Continuing popular fears of German revival and aggression might also influence the Kremlin to preserve the present pattern, through which the Sov. Union is able to pose as the satellites’ defender and thus keep them dependent and submissive. Two minor considerations might also be mentioned. Direct incorporation now would possibly increase the difficulty, already serious enough, of persuading the satellite populations that their participation in the Soviet bloc is aimed at raising their living standards rather than benefiting the USSR. And though, as pointed out in Budapest’s 522, an attempt would certainly be made to avoid the loss of UN representation and voting strength, it appears doubtful that the non-communist member states would now be susceptible to the considerations which may have justified the special status given White Russia and the Ukraine while the common life-and-death struggle against fascism was still in progress.
While the Kremlin evidently views the present world situation as one warranting behind-the-eurtain “consolidation”, as also noted by Legation Budapest, the indications are that Moscow is still hoping and planning for further advances in the near future, at least in the Far and Near East, if not even in Europe. As long as the Berlin blockade can be used to pressure the western occupants and the present political impasse in western Germany continues, the Soviets are undoubtedly still hopeful of making eventual progress in this “key” [Page 16] country. Likewise, despite the present status of the “Varga controversy”, they are presumably still looking forward to economic reverses, possibly even a major depression, in the US-led western world in the next year or two, or at least after termination of EKP. For those reasons, they seem likely to refrain from steps, such as satellite incorporation, which might impair or jeopardize their ability to exploit such possibilities.
Whether the Kremlin’s obvious desire to liquidate Tito is likely to increase the desirability of satellite incorporation now depends on the methods to be used. As indicated in mytel 829 April 4,7 Embassy still feels the Soviets will refrain from direct military action and are desirous of remaining ostensibly in the background. From this viewpoint, it seems preferable to retain the present setup of satellite pressures against neighboring Yugoslavia. And though the Kremlin continues to devote serious attention to the problem of Titoism (i.e. nationalist deviations) throughout the satellite area, Embassy seriously doubts that Moscow really fears or anticipates that the Western Powers are likely to succeed in “splitting off successively Albania, Bulgaria, etc.”, as suggested by Budapest Legation. As a matter of fact, the speed with which Gomulka was liquidated in Poland, together with the more recent purges in Albania and Bulgaria, suggests that the Soviets are confident of their ability to keep the remaining satellite states in line.
Though still undoubtedly somewhat bothered by the presence of western diplomatic missions in the satellite areas, the Soviets presumably have every hope of isolating these centers of pernicious influence and information within the next year or two as effectively as has been accomplished in Moscow.
The above is admittedly speculative reasoning and no certain conclusions can be drawn. In fact, the question of the Kremlin’s “timetable” regarding eventual satellite incorporation remains one of the most intriguing facing western analysts and possibly the Kremlin itself.
- Not printed. It reassessed the possibility of steps “in the not too distant future” to incorporate the Eastern European satellite states into the USSR. Such an action might serve to speed the consolidation of Communist power in Eastern Europe. It might also be viewed by Soviet leaders as a means of forestalling the growth of nationalism and independence encouraged by the success of Yugoslavia in resisting Cominform pressure. Incorporation of the satellites might also facilitate the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and result in the exclusion of Western diplomatic missions from Eastern European capitals (864.00/4–549).↩
- Petr Nikolaevich Pospelov, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Editor of Pravda, the official organ of the Party. For a long extract of the speech under reference here, see Margaret Carlyle, Editor, Documents on International Affairs 1949–1950, Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 126–129.↩
- Not printed. It observed that the merger in December 1948 of the Polish Workers’ Party and the Polish Socialist Party into the United Polish Workers’ Party completed the “shot gun marriages” of Socialist and Communist Parties throughout Eastern Europe and brought 1948 to a close with all effective power concentrated in the hands of Communist-dominated “united workers” parties whose rivals had been reduced to the status of mere scenery prolonging the illusion of parliamentary democracy. The Embassy in Moscow concluded that future internal developments within the Eastern European states would include the following: (1) further consolidation of the remaining non-Communist parties and their eventual elimination; (2) liquidation of the remaining capitalist elements from the economy; (3) completion of the “communization” of education and elimination of such remaining centers of independent thought as the Catholic Church (800.00B/1–549).↩
- Ante, p. 1.↩
- Not printed; it advanced the view that the incorporation of Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European satellites into the USSR was not currently necessary to the Soviet Union in order to ensure full obedience and might in fact tend to disturb domination of the satellites (761.00/9–2348).↩
- This telegram presented an analysis of Soviet reactions to plans for a possible Balkan Federation. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, p. 293.↩
- Post, p. 880.↩