803.00/3–249: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 3—1:55 a. m.]
Cantel 92. Chen Tai-chu, Director American Section Foreign Office, again expressed to me today his belief peace negotiations might [Page 159] last for long time and might be successful (my 80, February 24, repeated Nanking 78, Shanghai 48). He remains convinced that there exists in Communist ranks serious difference of opinion between those who believe in desirability granting Nationalists reasonable peace and then attaining control through pattern set Eastern Europe, and those who insist on continuance military operations.
I am becoming convinced there may be something in what he says. Communists are not exercising their military capabilities. They have not attempted cross Yangtze, nor have they attacked Nanking or even shown their disrespect for that city by shelling it. They have permitted continuation of peace campaign during period prolonged military inactivity. The longer troops remain inactive, the more difficult it becomes to renew battle. This is true of Communists equally with Nationalists. Also strategy Acting President Li has been most successful in placing onus on Communists should fighting be renewed. Li has demonstrated most clearly that he is willing to go to almost any extreme regardless of his own prestige to attain reasonable peace. Communists realize war weariness of people exists in Communist areas as well as in those occupied by Nationalists. Therefore, after prolonged negotiations, during which resumption of postal, telegraph and transport facilities will take place, psychological situation will be reached where it seems unlikely fighting can be resumed. We know that Li Tsung-jen seeks: (1) Territorial arrangement which would give him opportunity demonstrate superiority democratic processes, or failing that (2) federation leaving considerable regional autonomy, thus also providing opportunity demonstrate superiority democratic processes; or (3) coalition in which Kmt and other elements would participate as group; and finally, failing even this, resumption of hostilities.
It is difficult to believe Communists would accept either territorial or federal arrangement, but it is entirely possible they may accept coalition even though in its early stages Kmt and others enter as units possibly after purging certain principal “war criminals”. Such an arrangement should be attractive to Communists. They would take over functioning Nationalist and Provincial Government machinery. They would assume control of Nationalist Government already recognized internationally and would, in fact, assure eventual attainment their aims without that renewal of hostilities so dreaded by war-weary people. I do not believe, therefore, that we can rule out possibility Communists may change tactics and permit Li’s peace negotiations to succeed. Should Sun Fo fail and be replaced by Shao Li-tze, possibility such development would increase.
I believe we could expect the Western leaders to go along with Li provided certain amount regional autonomy was recognized. Only fly in ointment is, of course, Generalissimo. He is most certainly one [Page 160] of “war criminals” and Li cannot deliver him over to Communists. He is still power to be reckoned with and should he see Li’s peace efforts succeeding, he might re-emerge in defense of “democratic principles” and assume defense of his prepared bastion in the Foochow–Amoy–Taiwan triangle.
Sent Department; repeated Nanking 89, Shanghai 58, Moscow 4.