893.00/3–249: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:45 p. m.]
339. ReContel 260, February 19, second paragraph.80 Following are two natural points view re results of Yen mission: 1, peace possible; 2, peace improbable. Ex-Mayor Ho Ssu-yuan expresses first point view contending difficulties now experienced by Communists likely turn them to peaceful path. He points out peace talks and acceptance by Nanking of eight points first offered by Communists as peace condition have developed on Communist side as well as on national peace psychology, that anticipation and desire peace now growing among Communist troops as well general population. On economic side he points out absence integrated economic plans, coupled with popular disappointments regarding situation existing after Communists occupied Peiping, Tientsin, has made difficulties such as to give Communists pause. As examples he pointed out that 70,000 dock workers Tientsin now lie idle; that whereas before Peiping was allocated approximately 700,000 bags flour monthly none is now coming in; that monetary problems are unsolved.
Ho said March 1 that Yen mission came for exchange views; that mission desired discover whether Communists were prepared make any concessions (for unless they made concession, particularly re point one, there was no hope); that they took back no formal proposals but undoubtedly would discuss matters Nanking. He believed there would be further exchange views with Nanking delegates perhaps coming to Peiping; that in meantime PCC meeting scheduled be called here in March would be postponed pending developments other lines. If expressing March 1 general belief peace possible, be it noted that he seemed less hopeful than last week when he opined he might himself go south with peace delegation to assist (he may have desired escape).
Typifying second line thought is contention old time police official that peace most improbable. He explains this mission received because it would have been impolite refuse proffered visit prominent leader statesmen like Yen and Shao Li-tzu, that Communists experienced no loss in letting them come but would not have profited by keeping them away. He holds that there is no common ground for compromise between such unlike groups. Another Chinese commenting along same lines expressed belief Communists “would endeavor cheat Li Tsung-jen just like they cheated Fu Tso-yi”.
[Page 158]Invite attention to parallels between present situation and that prevailing 1927 when Communists proposed stop Hankow instead of proceeding Shanghai with risk revolution. All Communist ideology is directed toward avoidance compromise basic revolutionary aims. It seems highly improbable Communists could reach agreement with Nanking Government on anything above surrender level and avoid political compromise of aims they presently hold or even that they could accept total surrender Nanking and take responsibility for South China without compromise basic economic principles. It would seem more likely that they desire now stop military advance long enough consolidate present gains with military government period continuing in meantime North China and this area effectively autonomous in respect to Manchuria; that in due course by plan “breakdown negotiations with Nanking” would be announced at PCC held Peiping; that subsequently there would be set up coalition government exclusive Nanking elements but including Li Chi-shen groups for window dressing but with Communists effectively in control; and that Communists’ aim at achieving ultimate political military control all China proper only after 1950 or later. Tung Pi-wu incidentally was quoted as stating in speech before cultural leaders February 20 (Contel 274, February 2181) that people should not expect achievement revolutionary aims too soon; that it would probably be 5 years before changes were perceptible; and that in order to achieve present aims of revolution 30 years would be requisite. Primary objective Communists by all logic must be presumed to be maintenance integrity their political line and all Soviet force, whether persuasive or organizational, could be expected support that line. Major Communist concerns for present, therefore, are presumably (1) consolidation of gains and (2) prevention consolidation Nationalist regime with or without outside help. Granted difficulties facing them in present circumstances their aim logically cannot be peace which would in actuality increase political dangers for them. They would in latter case cease be Communists.
Sent Department, repeated Nanking and Canton.