128. Report From the National Security Council to President Truman1

SUBJECT

  • Brief on No. 7, “The Foreign Intelligence Program,” NSC 135

The basic handicap of the program is, of course, the paucity of intelligence of all types, covert and overt, on the Soviet Orbit. Nevertheless, atomic estimates, though still uncertain, are more reliable than a year ago. A number of “finds” in Soviet electronics and telecommunications have been made. Intelligence on air defense and on basic scientific research is improved. New economic sources and techniques promise better intelligence on Soviet military production. Use of foreign radio broadcasts was good. Target research progressed. The NIS program (world-wide encyclopedic data) is 45% complete on the 24 highest-priority areas, and 22% complete as a whole. NATO intelligence requirements are being met.

Despite the fact that espionage within the Orbit has failed to produce significant results, outside the Orbit it is generally good. A number of stay-behind nets have been established.

Improvement is needed in coordination between intelligence and policy and between intelligence and operational planning, although the [Page 328] national estimates are now effectively drawing upon governmental resources. Political, social, and cultural intelligence research-in-depth is needed for areas outside the Orbit. Enemy long-range plans and intentions, especially in Korea, are not known. Knowledge of the Soviet guided missile program is poor. Collection by the Service attachés is inadequate. Further exploitation of aerial reconnaissance is indicated. Knowledge of Soviet work in the field of radio jamming and in biological and chemical warfare is inadequate. Psychological and economic warfare have created unparalleled demands for intelligence.

There is no guarantee that intelligence will be able to furnish adequate warning of attack prior to actual detection of hostile formations. Certain last-minute defensive and offensive preparations may, however, be detected; opportunities for such detection vary from fair (in Germany and Korea) to extremely poor (in Transcaucasia and Southeast Asia).

  1. Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files. Top Secret; Security Information. This is a summary prepared by the NSC Reporting Unit of a 12-page report (Report No. 7 of NSC 135, “Status of United States Programs for National Security”) prepared by CIA with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The full report is ibid. It omits paragraph 5, which is printed as Enclosure 3 to Document 127.