310.2/8–1150
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Message From Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks Dated 11th August1
Chinese Representation in the United Nations
I have made a careful study of Mr. Acheson’s most helpful letter of August 4th and I should like you to put to him the following considerations:—
2. In the first place I should like Mr. Acheson to know what I mean by considering the question of Chinese representation on its merits. I would certainly agree that the present debate in the Security Council, in view of the way it has developed, would make it impossible to consider the question on its merits. Before the debate opened I had supposed it possible that the item on Chinese representation, if considered after the item on Korea, might have been discussed on its merits. What I am now thinking of is that this issue may be raised, possibly by India, on a separate occasion (which would probably not be until after Malik has left the Chair), and in its own context and not in the context of Korea. In that event I think we should be very unwise to drag in Korea if the Russians do not do so. Whether other members would be influenced by the consideration that China has on the whole taken the Russian line on the Korean question I do not know.
3. But what I mean by considering the case on its merits is that the Security Council (or the Assembly if it comes to that Body) could consider whether the Peking Government should or should not occupy the seat now occupied by the Nationalist representatives. If [Page 260] that question is put to the vote in the circumstances I have described, I think Mr. Acheson should know that we shall feel obliged to vote for the Peking Government, even if our vote does not secure the necessary majority. In this connexion I should like Mr. Acheson to know that I maintain my view that the matter should preferably be considered in the Security Council, rather than the General Assembly.
4. I will try to explain why I feel that we should vote in this way. Our attitude towards this question has been governed from the outset by the fact that any question relating to China is essentially an Asian problem, on which Asian countries have strong views to which they are entitled. I have always regarded Asia as a whole and I believe that we must not regard our attitude towards one country in Asia in isolation without considering what the effect is going to be on the whole land mass. I cannot ignore the views of India, Pakistan and Ceylon on a question like China. Briefly, our attitude is that the Peking Government is without any shadow of doubt the Government of China and that the Nationalist Delegation in the United Nations represents nothing but a small remnant in Formosa, which in turn represents nothing but itself. It is, further, that Western nations have no right to refuse the admission of the Peking Government just because they do not like its politics or its ideology. It is arguable that we have no right to debar China from the deliberations of the United Nations of which it is a Charter member. It is also arguable that we extend to China even less favourable treatment than we do to Russia which is recognised by all to be at the very root of all the trouble in the United Nations. I think it is very hard to counter these arguments or to justify the continued exclusion of the representatives of the Peking Government from the United Nations. In these circumstances I feel we must vote for China. Our vote may not prevail. But I do not feel we can ignore Asian opinion on this Asian question.
5. Mr. Acheson may ask what advantage we would expect to derive from seating a Peking representative in the Security Council. To this I would answer that there will certainly be no immediate advantage. I think we must recognise that there will be concrete disadvantages, for even without dictation from Moscow (which I do not believe China will necessarily accept) we must expect that on most occasions China will vote the same way as the Soviet Union. But if Chinese behaviour in the United Nations is as bad as that of the Soviet Union, there will be the negative advantage that she will be exposed to Asia for what she is. I would consider that as of the greatest value in solidifying South and South East Asia against China if she proves to be as bad as all that.
6. That is however the worst case. Mr. Acheson will be aware that I have always held the view that it is a mistake to seal China off from [Page 261] the West (in which I include India). Nothing has so far been said by Chinese leaders to indicate that they will refuse to accept China’s international obligations and it is by no means certain that China will refuse entirely to accept the standards of conduct laid down by the civilised world. It is by no means the case that everything today in China is bad, and the attitude of the Chinese Government towards those Powers which have accorded recognition, if aloof, is not hostile. No major political move has so far been made by China to which serious exception could be taken and, though we must be on guard, I do not think we should seek to convict a man before he has committed a crime, since this can only create a sense of injustice which will lead us nowhere.
7. I do not suggest that we can wean China away from her association with the Soviet Union, nor do I think we should try to do so. For if there is friction with the Soviet Union it must develop within China itself. But we must ask ourselves whether Tito would have broken from Moscow if he had had no hope whatever of any friendly association with the West and if Yugoslavia had not been a member of the United Nations. If China continues to be excluded from the United Nations, and if the attitude of the West continues to be coldly hostile, must she not come to the conclusion, even when the moment arrives when she would like to move away from Moscow, that she has no other course but to maintain her association?
8. Mr. Acheson asks whether the admission of China to the United Nations would not be a stimulus to communist aggression in Asia. I do not think so but I do think that the continuance of a policy which as regards representation at the United Nations is even more hostile to China than it is to Russia, will so aggravate the situation in Asia that we shall seriously weaken our own capacity to influence Asian peoples and greatly increase the chances of open hostility. Militarily neither we nor the United States want to become involved in hostilities with China. I think we must be very careful not to create the situation which invites such hostilities. I am very concerned at the increasing tension between the United States and China, now accentuated by the Fomosan situation. If this continues there may be an explosion and that I think we should both wish to avoid.
9. You will see from the above that I am not asking that the United States should do anything. I am saying that we shall have to vote for China when the time comes though we ourselves will not force the issue and will have to determine the appropriate moment. I appreciate that this decision will not be popular in the United States and that it may cause some outcry when the time comes. But for the reasons I have stated we shall have to follow this course, even if it does not secure the admission of China to the United Nations. If the matter [Page 262] is brought up in the Assembly I do not know how the voting will go but if the result should show a substantial cleavage between East and West I think the consequences will be very serious indeed. Those consequences will at any rate be minimised to the extent that our vote would be cast for China.
10. While I very well understand the feelings of the United States about the seating of the Peking regime, I have confidence that it is one of the great virtues of our democracies, that difficult subjects may be calmly discussed between them.
- Copy handed on August 14 to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Burrows).↩